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CHAPI'ER I 
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF MODERNITY: NATURE AND LINEAGE 
The rise of political mass movements based upon 
comprehensive intellectual systems has been widely 
recognized as one of the most prominent features of 
nineteenth and twentieth century political history. The 
impact of such movements, along with their apparent 
novelty, has in fact led certain scholars to characterize 
the last 150 years as the "Age of Ideology. 111 Although 
the impact of ideological movements has indeed been great, 
and while the ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries are certainly novel in important respects, the 
suspicion has persisted among many analysts of ideology 
that these movements cannot be understood simply as 
products of the political conditions or climate of opinion 
of the late modern period. Since ideologies such as 
Hegelianism, Marxism, fascism, progressivism and 
positivism continue to attract adherents long after the 
passing of the political conditions present during the 
lE.g., Henry David Aiken, The Age of Ideology: The 
Nineteenth Century Philosophers (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1957): Karl Dietrich Bracher, The Age of 
Ideology: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1985); Isaac Kramnick 
and Frederick M. Watkins, eds., The Age of Ideology: 
Political Thought 1750 to the Present (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1979). See also Eric 
Voegelin, Anamnesis (Notre Dame, Indiana, and London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 146. 
1 
2 
period of their development (and, some would argue, long 
after these ideologies have been decisively refuted), it 
is difficult to see how the generation and expansion of 
ideology can be explained by factors such as the events 
surrounding the advent of capitalism or the French 
Revolution or the breakup of feudal society. As a broader 
background seems to be needed in order to account for the 
diversity and persistence of ideological phenomena, much 
attention has been devoted to the "modern project" in 
general or to the various "waves" of modernity. 
Yet, in works such as Norman Cohn's The Pursuit of 
the Millennium, 
the patterns 
one can find reason to question whether 
of thought and activity typical of 
ideological movements can be contained even within the 
modern period as a whole. Cohn's analysis of the 
similarities between medieval millenarianism and modern 
ideological movements suggests that the movements of our 
age are not products of that age but, rather, 
manifestations of a pattern of psychic disorientation 
which may arise in widely varying cultural and political 
contexts. This line of thinking has been supported to 
some extent by sociological, 
historical research, but finds 
competent theoretical expression 
anthropological 
its fullest and 
in the work of 
and 
most 
Eric 
3 
voegelin. 2 In Voegelin's last writings the origins of 
ideological types of activism are traced not to modernity 
but to antiquity, and are explained as reactions not to 
particular circumstances but to the human condition 
itself. 
Voegelin's life-long effort to uncover the 
historical and intellectual roots of ideological activism 
was initiated by his early realization that "the academic 
institutions of the Western world, the various schools of 
philosophy, the rich manifold of methodologies, did not 
offer the intellectual instruments that would make the 
political movements ••. of Communism, Fascism, National 
Socialism, and racism, of constitutionalism, liberalism 
and authoritarianism ..• intelligible."3 A distinct and 
continuous theme running throughout Voegelin's voluminous 
writings is the argument that the proliferation of 
ideological movements is symptomatic of a deeper 
civilizational crisis. His career as a political 
scientist can be described as a search for (1) the 
wellsprings of the political crisis of modernity, (2) the 
analytical tools required to render it intelligible, and 
(3) sources for an appropriate therapy. While Voegelin's 
2see esp. Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., Millennial Dreams in 
Action: Essays in Comparative study (The Hague: Mouton, 
1962), passim. 
3voegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 3. 
4 
writings were by no means confined to the modern period, 
and although he was ultimately to find neither the cause 
nor the cure for the crisis within modernity, he 
frequently noted that his theoretical project as a whole 
should be understood as a response to "the spiritual 
disorder of our time, the civilizational crisis of which 
everyone so readily speaks."4 Given Voegelin's 
characterization of philosophy itself as "an act of 
resistance illuminated by conceptual understanding, n5 it 
is clear that an evaluation of his analysis of ideological 
phenomena must be central to any assessment of his stature 
as a political philosopher. 
As an introduction to Voegelin's analysis of the 
political crisis of modernity--and to the patterns of 
consciousness from which he believed the crisis has arisen 
--this chapter will be devoted to an examination of three 
central issues: 
consciousness? 
( 1) What is the nature of ideological 
(2) Can equivalents of ideological 
consciousness be found prior to the so-called Age of 
Ideology, and, if so, what characteristics unite or 
distinguish these patterns of consciousness? (3) What are 
the psychological or experiential foundations of 
4voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1968), p. 22. 
5voegelin, Order and History, Vol. III: Plato and 
Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1957) f p. 68. 
5 
disordered patterns of consciousness and how are we to 
explain 
attempt 
their 
will 
expansion 
be made 
during the modern period? An 
below to provide a concise 
formulation of Voegelin's argument as it pertains to these 
questions. To do so it will be necessary to introduce a 
generic concept of "pneumapathological" consciousness, as 
well as a conceptual framework which will help to clarify 
the basic varieties of that general pattern of experience 
and symbolization. Finally, several problems concerning 
Voegelin's method will be considered, and the chapter will 
close with an explication of the theoretical issues and 
analytical categories to be employed in the chapters which 
follow. 
The nature of ideological consciousness as Voegelin 
understood it is somewhat easier to grasp when 
distinguished from ideological systems and from disordered 
consciousness in general. For the purposes of this 
discussion ideological systems will be treated as 
constructs which are based upon a seemingly comprehensive 
account of reality and the human's place within it, and 
which are intended to provide a program for the trans-
formation of society. For Voegelin they are relatively 
recent in origin. Ideological consciousness, in contrast, 
was understood by Voegelin as a modern variant of a 
broader, more inclusive type of spiritually disordered or 
"closed" consciousness which can be found throughout 
6 
history. Indeed, Voegelin found examples of this generic 
form of consciousness, referred to here by the terms 
"pneumapathological consciousness" or "disorientation," in 
several of the earliest writings known to historians. 6 
Voegelin's argument does not imply that pre-modern 
writings in which pneumapathological consciousness is 
expressed are "ideologies" or ideological systems, since 
he maintained that such systems were simply unknown prior 
to the eighteenth century.7 Hence, it has been necessary 
to develop concepts (based upon terms found in Voegelin's 
writings) which are capable of denoting pre-ideological 
forms of consciousness which are nonetheless included 
within the general category of pneumapathological 
consciousness. Voegelin's argument on the relationship of 
these forms ("metastatic faith," "prometheanism" and 
"parousiasm") to ideological consciousness represents the 
center around which the major questions of historical 
accuracy and explanatory power regarding his treatment of 
modernity revolve. These concepts and the nature of the 
6E.g., "The Sumerian Kinglist," Assyriological 
Studies, no. 11 (Chicago, 1939). Cf. Voegelin, Order and 
History, Vol. IV: The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 65-67. 
"Dispute of a Man, Who Contemplates Suicide, With his 
Soul," Anon., Egypt, circa 2000 B.C. Cf. Voegelin, 
"Immortality: Experience and Symbol," Harvard Theological 
Review (vol. LX, 1967, pp. 235-79), pp. 241-48. 
7voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin (R. Eric 
O'Connor, ed.) (Montreal: Thomas More Institute,· 1980), 
pp. 13-18, 147. 
7 
distinctions among them will be explored more fully below. 
At this juncture it is sufficient to note that our 
understanding of modern ideological politics would be 
greatly enhanced if it could be shown that the types of 
thought and activism which characterize the present era 
are not simply the results of present circumstances or of 
the idiosyncrasies of influential individuals. For if 
these forms of thought and activism are rooted in a 
general pattern of consciousness which is an historical 
constant, as Voegelin argued, important implications would 
be suggested for an appropriate response to the political 
crisis of modernity. These implications will be discussed 
in the final chapter. On the other hand, the helpfulness 
of Voegelin's analysis must be called into question if 
ideological consciousness cannot persuasively be related 
to the other, older forms of pneumapathological dis-
orientation. Should this turn out to be the case, 
Voegelin would appear (as William C. Havard, Jr. 
speculated he must appear to partisans of this or that 
ideology) as "a sort of intellectual anachronism trying to 
apply the outmoded internecine arguments of the Christian 
Middle Ages to a modern secular world in which they have 
no place."8 
8william c. Havard, Jr., "Notes on Voegelin's 
Contributions to Political Theory," in Ellis Sandoz, ed., 
Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1982, pp. 87-114), 
8 
Voegelin's attempt to provide a broader theoretical 
context for the understanding of ideological phenomena was 
founded upon a more formidable base than can be furnished 
by a history of ideas. Rather than simply tracing the 
development of specific ideas which eventually came to be 
expressed in ideological forms, Voegel in structured his 
analysis in the form of a philosophical anthropology which 
is informed by a theory of consciousness and a philosophy 
of history. As a result, it was possible for Voegelin to 
conceptualize the disordered or "pathologically closed" 
consciousness of the ideologue by reference to well-
ordered or "open" patterns of consciousness. Voegelin's 
analysis of the relationship between these most general 
patterns of (disordered or well-ordered) consciousness is, 
however, much more subtle than a comparison of "true" and 
"false" doctrines, since closed as well as open 
consciousness arise from fundamental experiences of the 
human condition which cannot, as such, be simply false: 
The conflict of Truth and Delusion, thus, is not a 
conflict between true and false propositions. In 
fact, the Delusion is quite as true as the Truth if by 
truth we mean an adequate and consistent articulation 
of an experience. Truth is the philosophy of the 
realissimum that we experience if we follow the way of 
immortalization in the soul; Delusion is the 
philosophy of the reality that we experience as men 
who live and die in a world that itself is distended 
in time with a beginning and an end. The 
characterization of this philosophy of reality as a 
Delusion derives its justification from the experience 
p. 98. 
9 
·of a superior reality. 9 
Ideological thought, no less than philosophical or 
religious thought, is engendered by experiences of 
uncertainty and contingency, incompleteness and suffering 
in a world where all things pass away .10 The Platonic 
symbolism of imprisonment in darkness also appears in 
ideological and proto-ideological symbolism. The parting 
of the ways of philosophy and ideology first becomes 
evident in characteristically different reactions to this 
condition. 
For Voegelin, philosophical consciousness is 
exemplified by the Platonic periagoge, the turning-around 
of the soul in loving openness toward transcendent reality 
and the ground of being .11 By contrast, ideological 
consciousness is typified by a turning-away from the 
transcendent ground in revolt against the tension of 
contingent existence. In the modern era this revolt has 
taken many forms, all of which are expressive of 
dissatisfaction with the degree of certainty afforded by 
faith, trust and hope as sources of knowledge and 
9voegelin, Order and History, Vol. II: The World of 
the Polis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1957) I P• 216. 
lOcf. Voegelin, "History and Gnosis, 11 in Bernard 
Anderson, ed., The Old Testament and Christian Faith (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1969, pp. 64-89), p. 82. 
llvoegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 115-17; 
Anamnesis (1978), pp. 183-85. 
10 
existential orientation. According to Voegelin, the great 
ideologists sought to displace classical Greek philosophy 
and Judea-Christian revelation by (mis)placing the 
transcendent ground within an immanent hierarchy of being, 
identifying the essence of human existence as, e.g. , 
productive relations, historical progress, racial 
composition, libidinous drives, scientific rationality or 
the will to power. Within the intellectual systems 
constructed around these misplacements of the ground, 
humanity appears as an autonomous, self created species 
capable of assuming control of its destiny through the 
self-conscious application of new forms of knowledge. 
Thus, on the level of individual experience, Voegelin 
regarded ideological consciousness as a form of existence 
in rebellion against human imperfection and the 
uncertainties of life in a world grounded in an ultimately 
mysterious order of being .12 It is in this sense that 
Voegelin attributed the ideological impulse not to modern 
conditions but to the human condition as such. Viewed 
historically on the political level, ideological systems 
12voegelin's one, relatively early definition of 
ideology runs as follows: "Ideology is existence in 
rebellion against God and man. It is the violation of the 
First and Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the 
language of Israelite order; it is the noses, the disease 
of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus 
and Plato." Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. I: Israel 
and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1956), p. xiv. 
11 
of thought represent a series of (counter) movements 
against the philosophical and revelatory traditions of the 
west, movements which seek to transform the nature of 
humanity and society beyond their divinely set parameters. 
Yet pneumapathological disorientation cannot be 
limited to the modern form of ideological consciousness, 
because paths of escape from the tension of contingent 
existence are not limited to those taken by modern 
ideologists. Evidence of alienation, hubris, libido 
dominandi, closure and other symptoms of ideological 
consciousness can be found long before the Age of 
Ideol.ogy. The emergence of pneumapathological 
consciousness can be fixed in time because awareness of 
the tensions arising from existence between the 
transcendent and mundane poles of reality was itself an 
epoch-marking discovery in history. 13 This area within 
reality, symbolized by Plato as the metaxy or "In-
Between," was unknown prior to what Voegelin called the 
"de-divinization" of the world.14 Whereas mythological or 
"cosmological" accounts of reality could speak of human 
activity as occurring within a world "full of gods, 11 the 
authors of the Old Testament and the philosophers of 
13voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 1-16; 
The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 1-13. 
14p1ato, Symposium, 202a-203; Voegelin, The Ecumenic 
Age (1974), pp. 183-87; Conversations with Eric Voegelin 
(1980), pp. 44-45, 81. 
12 
ancient Greece located the divine creative forces of the 
universe beyond the mundane realm of human activity in the 
world. 15 The tensions which lie behind 
pneumapathological disorientation first arise from the 
awareness that one exists in a de-divinized world that is 
incomplete and imperfect in essence; this condition 
becomes especially problematic when its recognition is 
accompanied by the experience or promise of participation 
in a transcendent realm of being.16 As an example of the 
disorientation which may stem from this complex of 
experiences Voegelin frequently turned to Gnosticism, in 
which the world was regarded as a demonically created 
prison which restricts the divine spark within humanity. 
More generally, attempts to artificially relax the 
tensions associated with the de-divinization of the world 
tend to assume two characteristic forms: disregard for 
the re-quirements of existence in the world, or a turning-
away from transcendent reality to live in this world 
alone. 17 This distinction is of great importance in 
15voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), pp. 9-13; 
Anamnesis {1978), pp. 75, 159. 
16voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 
107-110. 
17voegelin, Order and History, Vol. V: In Search of 
Order {Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1987), p. 37. On this distinction see also Gregor Sebba, 
"Order and Disorders of the Soul: Eric Voegelin's 
Philosophy of History," Southern Review ( n. s. , vol. III, 
13 
voegelin's work on disordered political consciousness. 
Both forms of "escapism" from the tensions of existence in 
the metaxy can be observed in all periods of history 
subsequent to the "leaps in being" identified by Voegelin 
in the ancient world. 
As an example of the former type of disorientation, 
voegelin noted a tendency toward chiliastic expectation of 
the "Kingdom of God" among those who gave credence to the 
promise of salvation but chafed impatiently under the 
corruption of life in worldly society. This variant of 
pneumapathological disorientation may be expressed in 
either a profound disregard for mundane necessities and an 
all-consuming desire for eternal perfection, or a longing 
for an apocalyptic transformation of the worldly vale of 
tears. Voegelin found evidence of this general type of 
pneumapathological consciousness (which will be subdivided 
below into metastatic faith and parousiasm) in the 
apocalyptic strains of Old Testament prophecy and early 
Christianity, the Gospel of John, the Epistles of Paul, 
ancient Gnostic and Manichaean writings, the millennial 
"heresies" of evil times and the tracts of militant 
Puritanism. 
The other path of escape from "existence-in-
1967, pp. 282-310), pp. 301-302; Eugene Webb, Eric 
Voeqelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1981), p. 201. 
14 
tension" is to eclipse the transcendent dimension of human 
experience by establishing man as the measure of all 
things. This general type of pneumapathological 
consciousness (which will be subdivided below into 
prometheanism and ideological consciousness) may take the 
form of hatred of the gods or, among more ambitious 
moderns, of attempts to usher in an era of human autonomy 
through a redirection of humanity's energies toward a 
perfection of the "estate of man." Voegelin argued that 
the ideological form of this type of pneumapathological 
consciousness can be found, in varying degrees of 
prominence, in virtually every movement of note within 
modern political thought:l8 
Marxism Fascism 
18Marxism: From Enlightenment to Revolution (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 240-
302. Fascism: Anamnesis (1978), p. 3; Ellis Sandoz, The 
Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 
pp. 50-60. Progressivism: From Enlightenment to 
Revolution (1975), pp. 110-35. Positivism: Ibid., pp. 
136-94. Anarchism: Ibid., pp. 195-239. Biologism: 
Ibid., p. 69; Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xii. 
Psychologism: Ibid. Utilitarianism: Ibid., p. 52. 
Liberalism: "Liberalism and Its History," Review of 
Politics (vol. XXXVII, 1974, pp. 502-20, passim. 
Behavioral ism: Anamnesis (1978), p. 146. 
Constitutionalism: Ibid., p. 3. Scientism: "The 
Origins of Scientism," Social Research (vol. XXVI, 1948, 
pp. 462-94), pp. 462-64, 484-94. Hegelianism: "On Hegel: 
A Study in Sorcery," Studium Generale (vol. XXVI, 1971, 
pp. 335-68), passim. Existentialism: "The Eclipse of 
Reality," in Maurice Natanson, ed., Phenomenology and 
Social Research (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 
185-94), passim. 
15 
Hegelianism Existentialism 
Progressivism Psychologism 
Positivism Anarchism 
Behavioral ism Scientism 
Utilitarianism Constitutional ism 
Liberalism Biologism 
common to all these movements, in one form or another, is 
what Voegelin identified as a hubristic revolt against the 
limitations of the creaturly nature of human beings. 
Contrary to those who regard this revolt as a 
distinctly modern phenomenon, Voegelin argued that this 
form of consciousness and its pathological dimensions 
(although not its systematic, quasi-scientific trappings) 
were far from unknown to the ancients: 
In fact the Greek thinkers diagnosed it as a disease 
of the psyche from the time they had occasion to 
observe it in the embattled polis. Heraclitus and 
Aeschylus, and above all Plato, speak of the nosos or 
nosema of the psyche; and Thucydides speaks of the 
expansion of the disease into the disorders of the 
Peloponnesian War as a kinesis, as a feverish movement 
of society .•.. The Stoics, especially Chrysippos, were 
intrigued by the phenomenon, and Cicero, summarizing 
the findings of the preceding centuries, deals with 
the disease at length •... He calls it the morbus animi, 
the disease of the mind, and characterizes its nature 
as an aspernatio rationis, as a rejection of reason.19 
Insofar as pneumapathological disorientation in general 
can be traced to an alienated dissatisfaction with the 
human condition as such, its origins appear not simply 
19voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation" (1981), p. 243. 
16 
modern but universal and perennial . Moreover, since we 
have seen that this dissatisfaction becomes potentially 
radical only with the advent of doctrines which hold out 
the possibility of redemption in a transfigured reality 
beyond history, the necessary conditions for the expansion 
of pneuma-pathological disorientation arise within 
antiquity rather than within modernity. Among these 
traditions Christianity has proven to be the most powerful 
accelerant in the expansion process. Voegelin attributes 
the "popularization" of disordered consciousness in modern 
society not to a decline of the cultural influence of 
Christianity, but rather to the spread of its influence 
during the late Middle Ages: "The more people are drawn 
into the Christian orbit, the greater will be the number 
among them who do not have the spiritual stamina for the 
heroic adventure of the soul that is Christianity. n20 
Those who regard the excesses of the Age of Ideology as 
the logical consequence of a fall from Christianity will 
be no more pleased with Voegelin's argument than those who 
consider the Age a triumph over the Christian past: 
Considering the history of Gnosticism,21 with the 
20voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction {1952), p. 123. 
An Intro-
2lvoegelin's use of this term, which roughly 
parallels the generic usage of "pneumapathological 
consciousness" in these pages, will be discussed below. 
Voegelin's most extensive discussions of the concept {and 
the historical tradition) are in Science, Politics and 
17 
great bulk of its manifestations belonging to, or 
deriving from, the Christian orbit, I am inclined to 
recognize in the epiphany of Christ the great catalyst 
that made eschatological consciousness an historical 
force both in forming and deforming humanity.22 
Although certain forms of pneumapathological consciousness 
precede the epiphany of Christ (such as the metastatic 
faith of Isaiah2 3 and the disorders diagnosed by the 
ancient Greeks), Voegelin held that "explicit persistence 
in the state of alienation [characteristic of parousiasm 
and ideological consciousness] is possible only after 
Christianity has differentiated the problem of existence--
a relation of man to the unknown God who is not intra-
cosmic (as the polytheistic type is) but extra-cosmic. 11 24 
The epiphany of Christ thus represents the break 
which periodizes the history of pneumapathological 
consciousness, rather than the distinction between modern 
and pre-modern eras. If we incorporate Voegelin's 
identification of this break in history with the 
distinction he has drawn between the two characteristic 
Gnosticism (1968), pp. 3-12, 53-59, 83-103, and The New 
Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 107-32. 
See also James L. Wiser, "From Cultural Analysis to 
Philosophical Anthro-pology: An Examination of Voegelin's 
Concept of Gnosticism," Review of Politics (vol. XLII, 
1980, pp. 92-104), passim. 
22voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 20. 
23see Voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), pp. 
476-501; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 25-27. 
24voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin .(1980), 
p. 80. 
18 
paths of escape from "existence-in-tension," it becomes 
possible to construct a diagram which will help to 
distinguish the major forms of pneumapathological 
disorientation: 
Eclipse 
of 
Worldly 
<
Reality 
Pneumapathological 
Disorientation 
Closure 
against 
Transcendent 
Experience 
B.C. 
Metastatic 
Faith 
Promethean 
Revolt 
A.D. 
Parousiasm 
Ideological 
Consciousness 
It should be emphasized that not every thinker in whom 
Voegelin discerned pneumapathological tendencies will fall 
neatly into one or another of the cells in this diagram. 
Voegelin' s distinction along the vertical axis, and the 
diagram as a whole, should be thought of as heuristic 
suggestions. The two characteristic patterns of 
"imbalanced" consciousness--closure against transcendent 
experience and eclipse of worldly reality--are often 
observable in a single writer. It could be argued, for 
example, that an ideologist such as Marx has fallen into 
either or both patterns of imbalance. His manifest 
contempt for all speculation on transcendent realms of 
being would seem to place him in the lower right cell, 
whereas a parousiastic disregard of worldly reality would 
19 
seem to underlie his vision of a communistic future in 
which humanity will "succeed in ridding itself of all the 
muck of ages.n25 The horizontal axis will also not prove 
to be inflexible, except in a formal sense, since 
parousiastic writers borrowed heavily from the Jewish 
apocalyptic and messianic traditions,2 6 just as the symbol 
of a chosen people reappears in modern fascism and Marx 
makes Prometheus "the foremost saint and martyr in the 
philosopher's calendar.n27 
Since pneumapathological disorientation is a 
manifestation of "existence-in-revolt" against the 
spiritual demands of "existence-in-tension," it is perhaps 
not surprising that ideologists have turned, in their 
efforts to symbolize the revolt, to those symbols 
developed for the expression of that very tension. 
Voegelin argued that this is a constant in ideological 
symbolism. For example, the Christian symbol of the 
"approaching Kingdom" is transposed and hypostatized into 
the Hegelian "end of history," the Marxism "realm of 
25Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 60. 
26see Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: 
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the 
Middle Ages (Revised and Expanded Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), pp. 19-36. 
27Marx, "Preface," to doctoral thesis, "The 
Difference Between Democritus' and Epicurus' Philosophy of 
Nature, 11 in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 13. 
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freedom," the National Socialist "Drittes Reich," or the 
comtean "positivistic age of Mankind." Similarly, the 
"redemption of man" is transposed into a politically or 
scientifically altered human nature, and 
philosophical/theological searching for the order of being 
is transposed into a scientific knowledge of the laws of 
nature and history. 
Of course, the identification of symbolic parallels 
does not lay to rest the question of whether Voegelin 
succeeded in 
ideological 
establishing a relationship between modern 
activism and the pre-modern forms of 
disordered consciousness. This question must be accorded 
a prominent place in any comprehensive evaluation of 
Voegelin's diagnostic analyses, and although a detailed 
examination must be reserved for the fourth chapter, it 
may be helpful at this point to identify several of the 
central issues. It is likely that, as Voegelin' s work 
becomes more widely known, criticism will revolve around 
the difficulties involved in his attempt to diagnose 
particular thinkers as spiritually diseased and the 
further difficulty of relating such an analysis to ancient 
forms of disease. These lines of criticism have already 
been suggested in the literature on Voegelin. For 
example, to speak of thinkers of the stature of Hegel, 
Marx and Nietzsche as spiritually diseased, as sorcerers 
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and magicians,28 is a step that even some of Voegelin's 
most sympathetic commentators are unwilling to take.29 
It may seem as though Voegelin fell into an 
enormous error by applying age-old categories of analysis 
to distinctly modern phenomena. However, far from 
betraying uneasiness over the apparent antiquity of his 
basic thesis, Voegelin regarded this as the surest form of 
corroboration. For the only significant test of 
philosophical propositions concerns not their originality 
but their truth, and for Voegelin "the test of truth, to 
put it pointedly, will be the lack of originality in the 
propositions: 11 30 
The validating question will have to be: Do we have 
to ignore and eclipse a major part of the historical 
field, in order to maintain the truth of the 
propositions, as the fundamentalist adherents of this 
or that ideological doctrine must do; or are the 
propositions recognizably equivalent with the symbols 
created by our predecessors in the search of truth 
about human existence?31 
If this, then, is the standard to which Voegelin's 
28voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation" (1981), esp. pp. 243-44; "On Hegel: A Study 
in Sorcery" (1971), passim. 
29For example, Dante Germino, "Eric Voegelin's 
Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently 
Published Work," American Political Science Review (vol. 
LXXII, pp. 110-21), p. 118, 29n. 
30voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Sym-
bolization in History," Eternita e Storia, I valori 
permanenti nel divenire storico (Florence: Valecchi, pp. 
215-34), p. 222. 
31rbid. 
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diagnosis of modernity should be held, it is nevertheless 
far from clear that a positive evaluation is assured 
simply because the test was of his own making. The 
central issues can be framed in the terms of Voegelin' s 
test: Has he ignored and eclipsed the modern part of the 
historical field by "de-modernizing" ideology? Are 
voegelin's propositions regarding modern ideologies in 
fact recognizably equivalent with the symbols created by 
those he referred to as his predecessors? Is modern 
ideological consciousness recognizably equivalent with the 
phenomena described in their writings? Is this 
equivalence so strong that "unoriginality" becomes a 
theoretical virtue, or has Voegelin made a virtue of 
necessity? 
The strength of this claimed equivalence must be 
measured by reference to the original sources, but in a 
manner which takes into account Voegelin's theory of 
experience and symbolization. According to Voegelin, 
writings expressive of spiritual disorientation tend, 
whether modern or pre-modern, to incorporate: (a) symbols 
engendered by distorted reactions to experiences of the 
world common to all mankind32 and (b) deformations of 
symbols engendered by experiences of transcendent reality 
32voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), p. 167; The World of the Polis (1957), p. 
216; "History and Gnosis" (1969), p. 82. 
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not shared by the deformers. 3 3 Voegelin argued that an 
equivalence can be detected among these symbols, the 
patterns of their deformation, and the experiences from 
which they are engendered. Yet it should not be expected 
that equivalence will take the form of strict doctrinal 
reproduction, because experiences and symbols of the world 
and of transcendent reality vary in terms of their 
"compactness" and "differentiation." For example, the 
Christian symbol of "God" is more differentiated than the 
intra-mundane "gods" of ancient Greece. Thus, the 
consciousness which hates the gods (e.g., Aeschylus' 
Prometheus) and seeks to make man the measure of all 
things will express itself somewhat differently than the 
atheistic consciousness characteristic of modern ideology, 
which revolts against a more differentiated background. 
That a certain equivalence may be present nevertheless is 
suggested by Marx's praise of Prometheus: 
The proclamation of Prometheus--"in a word, I hate all 
the gods"--is [philosophy's] own profession, her own 
slogan against all the gods of heaven and earth who do 
not recognize man's self consciousness as the highest 
33voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction ( 1952) , pp. 64-65: "Theory as an explication of 
experiences is intelligible only to those in whom the 
explication will stir up parallel experiences as the 
empirical basis for testing the truth of the theory. 
Unless a theoretical exposition activates the 
corresponding experiences at least to a degree, it will 
create the impression of empty talk or will perhaps be 
rejected as an irrelevant expression of subjective opinions." 
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divinity. There shall be none other beside it.34 
voegelin persuasively maintains that Marx has transposed 
the Prometheus symbol of Aeschylus by failing to note the 
response of Hermes ("it strikes me as no small 
madness 11 35), and Marx clearly felt a certain affinity with 
the Prometheus of his own making. Yet there remains the 
question of how Voegelin can demonstrate that disorders 
such as those known to Aeschylus are related to those he 
finds in the ideological activism of our own time. His 
attempt was premised upon the possibility of discovering 
the experiences (e.g. I alienation, hubris, libido 
dominandi, chiliasm, etc.) which lie "beneath" the symbols 
utilized for expression of a particular pattern of 
disordered consciousness. This is, at best, a difficult 
hermeneutical task, and neither the procedure nor the 
results can be vindicated apart from an extended 
presentation of Voegelin's theory of consciousness, his 
philosophical anthropology, and his perspective on the 
relation of history to theory. A section of the fourth 
chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to the 
problem, since Voegelin's diagnostic lexicon could be 
reduced to an untheoretical mash of invective if his 
34Marx, "Preface" to doctoral thesis, in McLellan, 
ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
35Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 977. 
The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 253-64; 
with Eric Voeqelin, pp. 80-81. 
Cf. Voegelin, 
Conversations 
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exigetical procedure cannot be justified. While I am not 
of the opinion that so harsh a conclusion is warranted, 
there is a very real danger that less cautious polemicists 
will invoke Voegelin's categories without troubling 
themselves over the difficulties involved in establishing 
the presence of spiritual disease in the objects of their 
ridicule. Note Voegelin's awareness of these 
difficulties: 
I am speaking cautiously of a suspension of 
consciousness because it frequently is difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine in the case of an 
individual activist whether the suspension is an act 
of intellectual fraud or of persuasive self-deception, 
whether it is a case of plain illiteracy or of the 
more sophisticated illiteracy imposed by an 
educational system, whether it is caused by a degree 
of spiritual and intellectual insensitivity that comes 
under the head of stupidity, or whether it is due to 
various combinations of these and other factors such 
as the desire to attract public attention and make a 
career.36 
The possibility of misuse of Voegelin's diagnostic 
categories is enhanced by their eminent suitability for 
polemical purposes. Since a detailed analysis of a 
thinker's work could be considered superfluous after 
pathological disorders are found lying behind his thought, 
reference to Voegelin's conclusions might easily be 
considered a convenient substitute for careful criticism. 
In light of the large investment of time required for 
careful criticism of figures such as Marx or Hegel, the 
36voegelin, Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation (1981), p. 236. 
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attractiveness of such a short-cut for those not enamored 
of Marxism or Hegelianism is apparent. This tack may even 
seem justifiable, as Voegelin himself intentionally 
avoided point-by-point refutations of ideologists, largely 
because he viewed the errors which vitiate their work as 
deliberate: 37 
If we were to accept the activist's counter-image as 
the "theory" it claims to be, as a theory to be 
verified or falsified on the positivistic level, we 
would play the activist's game, even if our evaluation 
of the details should turn out to be devastatingly 
negative •.•. [P]henomena of this class must certainly 
not be neglected in specialized studies of such 
counter-images •... Nevertheless, they are of 
symptomatic importance only and must not analytically 
obscure the intended analytical obscurity of the 
activist dreamer. Only if we disengage the dream 
story from the complicated counter-image can we bring 
the truly theoretical issue of reality and imaginative 
dreaming into focus.38 
37voegelin, science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
pp. 23-28; "The Eclipse of Reality," in Maurice Natanson, 
ed., Phenomenology and Social Reality (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 185-194), pp. 188-89; 
"Remembrance of Things Past," in Anamnesis (1978), pp. 3-
9; "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation" 
(1981), pp. 235-39. 
38voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation" (1981), p. 239. The point is also made, less 
reservedly, in Anamnesis: "A true scholar has better 
things to do than to engage in futile debate with men who 
are guilty of the aspernatio rationis. The revel t at 
large has not become vociferous enough, and perhaps never 
will, to match the paranoiac aggressiveness of the mental 
cases, but it has become extensive enough to leave no 
doubt that the restrictivist movements have maneuvered 
themselves out of the empirical advance of the historical 
and philosophical sciences." Pp. 8-9. Compare with, "On 
Debate and Existence," Intercollegiate Review (vol. III, 
1967, pp. 143-52), p. 144, where Voegelin argues that 
debate is a philosophical obligation. 
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The inevitable result of this decision to disengage the 
consciousness of the dreamer from the particulars of the 
dream is that the seriousness of the charges occasionally 
seems incommensurate with the thoroughness of the analyses 
that support them. This problem is, in Voegelin's case, 
often more apparent than real. For example, only after a 
section of the manuscript of Voegelin's massive History of 
western Political Thought written during the 1940s was 
published in 1975 under the title, From Enlightenment to 
Revolution did it become clear that the almost cryptic 
reflections on certain modern figures in The New Science 
of Politics and Science, Politics and Gnosticism were 
based upon a thorough familiarity with the period and 
writers in question. There are, nevertheless, certain 
points at which the problem is indeed real, as when 
Voegelin referred in passing to "biologism" or 
"psychologism" as ideological inversions of human order.39 
Those who are versed in the Voegelinian corpus will 
probably know what is meant in such passages, but the 
uninitiated could hardly be faulted for wondering what 
thinkers Voegelin had in mind or how deeply ideological 
elements had, in his view, penetrated the disciplines of 
psychology and biology. One of the virtues of Voegelin's 
theoretical framework is that it helps to draw into 
39voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p.. xii; 
From Enlightenment to Revolution, p. 69. 
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clearer relief the underlying similarities among the 
various and diverse ideologies of the age. However, 
there is reason to question whether the patterns of revolt 
and disorientation highlighted in his framework are of 
even remotely equivalent prominence in the movements 
listed above. Although there is some substance to Thomas 
J. J. Altizer's charge that "Professor Voegelin finds 
everything to be Gnostic, 11 40 it is hoped that, by getting 
down to the specifics of Voegelin's analyses, it can be 
shown that his approach should not be used to lump 
together and dismiss modern intellectual/political 
movements on grounds of their being all of one piece. 
Voegelin's intention was to bring into focus an 
experiential unity often obscured by the "dogmatomachy" of 
inter-ideological squabbles. It will be argued that 
Voegelin not only succeeded in clarifying this 
experiential unity, but also, by basing his analysis of 
ideology on a theory of consciousness and human nature, 
made it possible to account for the motivations underlying 
the construction of such systems as well as the extremes 
to which the rank and file have gone in order to actualize 
them. Moreover, Voegelin's concept of pathologically 
closed consciousness can be persuasively applied to a 
40Quoted by John William Corrington in "Order and 
History: The Breaking of the Program," Denver Quarterly 
(vol. X, 1975, pp. 115-22), p. 122. 
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remarkably wide range of phenomena across cultures, across 
time, and across differences such as those between 
ideological theoreticians, epigones and functionaries. 
Yet, just as Voegelin's diagnostic analyses may be 
prone to misuse, his conceptual innovations may give rise 
to some measure of confusion. From his first writings to 
his last, Voegelin complained of the lack of a developed 
terminology for dealing with the phenomena associated with 
pneumapathological consciousness.41 Accordingly, he 
experimented with a wide variety of conceptual and 
adjectival terms. Somewhat distressingly, however, 
voegelin never settled upon a particular framework. As a 
result, the theoretical distinctions implied by his use of 
terms are in certain important instances vague or 
unarticulated. For example, when Voegelin refers to 
Isaiah and modern ideologues as "brothers under the skin," 
and of the latter as "descendants of the prophetic faith 
in a transfiguration of the world, 11 42 the otherwise 
important distinction between pre- and post-Christian 
patterns of revolt becomes obscure. Also obscured is the 
difference between the expectation of divine intervention 
4lvoegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
p. 263; Review: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (with a reply by Hannah Arendt and a 
concluding remark by Voegelin), Review of Politics (vol. 
XV, 1953, pp. 68-85), p. 68; "Wisdom and the Magic of the 
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 261. 
42voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii. 
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in political events, on the one hand, and modern attempts 
to "murder God 11 and "immanentize the eschaton" on the 
other. An Isaiah and a Marx are "brothers under the skin" 
only in the sense that both seem to have lost the "balance 
of consciousness;" the direction and consequences of their 
respective imbalance are, however, vastly different. 
Finally, we might wish to know in what sense modern 
ideologues are "descendants" of the prophetic faith in a 
metastatic transfiguration of the world. Are they witting 
or unwitting descendants? If the latter is what Voegelin 
had in mind, as is presumably the case, but the sources 
and nature of their expected metastases are poles apart, 
is it not misleading to describe their relation in terms 
of kinship? 
While Voegelin's basic argument is relatively free 
of inconsistencies, his use of terms and analogies is 
often surprisingly indefinite. Concepts announced in one 
work fail to appear in the next,43 distinctions drawn at 
one point are not developed or applied at others, 44 and 
terms which arise in differing contexts are often used 
4 3E. g., "modern Prometheanism," from =T=h=e"--'N'-'-e=w....._-=s .... c=i:..;e=n=c=e 
of Politics: An Introduction (1952), p. 254; "social 
Satanism," from From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
pp. 71, 195. 
44E.g., those between teleological, axiological and 
activist immanentization, and intellectual, emotional and 
volitional gnosticism from The New Science of Politics: 
An Introduction (1952), pp. 124, 175, which do not,. to my 
knowledge, reappear in any subsequent work. 
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interchangeably. 45 One is forced to wonder why Voegelin, 
who was a very careful writer, would not have been more 
rigorous in the specification of his conceptual tools--
especially in light of his frequent references to the need 
for a diagnostic terminology. Not having an answer at 
hand, and at the risk of violating some hidden intention, 
I submit that both the strengths and weaknesses of 
voegelin's argument will be easier to discern when treated 
within the conceptual scheme presented in diagram form 
above. 
The most serious terminological problem presents 
itself with Voegelin's use of the concept of gnosticism, 
which was usually employed in the same generic fashion 
that I have used "pneumapathological consciousness." con-
siderable confusion has resulted as to whether the 
adjective "gnostic" means that a thinker has been 
influenced by historical Gnosticism or merely thinks along 
analogous lines. Further complications have been 
introduced with the discovery of the Coptic Gnostic 
45For example, the following terms are among those 
utilized as apparent synonyms for ideology or gnosticism 
at various points in Voegelin's writings: 
Pneumapathology, activist dreaming, egophantic revolt, 
metastatic faith, activist mysticism, demonic mendacity, 
Prometheanism, parousiasm, political religion, .social 
Satanism, magic pneumatism, eristics. 
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library at Nag Hammadi in Egypt, 46 which suggested that 
the classical form of Gnosticism tended toward rejection 
of the world rather than its transformation.47 Voegelin 
had previously used "gnosticism" to denote both 
tendencies, and thus, in order to account for the latter 
strand in modernity, recently spoke of hermeticism, 
alchemy and magic as being of comparable importance. 
Unfortunately, however, Voegelin had yet to make fully 
clear his views on the influence wielded by these elements 
at the time of his death in January, 1985. The works 
which Voegelin cited in this context (by Frances Yates and 
Mircea Eliade48 ) do not in and of themselves clarify the 
46English translation, 
English (James M. Robinson, 
and Row, 1977). 
The Nag Hammadi Library in 
ed.) (San Francisco: Harper 
47stephen A. McKnight, "Understanding Modernity: A 
Reappraisal of the Gnostic Element," Intercollegiate 
Review (Spring, 1979, pp. 107-117), pp. 107-109; Eugene 
Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, op. cit., p. 
201. 
48Mircea Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible (Stephen 
Corrin, trans.) (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962); 
Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
Voegelin makes brief mention of these works on pages 193 
and 194 of his "Response to Professor Altizer' s 'A New 
History and a New But Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., 
Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal, op. cit. 
Voegelin concludes his comments on the books of Eliade and 
Yates by stating "their obvious implication: the 
contemporary disorder will appear in a rather new light 
when we leave the 'climate of opinion' and, adopting the 
perspective of the historical sciences, acknowledge the 
problems of 'modernity' to be caused by the predominance 
of Gnostic, Hermetic and alchemistic conceits, as well as 
by the Magic of violence as the means for transforming 
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reasons why Voegelin would have thought hermeticism, 
alchemy and magic so important for understanding 
ideological consciousness. Yates and El iade do indeed 
suggest that these traditions may have been important in 
the development of the worldview characteristic of modern 
science, but this thesis is not without its informed 
detractors,49 and the connections between modern science 
and modern ideology are not explicitly drawn by Voegelin 
(or Yates or Eliade). In any event, it is clear that none 
of these traditions can serve as a replacement for the 
overarching uses to which Voegelin once put the concept of 
gnosticism, i.e., as including both rejection of the world 
and insistence upon its trans-formation. 
Eugene Webb has proposed, as a way out of this 
problem, capitalizing the name of the ancient Gnostic 
movement while using the term "gnosticism" for "all 
movements based on claims to gnosis of any sort. 11 50 
Leaving questions of (over) inclusiveness aside, along with 
the confusion this practice might occasion, Webb gives us 
reality." 
49cf., e.g., Roberts. Westman, "Magical Reform and 
Astronomical Reform: The Yates Thesis Reconsidered," and 
J. E. McGuire, "Neoplatonism and Active .Principles: 
Newton and the Corpus Hermeticum," in Hermeticism and the 
Scientific Revolution (Los Angeles: Clark Memorial 
Library), 1977. 
5 0 Eugene Webb , =E=r'""'i .... c~_V-'-""o'""e;...;;g""'e""'l""'1=· n="'-: ---'P;..h=i=l:...:o'""s::;.;:o::;.,ip;::;.:h=e=r---'o::;..:.f 
History, op. cit., p. 201. 
,. ' 
, ·, 
' ' 
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reason to doubt the helpfulness of his distinction less 
than a page later when he argues for a link between Marx 
and Gnosticism. He points out that Marx was an admirer of 
Thomas Muntzer and that Muntzer was an admirer of Joachim 
of Fiore, who in turn is said to have been influenced by 
Gnostic texts. 51 So is Marx a gnostic or an historical 
Gnostic? Moreover, it would seem that a case such as that 
of the metastatic faith of Isaiah could be termed 
"gnostic" only by invoking a very liberal notion of poetic 
license. There is certainly something problematic about 
speaking of gnostic tendencies prior to the advent of 
historical Gnosticism, and if the game of suggesting 
chains of literary influence can be made to work with Marx 
it will certainly not work with Isaiah. Any attempt to 
patch-up the concept of gnosticism as a generic term by 
dispensing with pre-Gnostic phenomena would not only have 
to ignore Voegelin's comments on the continuing 
significance of metastatic faith, 52 but would also run 
contrary to the basic thrust of Voegelin's argument, viz., 
that disordered consciousness arises not from Gnosticism 
but from the tensions inherent in the human condition. 
Since Voegelin mentioned late in life that he would 
probably not use the concept of gnosticism if he were 
51Ibid., pp. 201-202. 
52voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), pp. xiii, 
454; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 26-27. 
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starting over again, 53 I think it best to make a clean 
break with the term and use the concept of pneuma-
pathological consciousness or disorientation so as to 
incorporate the entire set of Voegelin' s terms. While 
these are admittedly rather inelegant neologisms, they are 
nevertheless more faithful to Voegelin's basic thesis than 
any alternative of which I am aware. "Psychopathological" 
would be somewhat easier on the contemporary ear, but that 
is precisely the problem, since "psyche" has come to mean 
something quite different in common parlance than its 
ancient Greek connotations. Since psychoanalysis 
(Freudian or otherwise) was itself, for Voegelin, an 
ideologically-charged symbol, 54 "psychopathological 11 will 
clearly not suit our purposes. "Pneuma," or spirit, can 
replace psyche without bringing in its wake similar 
ideological baggage. "Consciousness" must be appended to 
avoid the misimpression that physiological or ontological 
states are in question, as well as to retain Voegelin's 
stress on experience as the source of both order and 
disorder in human existence. Since the term 
"consciousness" could appear to lack content if used 
repeatedly in this context, "disorientation" will also be 
53Quoted in Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher 
of History, op. cit., p. 200. 
54voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
p. 83; Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980), pp. 28-9. 
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employed to emphasize the departure of the forms of 
consciousness we are examining from the balanced 
orientation of consciousness in the "In-Between" of the 
metaxy. 
The following chapter will open with an 
introduction to Voegel in' s understanding of well-ordered 
consciousness, which will provide a point of departure for 
our analysis of disordered patterns of consciousness. The 
patterns which have been categorized as metastatic faith 
and Prometheanism will also be discussed in the second 
chapter, along with Plato's search for a socially 
effective remedy for the noses, or disease, of the soul. 
Chapter three will be devoted to parousiasm and an 
analysis of the relationship between Christianity and 
spiritual disorientation. Voegelin's attempt to establish 
an essential equivalence among ideologies will be examined 
in the fourth chapter, along with his argument for a 
continuity between ideological consciousness and earlier 
patterns of disorder. An assessment of Voegelin's effort 
to "furnish the remedy" for the political crisis of 
modernity "through therapeutic analysis"55 will be 
undertaken in the fifth and final chapter, which will 
conclude with an evaluation of Voegelin's project as a whole. 
55voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
p. 83. 
CHAPrER II 
THE ETIOLOGY OF PNEUMAPATHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
For Voegelin the movement toward truth starts from 
a person's awareness of his or her existence in "untruth." 
Yet the process through which one gains an awareness of 
modes of existence in untruth is not a "given" in human 
experience; it is raised to the level of consciousness 
only during the movement toward truth. Thus, the origins 
of pneumapathological consciousness are difficult to 
distinguish from the origins of healthy or well-ordered 
consciousness. On the basis of Voegelin' s thought it 
would be as correct to say that the disordered soul 
"discovers" the patterns of spiritual order as to say that 
the well-ordered soul discovers the nature of its 
disordered former existence (or its unhealthy counterparts 
in the surrounding environment). These are probably not 
distinct events so much as correlative insights from a 
single experience: 
From the depth of the psyche wells up life and order 
when historically, in the surrounding society, the 
souls have sunk into the depth of death and disorder. 
From the depth comes the force that drags the 
philosopher's soul up to the light, so that it is 
difficult to say whether the upper There is the source 
of his truth, or the nether There that forced him up.1 
lvoegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 62 
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The disordered soul cannot be recognized as such prior to 
the emergence of its opposite. Its existence can be 
retrospectively postulated from accounts of the "leaps in 
being," which portray ignorance and disorientation as the 
background for new differentiations of the truth of the 
soul. But it cannot be analyzed until the differentiation 
is achieved, and the diagnosis cannot be justified except 
by comparison to the soul which is reformed by the 
achievement. 
It was shown in the preceding chapter that Voegelin 
considered pneumapathological consciousness an historical 
constant which can be related to certain aspects of the 
human condition. This is, however, a conclusion and not a 
premise. Only rarely did Voegelin stray from analysis of 
historical materials to off er general observations of this 
kind, and then only after the materials had been set 
forth. His writings have a strongly empirical flavor, 2 
2Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Bio-
graphical Introduction, p. 194: "Voegelin's noetic 
science rests squarely on reality experienced not as an 
abstract position or principle, but as a necessity 
dictated by the facts themselves. The reality of the 
discussion is the comprehensive reality of science, 
delimited by the insight that the only reality is the one 
known experientially or imaginatively extrapolated from 
direct experience. The symbols of noesis, he repeatedly 
stresses, are not something found floating in thin air. 
Rather they are tied to (engendered by) specific events 
reported by specific men in whom the experiences 
occur ..•. For this reason Voegelin's work is laden with the 
historiographic materials through which his "experiential 
analysis" (which contrasts with phenotypical analysis) 
proceeds in the back-and-forth zigzag of reiteration and 
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which would be lost if we were to treat the varieties of 
pneumapathological consciousness apart from the historical 
conditions in which they appear. Voegelin's method offers 
no encouragement to those who would like to get at the 
origins of spiritual disorder per se. He did not, and we 
shall not, attempt to push the search for the origins of 
pneumapathological disorientation beyond the points in 
time when diagnoses from a position of purportedly 
superior orientation emerge. Metastatic faith and 
prometheanism will therefore be analyzed in this chapter 
against the background of the specific tensions which 
occasioned these forms of existence-in-revolt. 
With these caveats having been stated, some general 
comments are in order regarding Voegelin's reflections on 
healthy (or open or balanced) consciousness. For while 
the particular varieties of existence-in-revolt were 
understood by Voegelin as spiritual rebellions against 
particular symbolizations of truth, the Israelitic, 
Hellenic and Christian symbolizations need not be strictly 
isolated. one of Voegelin's most important theses is that 
these symbolisms are essentially equivalent, despite their 
phenotypical differences, because they refer recognizably 
reflective reconsideration of texts and problems." 
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to the same structures in reality. 3 There is only one 
reality, but it may be symbolized in a manifold of forms, 
none of which is ever fully adequate to or exhaustive of 
its rich and mysterious nature. Myth, philosophy and 
revelation are examples of such symbolic forms. They vary 
in terms of differentiation, and arise at different times 
in history, but the latter and more differentiated do not 
3voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Sym-
bolization in History" (1970), passim; The Ecumenic Age 
(1974), pp. 7-11, 188-92, 249-55. It is important to note 
at this point that "equivalence" does not imply identity 
in voegelin's work. Something is gained--and lost--in the 
historical sequence that leads from cosmogonic myth to 
revelation to philosophy to Christianity, and it would be 
a grave error to assume that, since these symbolic forms 
are for Voegelin structurally equivalent, they are also 
interchangeable. This point is made most forcefully in 
voegelin' s comparison of the alethes logos in Book I of 
Plato's Laws with the "saving tale of divine Incarnation, 
Death and Resurrection" from the Gospels: "It [the 
'saving tale'] is richer by the missionary fervor of its 
spiritual universalism, poorer by its neglect of noetic 
control; broader by its appeal to the inarticulate 
humanity of the common man, more restricted by its bias 
against the articulate wisdom of the wise; more imposing 
through its imperial tone of divine authority, more 
imbalanced through its apocalyptic ferocity, which leads 
to conflicts with the conditions of man's existence in 
society; more compact through its generous absorption of 
earlier strata of mythical imagination, especially through 
the reception of Israelite historiogenesis and the 
exuberance of miracle-working, more differentiated through 
the intensely articulate experience of loving-divine 
action in the illumination of existence with truth." "The 
Gospel and Culture," in D. Miller and D. G. Hadidian, 
eds., Jesus and Man's Hope (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
Theological Seminary Press, 1971, pp. 59-101), p. 77. See 
also "On Chris-tianity," (reply to a letter from Alfred 
Schutz, January 1, 1953) in Peter J. Opitz and Gregor 
Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, 
Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1981, 
pp. 449-57), pp. 450-51. 
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simply supercede the earlier and more compact. Mythical 
patterns of symbolization play an important part in 
Platonism and Christianity, 4 and should not be regarded as 
regressive or untrue since certain types of experiences 
cannot otherwise be expressed. And just as late truths 
may be expressed in early forms of symbolization, early 
symbolisms may contain, in germinal form, a truth which is 
differentiated in subsequent symbolisms.5 
The constraints imposed by the scope of the present 
study will not permit an extended treatment of this 
controversial line of argument, but two points should be 
noted. First, the argument for essential equivalence will 
allow us to summarize Voegelin' s perspective on balanced 
consciousness without violating the principles of his 
historiography. Second, the argument for equivalence is 
decisively important for the justification of (a) the 
generic concept of pneumapathological consciousness, (b) 
the thesis that such consciousness is grounded in the 
human condition rather than transitory circumstances, and 
(c) the proposition that the history of such consciousness 
4voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 224-27; 
Conversations with Eric Voegelin, (1980), p. 27. 
5For example, Voegelin argued that "one has to 
recognize, and make intelligible, the presence of Christ 
in a Babylonian hymn, or a Taoist speculation, or a 
Platonic dialogue, just as much as in a gospel." 
"Response of Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New 
but Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's 
Thought: A Critical Appraisal, p. 191. 
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is characterized by an unbroken continuum of movements. 
For if no equivalence exists between, say, Israelitic 
revelation and Greek philosophy, patterns of rebellion 
against these traditions would have to be treated as sui 
generis and the principles underlying this study could 
rightly be deemed arbitrary. Although this potential 
problem must be acknowledged it cannot be resolved with 
anything short of a book-length examination. Yet a modest 
contribution will nevertheless be possible if we adopt an 
alternative strategy, assuming some measure of equivalence 
in the traditions and searching for equivalence in the 
corresponding patterns of revolt. 
According to Voegelin, the truth of the soul, or 
what we have ref erred to as open, heal thy or balanced 
consciousness, was "discovered" at definite points in 
history by particular individuals in certain societies. 
It is not part of the human birthright, to be retained or 
squandered, nor is it created through ingenuity. Although 
Voegelin noted that a primitive tribal village is 
"materially too cramped to leave room for the bios 
theoreticos, 1t6 he did not attempt to account for the 
emergence of the epochal, differentiating insights by 
reference to material or cultural preconditions. In fact, 
there is a sense in which he did not attempt to "explain" 
6voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 217. See 
also The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 306. 
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their emergence at all, since he regarded this as the 
mystery in the structure of history. The following 
questions are referred to in The Ecumenic Age as "the 
Question": 
(1) Why should there be epochs of advancing insight at 
all? why is the structure of reality not known in 
differentiated form at all times? 
(2) Why must the insights be discovered by such rare 
individuals as prophets, philosophers and saints? why 
is not every man the recipient of the insights? 
(3) Why when the insights are gained, are they not 
generally accepted? why must the epochal truth go 
through the historical torment of imperfect 
articulation, evasion, skepticism, disbelief, 
rejection, deformation, and of renaissances, 
renovations, rediscoveries, rearticulations, and 
further differentiations?7 
These questions, Voegelin argued, "are not meant to be 
answered; on the contrary, they symbolize the mystery in 
the structure of history by their unanswerability. 11 8 They 
cannot be answered because the insights gained by the 
prophets, philosophers and saints were not the result of 
autonomous projects of action but responses to 
"theophantic events" or "spiritual outbursts" or 
"hierophantic events" (or the persuasive communication of 
such events by others) . 9 The human participant in a 
theophantic event can respond by questioning or searching, 
but the revelatory movement from the divine ground is not 
7voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974). See also 
"History and Gnosis" (1969), p. 76. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., pp. 5, 11, 217. 
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at one's command. Thus, the accounts we possess of such 
events do not spell out methods of preparation but, 
rather, experiences of participation. Moses, Socrates and 
paul were acutely sensitive to their own unworthiness. 
Their special merit was that of openness, not of personal 
achievement. 
since the symbols and engendering experiences of 
prophets, philosophers and saints are, according to 
voegelin, structurally equivalent, it should be possible 
to turn to any of these three human types as exemplars of 
balanced consciousness. Yet, Voegelin argued that "the 
adequate articulation and symbolization of the questioning 
consciousness is the epochal feat of the philosophers, 11 10 
and thus we will concentrate upon philosophical symbols of 
health, openness and balance, especially those of Plato 
and Aristotle. Voegelin found within Platonic and 
Aristotelian thought a coherent body of language symbols 
that signify the various stages in the development of the 
philosopher's consciousness. There is, first, the group 
of symbols which express the initial experience of 
restless wondering: wondering (thaumazein) , seeking or 
searching (zetein), search (zetesis), and questioning 
(aporein, diaporein).11 The philosopher feels himself 
lOvoegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in 
Anamnesis (1978); p. 93. 
11Ibid. 
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moved (kinein) by some unknown force to ask the questions 
of which the search consists; he feels himself drawn 
(belkein) into the search. This is the experience 
recounted in the famous cave allegory of Plato's Republic, 
where the prisoner is forced by an unknown force to turn 
around (periagoge) and begin his ascent to the light. 
Aristotle's account seems to place somewhat greater 
emphasis on the philosopher's perception of his own 
ignorance, but in Voegelin' s reading this perception is 
not the first of a number of pieces of information but a 
restless stirring within the soul. For a person, Voegelin 
argued, "could not know that he does not know, unless he 
experienced an existential unrest to escape from the 
ignorance (pheugein ten agnoian) and to search for 
knowledge (episteme). nl2 Aristotle, no less than Plato, 
finds the origin of the movement toward knowledge outside 
the seeker: "The mind (nous) is moved (kineitai) by the 
object (noeton).13 The object which moves the mind of the 
philosopher is not an object in the external world of 
things, but the transcendent ground of those things and of 
the philosopher's own existence. And the ignorance that 
the lover of wisdom perceives, which in a sense 
constitutes his nature, is not an ignorance about things 
12voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190. 
13Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a30; Voegelin's trans-
lation from The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190. 
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but of his own origins: 
The search from the human side, it appears, 
presupposes the movement from the divine side: 
without the kinesis, the attraction from the ground, 
there is no desire to know, no questioning in 
confusion, no knowledge of ignorance. There would be 
no anxiety in the state of ignorance, unless anxiety 
were alive with man's knowledge of his existence from 
a ground that he is not himself.14 
The movement from the divine side mentioned in this 
passage--the pull from the ground that induces a search 
for the ground--is the philosophical equivalent of the 
"call 11 answered by the prophet and the saint. Voegelin 
repeatedly inveighed against the medieval distinction 
between natural reason and supernatural revelation, which 
in his view was based upon a misunderstanding of the 
mystical character of Platonic-Aristotelian noesis.15 
Although theophantic events are mysteriously 
reserved for prophets, philosophers and saints, rudiments 
of the experiential complex which initiates the search for 
the ground are bestowed upon all people by virtue of the 
14voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190. 
15voegelin, "Toynbee's History as a Search for 
Truth," in Edward T. Gargan, ed., The Intent of Toynbee's 
History (Chicago: Loyola University Press, pp. 181-98), 
pp. 196-98; "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), pp. 75, 77, 
82; The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 48; Conversations with 
Eric Voegelin (1980), p. 104; "Wisdom and the Magic of the 
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 256; "The Meditative 
Origin of the Philosophical Knowledge of Order, 11 in F. 
Lawrence, ed., The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from 
the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences. Supplementary issue 
of Lonergan Workshop, vol. IV (Chico, California: 
Scholar's Press, pp. 35-39), pp. 44-47; In Search of Order 
(1987), p. 43. 
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natural powers of reasoning and questioning. As Aristotle 
stated in the first line of the Metaphysics, "all men by 
nature desire to know, " and paramount among the things 
they wish to know about is their origin. The experience 
of contingency, which is of decisive importance in the 
development of philosophical consciousness, is not the 
exclusive preserve of philosophers: 
Man is not a self-created, autonomous being carrying 
the origin and meaning of his existence within 
himself. He is not a divine causa sui; from the 
experience of his life in precarious existence within 
the limits of birth and death there rather arises the 
wondering question about the ultimate ground, the 
aitia or proto arche, of all reality and specifically 
his own ..•. [T]his questioning is inherent in man's 
experience of himself at all times .... 16 
As was shown in the first chapter, Voegelin's distinction 
between "open" and "closed" consciousness is not based 
upon the assertion that the ideologist is closed to this 
class of experiences. Disorder is evinced in certain 
reactions to such experiences of contingency and 
uncertainty. If ignorance of the question of the ground 
were the condition of most of humanity, excepting only 
participants in theophantic events, disordered 
consciousness would be so widespread that it could not 
really be called disordered. And if the great majority of 
humanity were held culpable for not being prophetic or 
philosophical or saintly, these concepts would become 
16voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in 
Anamnesis (1978), pp. 92-93. 
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meaningless as designations of distinct human types. The 
concept of ideological closure presupposes a prior 
exposure, and Voegelin reserved his most strident 
criticism for those who, like Marx, display both an 
awareness of the problem of contingency and the requisite 
facility for pursuing it.17 
The experiences which orient humanity to the 
immanent and transcendent poles of existence in the "In-
Between" of the metaxy, and from which the balance of 
consciousness may be gained or lost, are thus not beyond 
the ken of the majority of human beings. Although 
adequate symbolization of these experiences can only be 
achieved by those possessing extraordinary gifts, and 
while the experiences are an existential precondition for 
penetration of the symbols created by those who possess 
such gifts, 
we find ourselves referred back to nothing more 
formidable than the experiences of finiteness and 
creaturliness in our existence, of being creatures of 
a day as the poets call man, of being born and bound 
to die, of dissatisfaction with a state experienced as 
imperfect, of apprehension of a perfection that is not 
of this world but is the privilege of the gods, or 
possible fulfillment in a state beyond this world, the 
Platonic epekeina [Beyond], and so forth.18 
Ideologues, and pneumapaths in general, have these 
17cf. Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism 
(1968), pp. 23-28; Marx, "Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844," in Early Writings (T. B. Bottomore, 
ed. and trans.) (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), pp. 165-67. 
18voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967), p. 146. 
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experiences but revolt against their finiteness and 
creaturliness, cannot adjust to the imperfection of their 
state, seek perfection without regard for divine 
privilege, and seek it not in a state beyond this world 
but rather within this world. 
According to Voegelin, man experiences himself 
tending beyond his human imperfection toward the 
perfection of the divine ground that moves him. As 
Plato's Socrates observes in the Symposium, the spiritual 
man, the daimonios aner, as he is moved in his quest of 
the ground, moves somewhere between knowledge and 
ignorance. "The whole realm of the spiritual (daimonion} 
is halfway indeed between (metaxy) god and man. 11 19 Thus, 
Voegelin argued, 
the in-between--the metaxy--is not an 
between the poles of the tension but the 
spiritual'; it is the reality of 'man's 
the gods' (Symposium, 202-203], 
participation (methexis, metalepsis) 
divine, and divine in human, reality.20 
empty space 
'realm of the 
converse with 
the mutual 
of human in 
The balance of consciousness is a balance between 
participation in the divine and respect for the needs and 
limitation of the "merely" human. The balance is what 
Voegelin called existence in the metaxy, and may also be 
symbolized as a balance between ignorance and knowledge, 
19p1ato, Symposium, 202a; Voegelin's translation from 
"Reason: The Classic Experience," in Anamnesis (1978), p. 
103 .· 
2°rbid. 
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imperfection and perfection, time and timelessness, matter 
and spirit, life and death.21 "Heal thy" consciousness 
consists in a simultaneous attunement to the divine and 
worldly realities from which these dichotomous symbols 
arise. Human beings are more than animals and less than 
gods, and may (perhaps understandably) be dissatisfied 
with the ambiguity involved in establishing their identity 
in a negative manner by reference to realities in which 
they participate only partially. From such 
dissatisfaction emerge various forms of disorientation. 
For example, in Gnosticism the world and the body were 
regarded as demonically created prisons which restrict the 
divine spark in humanity.22 The tensions arising from the 
fundamentally ambiguous condition of human beings have 
also been expressed in modern intellectual efforts to make 
a god of man, or to explain humanity solely in terms of 
animality, or to explain God as a projection of the human 
psyche, etc. 
Those who would make a god of man or who seek to 
explain conceptions of divinity as projections of humanity 
have not simply fallen into an erroneous philosophical 
21voegelin, "Equivalences 
bolization in History" (1970), 
Culture" (1971), pp. 62-63; The 
184-88. 
of Experience and Syro-
p. 220; "The Gospel and 
Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 
22voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
pp. 8-11. 
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anthropology. The anxiety which springs from the 
ambiguity of the human condition cannot be alleviated by 
developing ever more sophisticated models of human nature, 
because human nature is only one element within the human 
condition. For Voegelin, the human condition can only be 
understood within the comprehensive matrix of "God and 
man, world and society. 11 23 No single element within this 
matrix can be fully understood unless all of its elements 
are fully understood. Since a full understanding of the 
nature of divinity is beyond the powers of humanity, and 
since humanity cannot be fully understood without 
understanding that which is the ground of its existence, 
the human condition must always remain mysterious at its 
core. 
For Voegel in it was the tensions associated with 
the mysterious relationship between God and humanity which 
lay behind spiritual disorientation. Consequently, the 
earliest evidence of such disorientation is nearly as old 
as the awareness of such a relationship to a transcendent 
God. The first patterns of spiritual disorder, metastatic 
faith and prometheanism, follow in the wake of the 
discovery of spiritual order itself. According to 
Voegelin, the earliest conception of this order as a 
relationship to a transcendent (i.e., fully differentiated 
23voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 1. 
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from the immanent realm of existence) God arose with the 
Israelites, and was made explicit in the Decalogue. 
voegelin held that the Prophets interpreted all 
types of offensive conduct--including spiritual disorder--
as ultimately a violation of the Commandments. This was 
possible because the Decalogue, according to VOegelin, was 
not only a collection of substantive rules but also an 
exemplification of the injunctions to restrain self-
assertiveness with regard to God and man. As a 
consequence, Voegelin maintained, its meaning can be 
concentrated in one command: "Listen to my voice and I 
will be your . God, and you shall be my people; and walk 
consistently in the way that I command you" (Jeremiah 
7:23). The violations can, therefore, be correspondingly 
concentrated in the one offense: "Yet they neither 
1 istened, nor inclined their ear to me, but walked in 
their own counsels and the stubbornness of their evil 
hearts" (Jeremiah 7:24). Voegelin concluded that: 
Disorder in Israel thus was measured by the 
comprehensive order of the Decalogue. As far as 
persons were concerned, the rich and the poor, the 
king and the priests, the sage and the false prophets 
were equally judged by the standard of antidivine or 
antihuman self-assertiveness .... 24 
It should be emphasized that the spiritual disorder of 
antidivine and antihuman self-assertiveness (known to the 
Greeks as hubris and to Christians as the sin of pride) 
24 b'd 
.L_!_., p. 433. 
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has often been identified as the core of the ideological 
impulse in modern politics.25 Voegelin once defined 
ideology itself as "existence in rebellion against God and 
man."26 
Voegelin found evidence within the Old Testament of 
both of the basic patterns of imbalanced consciousness 
introduced in the preceding chapter. The metastatic faith 
of Isaiah as well as the periodic prometheanism of the 
Israelites were engendered, according to Voegelin, by a 
unique historical dilemma. The perennial problem of 
maintaining a balance between openness to transcendent 
experience and sober attentiveness to the necessities of 
mundane existence was especially acute for the people as a 
whole. Cognizant of their unique status as a Chosen 
people, but continually forced to confront the harsh 
realities of worldly political existence, the Israelites 
were involved in a continual struggle to reconcile the 
potentially conflicting demands of spiritual and political 
25Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essav on Man in Revolt 
(Anthony Bower, trans.)(New York: Vantage, 1956); Henri 
de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism (Edith M. Riley, 
trans.) (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1963); Karl Lowith, 
Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1949); J. L. Talmon, The origins of Totalitarian Democracy 
and Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase (New York: 
Praeger, 1960), Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815-1848 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967) ; Gerhart 
Niemeyer, Between Nothingness and Paradise (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1971); Hans Jonas, The 
Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon, 1972). 
26voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiv. 
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life. Admonished by the prophets to entrust their fate to 
Yahweh, and by the Kings to take fate into their own hands 
like other peoples, "existence-in-tension" was an 
historical reality for the Israelites. The admonitions of 
the prophets were clearly directed against forms of 
promethean hubris: 
You have plowed iniquity, you have reaped injustice, 
You have eaten the fruit of lies, 
in that you trusted in your chariots, 
and the multitude of your warriors. 
Hosea 10:13 
Let not the wise man boast of his wisdom, 
Nor the strong man boast of his strength, 
Nor the rich man boast of his riches. 
But if he boasts, let him boast of this, 
that he understands and knows me, 
How I, Yahweh, exercise mercy, 
justice, and righteousness on earth. 
For Yahweh of the hosts has a day 
Against all that is proud and high, 
Jeremiah 9:23-24 
and against all that is lofty and tall: 
Against all the cedars of Lebanon, high and lofty, 
and against all the oaks of Bashan; 
Against all the high mountains, 
and against all the lofty hills; 
Against every tall tower, 
and against every fortified wall; 
Against all the ships of Tarshish, 
and against all the gallant craft. 
Isaiah, 2:12-17 
Although the prophets were acute analysts of the 
promethean strain in the desire of the people for military 
strength and self-aggrandizement, Voegelin argued that the 
prophets were also prone to excess in their disregard of 
worldly necessities. While there may be something impious 
about a Chosen People entrusting their fortune to weaponry 
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rather than the God of the Covenant, the intensity of the 
prophets' experiences of partnership with Yahweh carried 
the risk of obscuring the fact that a Chosen People 
remains, under its mundane aspect, a people like others. 
AS such, the Israelites had need of an administration and 
an army like any other people, barring the appearance of a 
miraculous situation in which their spiritual assets could 
be directly converted into the currency of political 
power. 
Such a situation is not merely conceived as a 
momentary suspension of the vicissitudes of war and 
political struggle. Metastatic faith is a faith that the 
very structure of pragmatic existence in society and 
history is soon to undergo a decisive transformation. 
Thus it is also not merely a conversion of spiritual into 
political assets which is anticipated, but rather a total 
and permanent devaluation of the currency of political 
power, after which those who are rich in spirit will have 
the field of worldly existence to themselves. The gravity 
of the expected transformation, and the belief that it is 
within one's power to bring it about, is what 
distinguishes metastatic faith from the simple hope that 
one's burdens or those of one's society will be lightened. 
Voegelin's writings contain only one analysis of a 
case that is explicitly termed 1111\etastatic," although, as 
Will be argued below, it is clear that he understood the 
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basic experience as a perennial and widespread phenomenon. 
The tensions which lie in the background of this one case, 
that of Isaiah in the eighth century B.C., are both social 
and personal. On the social level we have encountered the 
tensions confronting the Israelites as a people bound by 
the necessities of mundane existence, like other peoples, 
but nevertheless cognizant of its unique status as a 
chosen People living in historical form under Yahweh. 
ouring the wars with Syria of 734 and with Assyria toward 
the end of the century, the potentially conflicting 
demands imposed by this dual role came to a head, as did 
Isaiah's sense of contradiction between the order of faith 
in Yahweh and the apparently senseless order of power in 
political existence. According to Voegel in, "it became 
clear, in brief, that Israel, while it did not mind being 
a Chosen People, did not care to be chosen at the price of 
ceasing to be a people like the others. 11 27 Here was the 
occasion for a prophet to say what a people should do in 
an emergency, whether it was an insult to Yahweh to rely 
on an army and even to have a king and an administration. 
Isaiah, at the command of Yahweh, approached King 
Ahaz and counseled that the King take no defensive 
27Ibid., p. 442. See also Voegelin's brief 
discussion of this incident in 11 Autobiographical Memoir" 
(transcript of a series of tape recorded interviews of 
Voegelin in 1973 by Ellis Sandoz), quoted in Ellis Sandoz, 
The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction 
(1981), pp. 134-35. 
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measures, for Yahweh had said that 11 it shall not stand, 
and it shall not be" that the designs of the enemy be 
crowned with success (7:9). As Voegelin interpreted it, 
this formula implies that "you will last, if you trust."28 
on the occasion of the Assyrian threat and the alliance 
with Egypt, the prophet demanded that the "House of 
oavid, " i.e. , the King and his court, not trust in the 
army or the Egyptian auxiliaries, but "consult Yahweh." 
This voegelin took to mean, "consult Isaiah," who offered 
the advice that the King "trust in the ruach [spirit] that 
lived in him. 11 29 In response to the "crucial question how 
the prophetic charisma can be considered by anybody an 
effective substitute for weapons on the battlefield," 
Voegelin argued that: 
An aura of magic undeniably surrounds the counsel: It 
is due to the fact that the divine plan itself has 
been brought within the knowledge of man, in as much 
as Isaiah knows that God wants the survival of Judah 
as an organized people in pragmatic history. With 
that knowledge is given the trust, not in the 
inscrutable will of God that must be accepted however 
bitter it tastes when it does not agree with the plans 
of man, but in the knowable will of God that conforms 
with the policies of Isaiah and the Chosen People. 
That knowledge of the divine plan casts its paralyzing 
spell on the necessity of action in the world .... 30 
Action in the world continues to be a necessity because 
the immanent structure of worldly existence is unaffected 
2srbid., p. 451. 
29Ibid., p. 449. 
Joibid., pp. 450-51. 
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in any decisive way by the discovery of the transcendent 
ground. Voegelin held that the leap in being is not a 
leap out of existence; the order of this world remains 
autonomous, even when the one God is revealed as the 
ultimate source of order in humanity, society and 
history.31 An enduring recognition of this sobering truth 
almost seems to define what Voegelin termed the balance of 
consciousness. 
The autonomous workings of the political realm may 
appear senseless to one who has participated in the leap, 
and they may at times be senseless from any rational 
perspective, but they are not therefore manipulable by 
extra-worldly means. Voegelin found an aura of magic 
surrounding Isaiah's counsel because Isaiah "has tried the 
impossible: to make the leap in being a leap out of 
existence into a divinely transfigured world beyond the 
laws of mundane existence. n32 This is not a case of 
simple neglect of these laws, but of "rebellion against 
the nature of things as ordained by God, "3 3 and hence a 
case of pneumapathological consciousness. As such, it 
bears a resemblance to cases with which we have a more 
31see Voegelin, 
Introduction (1952), 
(1956), pp. 11, 452. 
32Ibid., p. 452. 
33Ibid., p. 453. 
The 
pp. 
New Science of Poli tics: An 
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immediate familiarity, and thus it is not surprising that 
Voegel in could argue that "the prophetic conception of a 
change in the constitution of being lies at the root of 
our contemporary beliefs in the perfection of 
society .••. 1134 
Nevertheless, if there is a resemblance between 
this case and modern cases of ideological consciousness, 
there is also an important dissimilarity. To be sure, 
metastatic faith and ideological consciousness both arise 
from rebellion against the nature of things as ordained by 
God, but the faith that God himself will set things aright 
is vastly different from the declaration of an ideological 
project which purports to enable human beings to transform 
the world through their own efforts and according to their 
own preferences. The advice of Isaiah may represent, as 
Voegelin maintained, a "gnosis of transmutation, n35 but 
it does not represent a human knowledge of a purportedly 
immanent ground as in ideology. For this reason there are 
problems involved in Voegelin's identification of Isaiah 
and modern ideologues as "brothers under the skin," and, 
as we shall see, metastatic faith is much more akin to 
parousiasm as a form of imbalanced consciousness. 
It seems that Voegelin did not make this 
34Ib 'd ''' 
__ 1_. I p. Xl.l.1. 
35voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 27. 
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distinction when examining the case of Isaiah in Israel 
and Revelation because "metastatic faith" was then being 
used in roughly the same generic sense in which 
"gnosticism" increasingly came to be used in subsequent 
writings. Consequently, the problems which attend to 
voegelin's application of the concept of gnosticism, 
discussed above, attend to his reflections on metastatic 
faith as well. That Voegelin was employing the term in a 
generic sense is apparent from the Pref ace to Israel and 
Revelation, where he observed that, 
Metastatic faith is one of the great sources of 
disorder, if not the principal one, in the 
contemporary world; and it is a matter of life and 
death for all of us to understand the phenomenon and 
find remedies against it before it destroys us.36 
surely he did not mean that the expectation of a divine 
intervention in Old Testament style was a massive force in 
our day. If we employ the somewhat more differentiated 
terminology introduced in the first chapter, we can see 
that Voegelin was arguing that modern ideological con-
sciousness can only be understood as a variant of a 
broader pattern of psychic disorientation, and that the 
evidence of pneumapathological consciousness extends deep 
into antiquity. This important contribution to twentieth 
century political science is not diminished by problems 
Voegelin encountered while struggling to develop an 
36voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii. 
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adequate diagnostic vocabulary. There is a remarkable 
passage in Israel and Revelation where Voegelin 
demonstrated both a brilliant grasp of continuities in 
history and an unfortunate tendency to group under a 
provisional rubric movements which are best kept distinct: 
... (T]he recognition of the metastatic experience is 
of importance for the understanding not only of 
Israelite and Jewish order but of the history of 
Western Civilization to this day. While in the main 
development of Christianity, to be sure, the 
metastatic symbols were transformed into 
eschatological events beyond history, so that the 
order of the world regained its autonomy, the 
continuum of metastatic movements has never been 
broken. It massively surrounds, rivals, and 
penetrates Christianity itself through the Old 
Testament, as well as through the Revelation of st. 
John. Throughout the Middle Ages, the Church was 
occupied with the struggle against heresies of a 
metastatic complexion; and with the Reformation this 
underground stream has come to the surf ace again in a 
massive flood--first, in the left wing of the 
sectarian movements and then in the secular political 
creed movements which purport to exact the metastasis 
by revolutionary action.37 
Insofar as a longing for the transformation of reality can 
be identified within each of these figures and movements, 
Voegelin was justified in drawing such broad parallels. 
Yet this passage reflects a lack of discrimination 
with regard to the subordinate levels of experience which 
distinguish those who conceive of the metastasis as an 
inrush of the divine from those who would transform 
humanity by human means. Thus Voegelin was rightly taken 
to task by Old Testament scholar Bernhard w. Anderson, who 
37 b'd ~., p. 454. 
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defended Isaiah by noting that: 
Clearly there is no basis anywhere in prophecy for the 
modern illusion that man can build the kingdom of God 
on earth, either through technological planning or 
revolutionary zeal. This notion is completely alien 
to the prophetic understanding of history.38 
As a criticism of Voegelin's handling of the relationship 
between metastatic faith and ideological consciousness (at 
least in Israel and Revelation) , this argument is well 
founded; yet it is not sufficient to establish a 
contention that Isaiah was not moved by metastatic faith. 
It is indeed obvious that the prophet did not regard 
technological planning or revolutionary zeal as the means 
by which the kingdom of God could be built on earth. But 
it does not follow that Isaiah regarded any such earthly 
kingdom as impossible, or that the pattern of his 
expectations bears no resemblance to more recent 
anticipations of a fundamental reordering of the world. 
Neither Anderson nor James M. Rhodes (who also expresses 
reservations about Voegelin's "attack" on Isaiah39) 
question Voegelin's interpretation of the scriptural 
passages in question. It is only the 1 ink to modern 
38Bernhard w. Anderson, "Politics and the 
Transcendent: Voegelin' s Philosophical and Theological 
Exposition of the Old Testament in the Context of the 
Ancient Near East, " in Stephen A. McKnight, ed. , Eric 
Voegelin's Search for Order in History (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1987, pp. 62-100), pp. 88-89. 
39James M. Rhodes, "Voegelin and Christian Faith," 
Center Journal (Summer, 1983, pp. 55-105), pp. 58-60, 67-
68, 101. 
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ideological movements that is disputed, and the gravity of 
this objection decreases markedly when metastatic faith 
and ideological consciousness are treated as variants of a 
broader pattern of psychic imbalance rather than as 
belonging to a single, undifferentiated class. Moreover, 
when the roots of this broad pattern are located in the 
very structure of the human condition rather than in a 
chain of literary influence it becomes clear that Voegelin 
was not intending to imply that, as Rhodes puts it, "the 
errant prophet was a protototalitarian. 11 40 
It was noted at the outset of this chapter that 
disorders of the soul can only be adequately diagnosed by 
reference to the order of the soul which was achieved in 
what Voegelin called the leap in being. As we turn to the 
diagnoses of the ancient Greeks we shall therefore focus 
on the analyses of Plato, but it is important to stress 
that the complex of disorders with which we are working 
was "compactly" understood long before philosophical 
scrutiny became possible. Voegelin took the Homeric epics 
to be, among other things, studies of the causes of 
personal and social disorder in the Aegean-wide Mycenaean 
civilization. The Iliad and the Odyssey contain a study 
of the pathology of heroes41 but not of the disorders of 
40ib'd 59 __ 1_., p. . 
4lvoegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), p. 83 
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souls, because, according to Voegel in, the "men of the 
seventh century B.C. had no soul, immortal or 
otherwise.n42 The terms mortal and immortal simply meant 
gods and men, and there is no word for "soul" in the 
epics.43 Since the "gods" are not self-contained entities 
prior to the leap in being but power complexes in a 
compactly experienced order of being that also embraces 
man, the specifically human origins of psychic imbalance 
in the metaxy could not be adequately symbolized. Yet it 
was possible for the author or authors of the epics to 
recognize that the surrounding society was disordered 
because its members were guided by passion (ate) rather 
than by reason and the common good. 
The Homeric ate means the blindness of passion that 
makes a person transgress the law in the turmoil of anger, 
frustration, righteous pride, guilt, or anxiety.44 
Voegelin credits Homer with having created, without the 
aid of an adequate conceptual apparatus, a tentative 
psychology which could identify the symptoms of spiritual 
42Ibid., p. 192. See also The New Science of 
Politics: An Introduction (1952), p. 67. Presumably this 
refers only to Greeks of the seventh century B. C. , as 
Voegelin recognized an earlier leap in being in Israel. 
43voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), p. 103. 
44Ibid., pp. 80, 87. 
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disease by reference to a transcendent order.4 5 Although 
the divine and the human are too closely intermingled in 
the world of Homer for a diagnosis such as that of the 
prophets to have been possible, it seems that the epics 
reflect a developing awareness that symptoms such as pride 
and uncontrollable wrath spring from antidivine and 
antihuman self-assertiveness. Voegelin summarizes the 
Homeric analysis of disorder as follows: 
(1) Man is in the habit of making the gods responsible 
for his misdeeds, as well as for the evil consequences 
engendered by his misconduct. 
(2) Theoretically, this habit implies that the gods 
are the cause of the evil which men do and suffer. 
This assertion is wrong. It is man, not the gods, who 
are responsible for evil. 
{ 3) Practically, this habit is dangerous to social 
order. Misdeeds will be committed more easily if 
responsibility can be shifted to the gods. 
(4) Historically, a civilizational order is in decline 
and will perish, if this habit finds general social 
acceptance. 46 
Homer's observation that the disorder of a society could 
be traced to the disordered behavior of its component 
members (especially the ruling class) prefigures the 
Platonic analyses of the fourth century. Despite "the 
45Ibid., pp. 108-109. Darrell Dobbs, who does not 
appear to have been influenced by Voegelin, has recently 
argued that Homer's principal intention in the Odyssey was 
to highlight the disordered nature of mundane rationalism 
when untempered by reverence before the sacred. See 
"Reckless Rationalism and Heroic Reverence in Homer's 
Odyssey," American Political Science Review (vol. LXXXI, 
1987, pp. 491-508). 
46voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 107-
108. 
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great difference which is due to the fact that Homer wrote 
before, while Plato wrote after the discovery of the 
psyche, 11 Voegelin regarded the Homeric diagnosis as a 
remarkable achievement in view of the "rather crude" 
symbols which were available.47 With the development of 
more sophisticated symbols in the intervening centuries 
Plato was able to penetrate much more deeply into psychic 
and social disorder, but surprisingly few of the eminent 
thinkers of the fourth and fifth centuries were to surpass 
Homer. For example, Voegelin maintained that the Homeric 
etiology of disorder was subjected to "rationalist 
destruction" at the hands of Herodotus, who disbelieved 
Homer's account of the Trojan War and preferred that of 
the Egyptians "because nobody would have been so foolish 
as to ruin a city for such a cause. 11 48 This dispassionate 
coordination of means and ends represented, in Voegelin's 
view, a decline from Homer's subtle attempts to explain 
precisely why such foolishness had happened. Moreover, 
Herodotus' great popularity in Athens only a few decades 
after the generation of Aeschylus and Marathon indicates 
that "the spiritual and intellectual decline" of Hellenic 
civilization itself "must have been as rapid as it was 
47rb'd io0 __ l._., p. . 
48rb'd 40 __ ]._., p. • 
67 
terrific. 114 9 The decline became still more precipitous 
when Thucydides, in conformity with the temper of his 
time, turned to the brute facts of political power as the 
standard of action.50 
By the latter years of the fifth century the strict 
rationality of a struggle for power without regard for the 
order of Hellenic society had apparently become the 
general standard of action in political practice. When 
pragmatic rationality displaces a sense of participation 
in right order it becomes, according to Voegelin, a 
dangerous indulgence that may grow into an irrational 
force destructive of order. Such a situation is described 
in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides. The speeches of the 
Athenian ambassadors to the Melians suggest that the 
libidinous logic of power and conquest had eclipsed all 
sensitivity for justice and compassion: 
You know as well as we do that in human discussion 
justice enters only where the pressure of necessity is 
equal. For the rest, the powerful exact what they can 
and the weak grant what they must.51 
The ambassadors open the negotiations with the request to 
dispense with all pretenses of justice and honorable 
conduct, which no one can any longer take seriously. They 
49rbid. 
5orbid., p. 41. 
51Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New 
York: Penguin, 1954), V, 89, p. 402. Voegelin's 
translation from The World of the Polis, p. 373. 
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do not attempt to derive a right of empire from their 
victory over the Persians, nor do they accuse the Melians 
of having done any wrong. As Voegelin summarized their 
justification, "empire is just empire, the ultimate 
reality. 11 52 Their course of action, which will ultimately 
result in the butchering of all the men of Melos and the 
selling of the women and children into slavery, is said to 
proceed from the "necessity" imposed by nature on men and, 
perhaps, on the gods as well: 
Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a 
necessity of nature they rule whenever they can. We 
neither made this law nor were we the first to act on 
it; we found it in existence before us and shall leave 
it to exist forever after us; we only make use of it, 
knowing that you and everybody else, if you were as 
strong as we are, would act as we do.53 
This is more than simple political "realism"; the passage 
suggests that the libido dominandi has begun to fashion 
for itself a philosophy of existence detached from any 
divine limitation. Such a philosophy will appear, full 
blown, in the speeches of Plato's Callicles. For Voegelin 
the passage signified a fictitious identification of 
conquest with reality, which was achieved by "identifying 
reality with a humanity contracted to its libidinous 
52voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 182. 
53Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, V, 
105, pp. 404-405. Voegelin's translation from The World 
of the Polis (1957), p. 373. 
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self. n54 Modern parallels come easily to mind, but what 
needs emphasis, Voegelin stated, is that unlike modern 
ideologists the Athenians were still conscious of the 
horror of this process: 
For the Athenian negotiators admit, and even stress, 
the horror in its starkness; they do not make the 
slightest attempt at smearing it over with idealisms, 
ideological verities, or speculative systems. It is 
true, they have deformed their existence and created 
an imaginary reality that will allow them to "do their 
thing," but in the background of this imaginary 
reality there is still the tragic consciousness of the 
process. They have not sunk to the untragic vileness 
of the ideologist who cannot cornrni t the murder he 
wants to cornrni t in order to gain an "identity" in 
place of the self he has lost, without moralistically 
appealing to a dogma of ultimate truth.55 
If the Athenians of the time were at least 
straightforward about their lust for power, Thucydides 
nevertheless found it necessary to turn to the models of 
the Hippocratic school in order to describe the behavior 
of his contemporaries. The medical conception of disease 
was invoked to relate the events now known as the 
Peloponnesian War in terms of a kinesis, a feverish 
movement of society and a disease of political order. It 
is interesting to note that although we now accept it as a 
fact that there was such an event as the "Peloponnesian 
War" from 431 to 404, the contemporaries of Thucydides did 
not share his perception that such a great war had 
54voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 182. 
55Ibid. 
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occurred. 56 They only knew of an Archidaman or Ten Years 
war, lasting from 431 to 421, and of a Decelean or Ionian 
war, lasting from 414 to 404. The seven intervening years 
were punctuated by no more violence than was considered 
usual in what the Hellenes called peace among their 
12oleis, and the expedition of Athens against Sicily in 
415-413 was not a war against the Peloponnesians. The 
great war described by Thucydides was a unit of his 
creation based upon the Hippocratic model. When his 
contemporaries said war they meant, according to Voegelin, 
a series of battles and campaigns that had a formal 
beginning with a declaration of war and a formal end with 
a treaty of peace. But "when Thucydides said war, " he 
meant: 
a movement that was more than a series of diplomatic 
and military actions in so far as, beyond physical 
clashes and conflicts of passions, it had a dimension 
of meaning extending into the regions of moral 
breakdown and transfiguration.57 
It was the pressure of this pervasive moral breakdown, 
exerted upon the soul of Plato in the aftermath of the war 
and the execution of Socrates, to which Voegelin 
attributed the founding experiences of political 
philosophy. 
56voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 350, 
358. 
57rb'd 358 
__ 1_. I P• • 
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Voegelin, who has often been labeled a Platonist,58 
flatly stated that he was "not concerned with a 'Platonic 
philosophy' or 'doctrine'" for the basic reason that the 
propagation of a doctrine was simply not, in his view, 
Plato's intention. The dialogues were rather a symbolic 
medium for Plato's resistance to the disorder of the 
surrounding society and his effort to restore the order of 
Hellenic civilization through love of wisdom. Thus, for 
Voegelin, 
[Plato's] philosopher does not exist in a social 
vacuum, but in opposition to the sophist. Justice is 
not defined in the abstract but in opposition to the 
concrete forms which injustice assumes. The right 
order of the polis is not presented as an "ideal 
state," but the elements of right order are developed 
in concrete opposition to the elements of disorder in 
the surrounding society. And the shape, the Eidos, of 
Arete in the soul grows in opposition to the many eide 
of disorder in the sou1.59 
One would search in vain for a distinction in Voegelin's 
writings between philosophy and political philosophy 
because he regarded all true philosophizing as an 
historically rooted act of resistance to the disordering 
of the soul and society by spiritual disease. He takes 
this to have been Plato's conception of philosophy as 
well, and the importance of Voegelin's diagnostic efforts 
58E.g., Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1977), p. 
127; Frederick o. Wilhelmsen, Christianity and Political 
Philosophy (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 
1978), p. 201. 
59voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 63. 
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within his thought as a whole should be understood in this 
light. It is not as though Voegelin simply digressed from 
time to time in his writings on ancient conceptions of 
order to off er an observation on the crisis of the 
present; the historical search itself was expressly 
intended as part of his own act of resistance.60 
It was noted in the previous chapter that 
voegelin's career as a political scientist can be 
described as a search for the wellsprings of the political 
crisis of modernity, the analytical tools required to 
render it intelligible, and sources for an appropriate 
therapy. This set of projects, like his conception of 
philosophy, clearly appears to have been derived from 
Plato: 
Philosophy ••. has its origin in the resistance of the 
soul to its destruction by society. Philosophy in 
this sense, as an act of resistance illuminated by 
conceptual understanding, has two functions for Plato. 
It is first, and most importantly, an act of salvation 
for himself and others, in that the evocation of right 
order and its reconstitution in his own soul becomes 
the substantive center of a new community which, by 
its existence, relieves the pressure of the 
surrounding corrupt society. Under this aspect Plato 
is the founder of the community of philosophers that 
lives throughout the ages. Philosophy is, second, an 
act of judgment .••• Since the order of the soul is 
recaptured through resistance to the surrounding 
disorder, the pairs of concepts [in the Republic] 
which illuminate the act of resistance develop into 
the criteria (in the pregnant sense of instruments or 
standards of judgment) of social order and disorder. 
60voegelin, Israel and Revelation {1956), p. 
Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 302; The Ecumenic 
(1974), p. 38; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 137-38. 
xiv; 
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Under this second aspect Plato is the founder of 
political science.61 
Just as Voegelin's diagnostic, conceptual and therapeutic 
projects are in a sense restorations of the Platonic 
analysis, Plato drew upon the symbols and methods of his 
own predecessors. He incorporated the characterization by 
Heraclitus of conceit as a "sacred diseasen62 and the 
distinction of Xenophanes between proper and improper 
representations of the gods.63 The medical models of the 
Hippocratic school as adapted by Thucydides were utilized, 
along with Aeschylus' understanding of authadia as a 
madness or disease (noses) characterized by "brazen, 
shameless, conceited, self-reliant self-satisfaction."64 
Building upon the Aeschylean understanding of society as 
an order of the soul, and of the soul as a social order of 
forces, Plato could formulate the principles of the 
Republic that social disorders are traceable to psychic 
disorders and that the right order of the soul is the 
source of order in society. 
For Plato justice and injustice are in the soul 
61voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 68-69. 
62Ibid., p. 260. 
63voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 171-
180, 184-88; Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 67. 
64Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 977, 1012, 1037; 
Voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 258-60. See 
also The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), 
p. 66. 
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what health and disease are in the body. 65 Bodily health 
is defined as the establishment of a natural order among 
the parts of the organism, whereas disease is a 
disturbance of the natural order of rule and subordination 
among the parts. Similarly, the condition of justice in 
the soul is conceived as a natural, harmonious order of 
the parts in which each fulfills its function without 
interfering with those of the others. Dikaiosyne or 
justice is contrasted to polypragmosyne, which Voegelin 
understood as "the readiness to engage in multifarious 
activities which are not a man's proper business. 11 66 When 
applied to the soul polypragmosyne refers to the tendency 
of appetites and desires to dictate human action and claim 
the rulership of the soul which properly belongs to 
wisdom. The rulership of wisdom consists in the ordering 
of one's life toward contemplation of divine being and the 
preparation of the soul for its existence beyond this 
life. Injustice is a diseased inversion of this order, 
manifested in hybris and pleonexia (unjust will to power), 
which are the basic characteristics of the complex we have 
termed pro-metheanism. 
The specifically political dimension of justice and 
injustice is expressed in the principle of Republic 368d-e 
65p1ato, The Republic of Plato (Allan Bloom, 
trans.) (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 444c-d, p. 124. 
66voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 64. 
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that society is man written in larger letters. Although 
the Republic begins as a dialogue on the just life of the 
individual, it could be broadened into an inquiry into 
order and disorder in society because of Plato's awareness 
that the state of the individual psyche manifests itself 
in the corresponding state of society. At 435e Plato's 
Socrates asks, "Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree 
that the same forms and dispositions as are in the city 
are in each of us?" and answers that "surely they didn't 
get there from any other place. n67 At 544d-e Glaucon is 
told that "it is necessary that there also be as many 
forms of human character as there are forms of regimes" 
and is asked, "or do you suppose that the regimes arise 
'from oak and rocks' and not from the dispositions of men 
in the cities, which, tipping the scale as it were, draw 
the rest along with them?"68 Thus it is not only the good 
polis which is man written large, but every polis writes 
large the type of person that is socially dominant in it. 
As Voegelin succinctly summarized the thesis derived from 
this "anthropological principle," "a polis is in order 
when it is ruled by men with well-ordered souls; it is in 
67p1ato, The Republic of Plato, p. 114. 
68 b'd 2 L.:1._., p. 2 2. 
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disorder when the souls of the rulers are disordered.n69 
In keeping with this anthropological principle, 
Plato analyzed the concrete disorders of his time on both 
the individual and social level, and thus was able to 
relate a sophisticated understanding of the reciprocal 
causal relationships involved in the corrupting process. 
The sophists, poets and politicians are cast as both the 
corruptors of society and also as mere creatures of an 
already corrupted society. In the Gorgias Socrates takes 
the famous sophist to task for empowering men without 
knowledge of the health of the polis with persuasive 
techniques that can make them politically powerful. Yet 
it becomes clear that the effectiveness of these 
techniques is dependent upon the debasement of the public 
at large, which prefers sophistic flattery to the sobering 
critical inquiry of philosophers. Socrates grants to 
Gorgias that one trained in rhetoric by a sophist will 
overcome a physician in public competition for a post like 
that of our Surgeon General, but notes that this is only 
the case when the competition takes place before a public 
which is ignorant of the art of medicine and which prefers 
the plea~ant but ineffective remedy of a confectioner to 
the painful treatment of a physician. The medical 
69voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70. on 
Plato's anthropological principle see The New Science of 
Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 61-63, 67-70; Plato 
and Aristotle (1957), pp. 67-70, 85-88, 124-29. 
77 
metaphor emerges again at 519, where Socrates accuses the 
"great" politicians of Athenian history of having 
"bloated" the city with docks and harbors and tribute 
money while leaving no room for justice and temperance. 
For this Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon and Miltiades are 
held culpable, but by the same token the political 
"success" of these figures is attributed to their 
willingness to deliver at the behest of a populace shot 
through with hubris and pleonexia. 
Plato avoids a blurring of the lines of 
responsibility in this situation--without losing sight of 
the pervasiveness of the disorder--by clearly defining the 
essential task of the statesman, who is again likened to a 
physician. A statesman is good if under his care the 
citizens become better; he is bad if under his rule the 
citizens become worse, in terms of existential order. 7 O 
Socrates declares this to be the true art of politics, of 
which he is the only practitioner.71 With this standard 
70Plato, Gorgias, 504e. In Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 277. 
See also Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 38. 
71p1ato, Gorgias, 521d, in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato, p. 302. Voegelin interprets this striking passage 
as a claim on the part of Plato--not Socrates--to the 
moral authority for which the corrupted public realm of 
Athens was no longer fit. Given the decidedly un-Socratic 
tone of the section, this seems plausible as an 
interpretive point. See Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle 
(1957) I PP• 36-39. 
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set, it becomes apparent that the supposedly great 
statesmen of Athens were not statesmen at all but 
exemplars of polypragmosyne or dilettantish meddlesomeness 
in matters for which they were radically unsuited. 
suitability for founding or ruling a political community 
is not a function of mundane political "know-how" but of 
the order established in the soul through the 
transformative vision of the Agathon or Good-in-itself. 
And as the Republic makes clear, the goodness of a polis 
originates not from its institutional pattern but from the 
psyche of the founder or ruler who will stamp the pattern 
of his soul on the institutions. Thus Socrates is quite 
elaborate in his description of the education that will 
form the souls of the guardians in his good polis, but, as 
Voegelin observed, Socrates 
roundly refuses to go into details, not only of 
customs and mores, but even of civil, commercial, and 
criminal law, because such matters will take care of 
themselves if only the souls of the legislative rulers 
are in good order ( 425a-d) . Moreover, he restrains 
himself deliberately at this point in order not to 
give the false impression that good order in a polis 
can be created through institutional devices. He 
considers it, on the contrary, a symptom of disease in 
a polis when the citizens are feverishly active with 
patching up this or that gap in the law, but do not 
dare to touch the well-known source of the multitude 
of minor evils.72 
Since it is the animating spirit of a regime and 
72voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 87. This 
is, in essence, the reason why Voegelin considered 
"constitutionalism" an ideology. 
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not its institutional form which will determine the nature 
of political order, Plato can speak of a sophistic or 
philosophic polis according to the nature of the ruler 
whose psyche determines its character. The philosophic 
polis is constituted by the rule of a philosopher king or 
a number of philosophers, and it is a matter of 
indifference to Socrates whether the institutional form 
will in fact be monarchical or aristocratic.73 The 
sophistic polis may also take on a variety of forms, none 
of which are strictly dictated by the nature of sophistry. 
Thus the problem with democracy for Plato is not technical 
or structural, except in the restricted sense that 
sophistic flatterers are somewhat more likely to rise to 
power, for the same reason that the dubious art of the 
sophist works best in a crowd. In this case, which was of 
course the case in Athens at the time of the composition 
of the Republic, the blame for the resulting degradation 
of politics must be shared between the sophists and the 
crowd--rather than being ascribed to procedural problems. 
The blame must be shared because the sophists, like 
politicians of the type encountered above, were as much 
the products as the causes of a spiritually corrupt 
society. It is less likely that Protagoras corrupted the 
73Plato, The Republic of Plato, 445c-e,- p. 125. See 
also Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), p. 62; Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70. 
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Hellenes by declaring man to be the measure than that he 
became famous for articulating an orientation to which 
they had gradually become accustomed. In Book VI of the 
Republic Socrates argues that it is not the sophists who 
corrupt the youth but society, which is described as "the 
greatest of all sophists. 11 74 Individual sophists are 
likened to a man who learns by heart the desires and 
dislikes of a great beast that he is rearing. Having 
learned which sounds indicate ferocity or tameness in the 
beast, and which stimuli bring forth these states, the man 
organizes his observations, calls them wisdom, and 
proceeds to teach others. Knowing nothing of what is 
actually good or bad for the beast but only what pleases 
or displeases it, the man is obviously a charlatan at the 
art of animal husbandry. Such is the relation of sophist 
to society. The sophistic politician merely observes and 
satisfies the desires of the "many-headed beast," as 
Socrates had stated to the great discomfiture of Callicles 
in the Gorgias.75 Men such as Callicles only seem to call 
the tune; in truth they mimic "the greatest of all 
sophists." But again, the blame must be shared because 
individual sophists and their students have, like the 
74rbid., 492b; cf. Voegelin~ Plato and Aristotle 
(1957), p. 70. 
75p1ato, Gorgias, 513, in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato, pp. 294-95. 
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allegorical handler of the beast, unjustly taken it upon 
themselves to practice an art for which they are wholly 
unsuited. 
Neither the greatness nor the limitations of 
Plato's diagnosis can be fully appreciated unless we 
depart from Voegelin's analysis to consider Plato's search 
for forms of personal and social therapy. This topic will 
also prove to be of great importance when we turn, in the 
final chapter, to Voegelin's own therapeutic project. 
What is most noteworthy about Plato's search is the 
development of an awareness that it was profoundly 
unlikely (although not impossible) that the transcendent 
pattern of order experienced in his soul could me made 
authoritative in the order of society. We know from the 
Seventh Letter and other sources that Plato, like Isaiah, 
was acutely sensitive to the pressures exerted by the 
corruption of the surrounding society.76 We are also told 
that he was the recipient of mystical insights into the 
transcendent source of order of such magnificence that 
they could not be distilled into the structure of 
language. 77 Yet, even in this extraordinary tension 
between the horror of the mundane and the beauty of the 
transcendent, Plato was able to maintain the balance of 
76p1ato, Letter VII, 324c-326b, in The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato, pp. 1574-76. 
77Ibid., 341b-e, 343a-344c, pp. 1588-91. 
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consciousness. This is the existential tension which gave 
rise to the metastatic faith of Isaiah and, as we shall 
see, the parousiasm of the millenarian sects of the Middle 
Ages. Voegelin regarded the Platonic response to this 
tension as a model of "noetic control," and contrasted it 
favorably to the Isaianic response: 
When Plato lets his analysis of right order in society 
culminate in the symbols of the Philosopher King and 
the Royal Ruler, he is fully aware of the obstacles 
presented by human nature and the course of pragmatic 
history to the event of a paradigmatic polis ever 
becoming the ins ti tu ti on of a society; he stresses 
both the improbability of its establishment and the 
inevitability of its decline if it ever should be 
established. When Isaiah lets his faith culminate in 
the vision of the Prince of peace who will set the act 
of faith which the pragmatic king rejects, he believes 
in the magic power of an act that will transmute the 
structure of reality, as well as in his own advice as 
a Gnosis of transmutation.78 
The Seventh Letter indicates that even as a young man 
Plato was aware that the poleis of his time could only be 
redeemed by an "effort of an almost miraculous kind. n79 
But unlike Isaiah, Plato seems never to have thought such 
a miracle forthcoming, nor did he think it within his 
power to bring about a metastasis. This is shown by his 
perception that even such a miraculous effort would have 
to be "accompanied by good luck.n80 
78voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 27. 
79p1ato, Letter VII, 326a, in The Collected Dialogues 
of Plato, p. 1576. 
80ibid. 
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A reform of the Hellenic world along the lines of 
the Republic or Statesman was not anticipated for a 
variety of reasons. We have seen that Plato discounted 
the possibility that a restructuring of political 
institutions could penetrate to the spiritual roots of the 
crisis of the polis. Thus there is little reason to 
believe that the Republic was intended as a blueprint for 
the institutional reform of the polis. Indeed, the 
unnatural and outlandish practices which are contemplated 
in the dialogue may have been intended as a warning 
against attempts to embody the Idea by means of social 
engineering. The hypothetical necessity of measures such 
as a program of eugenics and a thoroughgoing communism 
would seem to suggest that there is an inherent resistance 
in the matter of political life to the imposition of the 
form of transcendentally-grounded order. In addition it 
must be remembered that even these measures would not long 
maintain the order of the good polis against the flux of 
Becoming. 
A reform at the level of institutions would be of 
no avail unless the spiritual authority of the philosopher 
could set the pattern for a general spiritual reform. 
This second option is also highly problematic, as Plato 
shows with great subtlety. It is conceivable that 
philosophers might have been able to effect such a reform 
in at least four ways: ( 1) by means of the forcible 
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isolation and education of the uncorrupted youth, (2) by 
means of the propagation of a new religious dogma to 
replace the corroded cults popularized by epic and tragic 
poetry, (3) by means of a general appeal from the 
authority of philosophy to the populace, or (4) a reform 
of individual leaders through the cathartic effects of 
Socratic dialectic. 
in order. 
These possibilities will be taken up 
At the end of Book VII of the Republic Socrates 
suggests that in the event that true philosophers should 
come to power in a polis, the whole population over ten 
years of age should be sent out to the countryside. He 
and Glaucon agree that this would be the quickest and 
easiest way to institute the regime. With the rule of the 
philosophers established, they could raise the children 
under ten years of age according to their own manners and 
laws.81 Voegelin agreed that the program is ingenious and 
eminently practical, with the one flaw that it cannot be 
executed by true philosophers. For as Plato had also 
seen, "any attempt to realize the order of the idea by 
violent means would defeat itself. The authority of the 
spirit is an authority only if, and when, it is accepted 
in freedom. 11 82 While Plato evidently did not intend that 
8lp1ato, The Republic of Plato, 541a, p. 220. 
82voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, p. 135. 
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the program be put into practice, Voegelin observed that, 
we see it followed almost to the letter in our own 
time when bands of sectarians gain power in a country 
and begin to reconstruct the people according to their 
own manners and character by eliminating the older 
generation from public life and bringing up the 
children in a new creed.83 
There is ample evidence of this in the Hitler Youth of 
Nazi Germany, the Komsomol and Young Pioneers of the 
soviet Union, the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution, 
and in the wholesale slaughter of the older generation in 
Cambodia by children under the direction of the Khmer 
Rouge. Each of these grotesque attempts at the forcible 
embodiment of a creed has proven what Plato already knew: 
The disorder of the polis cannot be repaired by 
descending to the level of disorder, by adding a new 
faction to the existing ones. The tyranny of the 
rabble cannot be transformed into freedom by 
countering it with a tyranny of the spirit.84 
Even if it is recognized that a creed cannot be 
forcibly embodied, it would still be conceivable that a 
restorative creed could be publicized in such a way that 
through peitho or existential persuasion the souls of the 
citizens would be reordered. The problem here is that 
philosophy, as understood by both Plato and Voegelin, can 
issue in no such creed, political or religious. The 
communicable results of philosophizing are symbols of 
experience, not dogmas or doctrines. In fact, the latter 
83Ibid. 
84Ibid., p. 143. 
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are produced by hypostatizing philosophical symbols, which 
in simpler terms means transforming them into something 
they are not--for purposes to which they should not be 
put.85 We can again consult the Seventh Letter for 
Plato's assessment of public doctrine as a medium for the 
transmission of philosophical experience: 
I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor 
shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way 
of putting it in words •... If I thought it possible to 
deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a 
lecture for the general public, what finer achievement 
would there have been in my life than to write a work 
of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of 
things to light for all men?86 
Thus Voegelin simply denied the existence of anything that 
could rightly be called a religious "doctrine" in Plato's 
work, and insisted with regard to political "doctrine" 
that "if Plato's evocation of a paradigm of right order is 
interpreted as a philosopher's opinion about politics, the 
result will be hopeless nonsense, not worth a word of 
debate. 11 87 
85The problem of the hypostatization of philosophical 
symbols will be taken up in the final chapter. This is 
precisely the fate which befell Plato's philosophy at the 
hands of Dionysius. Cf. Plato, Letter VII, 341b, in The 
Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 1588. For a brief 
overview of Voegelin's views regarding hypostatization see 
Barry Cooper, "The Concept of Historiogenesis, 11 in The 
Political Theory of Eric Voegelin (Lewiston: The Edward 
Mellen Press, 1986, pp. 125-60), pp. 129-34. 
86p1ato, Letter VII, 341c-d, p. 1589. See also 
Phaedrus, 275c-e, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 
520-21. 
87voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70. 
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This is not to suggest that Plato did not attempt a 
reform of Hellenic theology. Such a reform was indeed 
attempted in the myths of Gorgias, Republic and Timaeus, 
and throughout the dialogues Plato is clearly in 
competition with the epic and tragic poets over 
representations of the gods. But an alethinos logos or 
"true story" can only provide orientation to those with 
experiences of truth; the disoriented soul must be told a 
gennaion pseudos, a "Big Lie. 11 88 Plato did not attempt to 
slip such a lie past his contemporaries. He called it a 
lie. The content of the lie or Phoenician Tale in 
Republic III is the truth that all men are brothers.89 It 
is called a "big" lie or a "whopper," as Voegelin 
translates, 90 because it was so little appreciated in 
Plato's disordered environment. Voegelin suggested that 
"the introduction of the supreme truth as an unbelievable 
Big Lie is one of the bitterest passages in a work that 
heaps so much scorn on Athens.n91 
Thus Plato rejected the possibility of effecting a 
spiritual reform by means of a dogmatic, public theology. 
88p1ato, Timaeus, 26e, in The Collected Dialoques of 
Plato, p. 1160; The Republic of Plato, 414c, p. 93. 
89p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 414b-415b, pp. 93-94. 
Cf. Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 105. 
90voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 105, 17n. 
91Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
concrete spiritual disorder. At Rebublic 365d-e and 
throughout Book X of the Laws Plato calls attention to a 
contrary set of propositions which apparently were 
commonly forwarded at the time: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
It seems that no gods exist: 
Even if they do exist, they do not care about 
humanity: 
Even if they care, they can be bribed with gifts 
and sacrifices.93 
To these Plato opposes the propositions that the gods do 
exist, that they do care about humanity, and that they 
cannot be appeased with bribes. In the Laws the creed is 
to be enforced by the Nocturnal Council. There is no 
suggestion that the creed can serve by itself as an 
adequate theology, or that it will even be effective as an 
antidote against the nosos when it has taken root in a 
soul. If we may pursue the metaphor, the creed represents 
a purely preventive prescription. As creeds go it is 
certainly not very detailed--in keeping with the dim view 
taken by Plato of doctrinal representations of 
transcendent truth for mass consumption. 
A direct appeal for spiritual reform by 
philosophers would pose equally intractable problems. 
There is first the difficulty that it is impossible for a 
multitude to be philosophic, as Socrates asserts in the 
93p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 365d-e, pp. 42-43; 
Laws X, passim. Cf. Voegelin, The World of the Polis 
(1957), p. 274: Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 263-67. 
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a purely preventive prescription. As creeds go it is 
certainly not very detailed--in keeping with the dim view 
taken by Plato of doctrinal representations of 
transcendent truth for mass consumption. 
A direct appeal for spiritual reform by 
philosophers would pose equally intractable problems. 
There is first the difficulty that it is impossible for a 
multitude to be philosophic, as Socrates asserts in the 
Republic, and that those who do philosophize are therefore 
necessarily blamed by them.94 In the Statesman the young 
Socrates agrees with the Eleatic Stranger that no large 
group of men will indeed be capable of acquiring any art, 
much less the art of ruling.95 Since the political art 
does not come within the range of their personal ex-
perience, they cannot recognize it even when it is being 
practiced before their eyes. If a ruler appears who 
wishes to reform the polis, the people cannot know whether 
he is a true ruler or a tyrant; his appeal will be 
rejected as a dangerous pretention because they cannot 
believe that anybody is able to rule in the spirit of 
wisdom and virtue.96 
94p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 494a, p. 173. 
95Plato, Statesman, 300e, in The Collected Dialogues 
of Plato, p. 1071. 
96Ibid., 301c-d, p. 1072. Cf. Voegelin, Plato and 
Aristotle (1957), p. 163. 
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The tone of these passages is empathetic rather 
than misanthropic. That the people cannot recognize the 
authority of the philosopher is disastrous but it is not, 
according to Plato, simply the fault of the people. When 
Socrates proposes that the city should be turned over to 
philosophers at Republic 487d, Adeimantus balks, 
apparently out of fear that he has been led to an absurd 
conclusion by dialectical trickery. For after all, 
Adeimantus suggests, everyone says that those who linger 
in philosophy become queer and useless to the cities. 
surprisingly, Socrates agrees, although he then tries to 
show that this is not the fault of true philosophers. 
Philosophers are useless to the cities because the people 
have no good reason to believe that the practices of the 
philosopher have anything to do with ruling. Acquainted 
as they are with the daily activities of rulers, they find 
it difficult to believe that one who spends his time in 
contemplation of eternal being will be very well equipped 
for such tasks. This is perfectly sensible on their part. 
The pilot of a ship must appear quite mad to a passenger 
who is unaware that the art of navigation requires the 
pilot to look toward the heavens. Both the pilot and the 
philosopher will be called stargazers. 
The situation is complicated further by the fact 
that most of those who purport to be philosophers are mere 
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imitators of the philosophic nature. 97 The result is that 
true philosophers, who seem odd enough as things stand, 
are innocently associated with a genuinely contemptible 
lot. That the people are innocent in making this 
association can be shown by returning to the perspective 
of the passenger aboard ship. If pilots were widely known 
to be quacks who continually run their ships aground, we 
could not help but sympathize with a passenger who would 
prefer someone at the helm who concerned himself with what 
lies immediately before the ship. The people cannot be 
blamed for pref erring politicians who concern themselves 
with what lies immediately before the polis. The people 
can recognize the need for docks and harbors and revenues 
but have not an inkling of the journey of the soul beyond 
death, and thus they turn to a Pericles (if they are 
lucky) and not to the philosopher who could prepare their 
souls for that ultimate voyage. 
The politicians who preside over the spiritual 
corruption of society are formidable opponents despite 
(and to some extent because of) their infirmities of 
character. This is grudgingly admitted even in the 
sharpest of Plato's attacks: 
He acquires a tense and bitter shrewdness; he knows 
how to flatter his master and earn his good graces, 
but his mind is narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship 
in slavery has dwarfed and twisted his growth and 
97p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 49la, p. 170. 
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robbed him of his free spirit, driving him into 
devious ways, threatening him with fears and 
dangers .•.. [S]o, turning from the first to lies and 
the requital of wrong with wrong, warped and stunted, 
he passes from youth to manhood with no soundness in 
him and turns out, in the end, a man of formidable 
intellect--as he imagines.98 
The philosopher is no match for such a person in political 
struggle, at least not as long as the most efficient 
techniques of combat are disdained. Plato seems to have 
studied this character type intently, and it is probably 
safe to assume that he articulated the worldview of a 
Thrasymachus or a Callicles with greater clarity than 
their historical counterparts, if such there were, could 
have done. Plato could easily have exposed such men to a 
devastating critique, not in writing but in the Assembly 
prior to a public appeal for reform, if he had thought 
this potentially fruitful. But the moral appeal would 
likely be publicly ridiculed because the philosopher tends 
to cut a ridiculous figure in public. 
In the Apology Socrates denies the charge of 
Aristophanes that he is engaged in the study of things 
below the earth and in the sky, yet he does not deny that 
philosophers are as bizarre from the perspective of the 
uninitiated as the Clouds had suggested.99 In Theaetetus 
98Plato, Theaetetus, 
Dialogues of Plato, p. 878. 
173a-b, in The Collected 
99Plato, Apology, 18a-19d, in The Collected Dialogues 
of Plato, pp. 4-6; Aristophanes, Clouds, in The Complete 
Plays of Aristophanes (Toronto: Bantam, 1962), pp. 101-
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socrates admits that although the philosopher spends all 
of his time inquiring into human nature he is hardly aware 
of whether his next-door neighbor is man or animal. 100 
The inattentiveness which landed Thales in the legendary 
well was not a quirk limited to an individual. It is 
characteristic of philosophers as a type, and the laughter 
of the Thracian maidservant will be raised to a din if the 
philosopher enters the public arena: 
•.• [O]n a public occasion or in private company, in a 
law court or anywhere else, when he is forced to talk 
about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes, the 
whole rabble will join the maidservants in laughing at 
him, as from inexperience he walks blindly and 
stumbles into every pitfall. His terrible clumsiness 
makes him seem so stupid.101 
If Plato's philosopher is forced to join in the 
disputation of the Cave he will become a source of 
laughter; if he actively attempts to free others from 
their bonds and to take the lead on the way of assent, 
they will kill him when an opportunity is presented.102 
As Allan Bloom has argued, Plato's understanding of the 
difficulties confronting the public dissemination of 
knowledge stands in stark contrast to the view of the 
leading figures of the Enlightenment: 
141. 
lOOp1ato, Theaetetus, 
Dialogues of Plato, p. 879. 
101Ibid., 174b-c. 
174b, in The Collected 
102p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 517a, p. 196. 
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The Enlightenment, taken literally, believed that the 
light could be brought into the cave and the shadows 
dispelled •.•• This Socrates denies; the philosopher 
does not bring light to the cave, he escapes into the 
light and can lead a few to it; he is a guide, not a 
torchbearer .... The Enlightenment teaches that the cave 
can be transformed; Socrates teaches that it must be 
transcended and that · this transcendence can be 
accomplished only by a few.103 
Thus a public appeal for spiritual reform would be 
ineffective at best. 
One final possibility remains. Since a philosopher 
can guide at least a few souls toward a transcendent 
orientation which could permit them to resist the 
attractions of power and passion, it seems that the reform 
of a number of important citizens could mitigate the 
corruption of the general public. At the disposal of the 
Socratic educator is "the art of turning around .•• the 
whole soul" toward knowledge and justice .104 Although 
Socrates insists in the Republic that it is impossible for 
a multitude to be philosophic, it is also asserted that 
the potential for reorientation exists in the soul of each 
individua1.105 Moreover, this potential is not exhausted 
when the malleability of youthful behavior hardens into 
the habits of adulthood. Thus it would not be necessary 
to expel the older generation from the city in order to 
103Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," in The Republic 
Qf Plato, op. cit., p. 403. 
l04Plato, The Republic of Plato, 51·ac-e, p. 197. 
105rbid., 518c, p. 197. 
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perform the art of turning around individual souls. Even 
the hardest cases, such as the sophistic politician just 
described, are susceptible to the cathartic effects of 
Socratic dialectic. Shortly after the soul of this man is 
described in Theaetetus as "dwarfed and twisted, .•• warped 
and stunted," Socrates acknowledges that a public 
exhortation to avoid evil "will sound like foolishness to 
such strong and unscrupulous minds. 11 106 Yet this outcome 
is not inevitable in all situations: 
But there is one thing about them; when you get them 
alone and make them explain their objections to 
philosophy, then, if they are men enough to face a 
long examination without running away, it is odd how 
they end by finding their own arguments unsatisfying. 
Somehow their flow of eloquence runs dry, and then 
they become as speechless as an infant.107 
In public the politician can reduce the philosopher to an 
object of laughter, but in private philosophical inquiry 
the situation is reversed: 
Now it is he who is dizzy from hanging at such an 
unaccustomed height and looking down from mid-air. 
Lost and dismayed and stammering, he will be laughed 
at, not by maidservants or the uneducated--they will 
not see what is happening--but by everyone whose 
breeding has been the antithesis of a slave's.108 
The superior cunning of the sophists and rhetoricians can 
be overcome in private. The pride which encases their 
l06p1ato, Theaetetus, 
Dialogues of Plato, p. 881. 
l07rbid., 111b. 
177a, in The Collected 
108rbid., 175d. See also Gorgias, 527a, in The 
Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 306. 
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souls can be pierced by dialectical questioning, and if 
their souls can be opened it is possible that the pattern 
within the souls could be changed. As we have seen, Plato 
held that the pattern of public order is largely a 
function of the pattern which exists in the souls of the 
leading citizens, and thus it would appear that reform 
could be brought about by means of inquiry and persuasion. 
The problem is that the closed soul can and will 
resist philosophical therapy, usually with an impressive 
array of rhetorical tricks, with support from the 
surrounding environment, and with ultimate success. Not 
for long will the proud public person be willingly 
subjected to an inquiry which induces dizziness and 
stammering. One can simply refuse to enter into 
discussion, or enter with such prolixity that nothing is 
accomplished. In the Protagoras Socrates complains that 
politicians and orators are only willing to speak in 
endless disquisitions: 
Ask them the smallest thing supplementary to what they 
have said, and like a gong which booms out when you 
strike it and goes on until you lay hand on it, so our 
orators at a tiny question spin out a regular Marathon 
of speech.1o9 
Voegelin recognized that, given, the fragile nature of 
rational discussion, this tactic is likely to meet with 
success: 
l09p1ato, Protagoras, 329a-b, in The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato, p. 324. 
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It is impossible to pin the speaker down to the 
subject; it is submerged in a f load of amusing but 
quite irrelevant digressions, of authoritative 
quotations, of aptly chosen examples, and of 
pretentious verbiage. Scrutiny of an idea, discussion 
in the form of terse argument and counter-argument, 
which necessitates perhaps fifty exchanges of 
assertion and retort before the issue is settled, 
becomes impossible if one of the protagonists replies 
to every argument with a speech lasting half an 
hour.110 
If the philosopher is nevertheless able to unsettle an 
unwilling partner, resort can still be had to other tricks 
exposed by Voegelin. One can use "back-stair psychology" 
to ascribe a sinister intention to others, or dismiss them 
by invoking pejorative labels. Retreating into a 
systematic dogmatism or skepticism is another effective 
means of evasion.111 If one is backed into a corner it 
can be claimed that trickery has made the weaker argument 
the stronger, and if all else fails one can admit defeat 
but later claim to have been insincere in doing so.112 
In brief, Plato recognized both the potential and 
the inherent limitations of rational discussion as a means 
for spiritual reorientation. His Socrates is often able 
to lead other characters into embarassing admissions, and 
llOvoegelin, "On Readiness to Rational Discussion, 11 
in Edward T. Gargan, ed., Freedom and Serfdom (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel, 1961, pp. 269-84), p. 276. 
lllibid., pp. 279-81. See also Plato and Aristotle 
(1957), pp. 26, 29-30, 43-44. 
112cf. Gorgias, 505c, in The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato, p. 288. 
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occasionally into a deeper anxiety which might blossom 
into humility and reverence. Yet instances of deep 
existential conversion are conspicuously absent from the 
dialogues. Thrasymachus is charmed into docility in the 
Republic, but one suspects that the spell will wear off 
quickly and that, like Alcibiades, a reversion to old ways 
is almost assured. In the Gorgias Callicles is drawn to 
admit that, "I don't know how it is that your words 
attract me, Socrates. Yet I feel as most people do: You 
can't quite convince me. nll3 This passage is especially 
illuminating because at three distinct points in the 
preceding pages Socrates had stated that his only 
objective in the discussion was to obtain the personal 
assent of Polus and Callicles: 
But for my part, if I 
my sole witness to 
statements, I shall 
nothing of importance 
discussion •••• 114 
fail to produce you yourself as 
testify to the truth of my 
think that I've accomplished 
toward solving the matter under 
It is made abundantly clear in the dialogue that Socrates 
fails to meet his own standard of success. Gorgias, Polus 
and Callicles are indeed defeated at the dialectical 
level; each is drawn into a sulky admission which involves 
a contradiction of their initial argument. Socrates is 
l13p1ato, Gorgias, 513c, in The Collected Dialogues 
of Plato, p. 269. 
114rbid., 472b-c, p. 254. 
486e-487b, p. 269. 
See also 474a, p. 256; 
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able to do this by showing the monstrous logical 
conclusions to which their positions lead. Each character 
chooses to contradict himself rather than embrace such 
conclusions before an audience, but these choices are not 
dictated by a recognition of the monstrosity of their 
positions. All three are exposed as deliberate deceivers 
of the people whose single aim is to enhance their 
personal power and pleasure. If they were to admit this, 
and avoid the embarassment of self-contradiction, the game 
would be over; better to accept defeat in one of Socrates' 
little quibbles and live to plunder on the morrow. All 
three maintain a consistency on the existential level 
which is unaffected by their dialectical inconsistency.115 
Socrates seems to recognize that his purpose has 
not been fulfilled. After Callicles has decided to cut 
his losses through self-contradiction and to make Socrates 
proceed on his own, Plato has Socrates change tactics and 
tell a story of the judgment of the dead. Since rational 
discussion has failed to penetrate to the deeper 
consciousness of his patients, Socrates can only attempt 
115This interpretation of the dramatic structure of 
the Gorgias is largely owed to James L. Wiser. See 
"Philosophy as Political Action: A Reading of the 
Gorgias," American Journal of Political Science (vol. XIX, 
1975, pp. 313-22; "The Force of Reason: On Reading 
Plato's Gorgias," in Francis Canavan, ed., The Ethical 
Dimension of Political Life: Essays in Honor of John H. 
Hallowell (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1983, pp. 49-60). 
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to find common experiential ground by eliciting the 
dreadful pathos which attaches to the apprehension of 
death. Callicles cannot otherwise be shaken because he 
knows the way to what he wants within the contracted 
reality of worldly struggles for power and pleasure, and 
he is sure that he will not be called to account for his 
actions. This is assured by his rhetorical training and 
by the gullibility of his prey. Only the prospect of 
death can cast a pall over what looks like a very bright 
future of power after power. The death of the body will 
entail the death of all that is real for Callicles, who 
cannot even hope that he is wrong in denying the existence 
of a spiritual realm. For if the soul were to live on it 
would come before judges in Hades who are not as gullible 
as Athenian jurors: stripped of his eloquence and 
reputation, the rottenness of his soul would be exposed 
and justice would finally be done. 
The beautiful exhortation to virtue which closes 
the dialogue goes unanswered, but there is little suspense 
as to the outcome. Socrates began the story with the plea 
that it is a true one, but he acknowledges that Callicles 
wil 1 take it for a myth. We can safely assume that a 
character such as Callicles would have found a way to 
quell whatever disturbance the story might have caused in 
his soul. The moment of dread will almost always pass and 
be forgotten, with the soul left unreformed. Owing to the 
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persistent corruption of its dominant element the city 
will also go unreformed. Socrates does not lead the 
eminent citizens to a life of reverence and self-
examination: he drives them to murderous anger. 
Plato would seem to have led us to an impasse. As a 
physician of the soul and society he was able to diagnose 
and conceptualize the sources of psychic nosos (disease) 
and ataxia (disorder) as hybris, pleonexia, thymes, 
epithymia, amathia and polypragmosyne. He was also able 
to set forth patterns for the right order of the soul and 
society. Yet remedies that patients cannot stomach are 
not cures, regardless of their hypothetical effectiveness. 
It is surely to Plato's credit that during his passionate 
search for a cure in the midst of a profound social crisis 
he could calmly instruct his readers about the intricate 
difficulties which confront such a project. It must also 
be remembered that a diagnosis is not invalidated because 
the remedy for which it calls turns out to be unworkable 
in practice. The remedy of periagoge is not simply 
unworkable: the turning around of the soul is a symbol 
developed to recount an actual experience of Plato and 
possibly of others in his circle as well, but the remedy 
cannot be socially effective because the periagoge cannot 
be compelled at the behest of the philosopher. Even if 
the eminent citizens were less unwilling there would 
remain the problem that the periagoge is not merely a 
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matter of will. As Plato describes the experience in the 
Republic, it is by the agency of some external force that 
a person is "released and suddenly compelled to stand up, 
to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the 
light.n116 The Platonic philosopher does not know the 
force which compelled his own assent, and does not know 
why he was chosen rather than the others. In the language 
of Christianity it is as though the periagoge is 
mysteriously granted by grace, and the recipient of grace 
does not also receive the capacity to extend it to others. 
According to Plato's Socrates, 
You should be well aware that, if anything should be 
saved and become such as it ought in regimes in this 
kind of condition, it won't be bad if you say that a 
god's dispensation saved it.117 
Plato ultimately recognized that only divine dispensation 
could save his contemporaries. This was also the 
conviction of certain medieval sectarians, with the 
difference that Plato did not think himself capable of 
calling forth such a dispensation. The impasse at which 
we are left is the impasse of the metaxy. The impasse is 
set by our inability to either perfect or flee the world, 
and is rich with the tensions of being in--but not of--the 
world. 
For Voegelin these tensions became even more acute 
116plato, The Republic of Plato, 515c, p. 194. 
117rbid., 493a, p. 172. 
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with the epiphany of Christ, as will be seen in the 
following chapter. In parousiasm we will encounter the 
consciousness in which worldly reality is eclipsed by an 
apprehension of transcendent perfection. In ideological 
consciousness it is the transcendent which is eclipsed by 
the passion for worldly perfection. These post-Christian 
mutations of metastatic faith and prometheanism stem from 
the same experiential basis in the human condition--from 
tensions which Plato could articulate but could not 
"solve." Plato did not find a socially effective "cure" 
for pneumapathological consciousness, and in the final 
chapter we shall see whether Voegelin's similar effort met 
with any greater success. Plato did, however, have advice 
to offer. In Theaetetus the wisdom of the mature Plato is 
crystallized in a speech of Socrates which simultaneously 
shows the way and shows that the way is perilous. It is 
remarkable that a passage which could stand as a stern 
warning against either basic form of psychic imbalance 
could also be used to express either form of imbalance: 
Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the 
good must always have its contrary; nor have they any 
place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt 
this region of our mortal nature. That is why we 
should make all speed to take flight from this world 
to the other, and that means becoming like the divine 
so far as we can, and that again is to become 
righteous with the help of wisdom.Ila 
ll8p1ato, Theaetetus, 176a-b, in The Collected 
.!l.ialogues of Plato, p. 881. 
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with modifications no greater than a touch of reification 
here and there, this passage could be cited with approval 
either by the gnostic who regards the world as the 
preserve of an evil second god, or by the ideologist who 
would deify humanity through systematic knowledge. Plato 
did not, of course, succumb to these temptations, but 
their presence at the center of his thought suggests that 
the tensions in the field of consciousness are heightened 
as one moves toward the point of balance. This in turn 
shows the ultimate reason why Platonic philosophy cannot 
provide a socially effective cure for the nosos of the 
psyche. Imbalanced consciousness of either basic variety 
is a movement away from the tension of consciousness in 
the "In-Between"; Plato's philosophy leads precisely 
toward the tension which the pneumapath would flee. 
CHA.Pl'ER III 
A NEW HEAVEN AND A NEW EARTH 
One of the most remarkable aspects of Voegelin' s 
work was his ability to break with his own theoretical 
programs. Writers are frequently said to be their own 
toughest critics, but of course we know that they are also 
frequently their own greatest admirers. This latter 
tendency was not to be found in Voegelin, whose integrity 
led him to criticize the theoretical structures which he 
had outgrown in the strongest of terms. Voegelin remarked 
that he abandoned the History of Western Political 
Thought, a four-thousand page manuscript which has yet to 
be published, after "it dawned on me that the conception 
of a history of ideas was an ideological deformation of 
reality."l A new program, announced in The New Science of 
Poli tics and carried halfway to completion in the first 
three volumes of Order and History, was in turn rejected. 
Voegelin discovered that his own conception of the process 
lvoegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" ( 1973), p. 64, 
quoted in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A 
Biographical Introduction, p. 77. on this initial break 
see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, 
pp. 6-7: William c. Havard, "Voegelin's Changing 
Conception of History and Consciousness," in Stephen A. 
McKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in 
History, pp. 14-16, 24; Gregor Sebba, "Prelude and 
Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin," in Ellis 
Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical 
Appraisal, pp. 15-17. 
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of history was vitiated by the very flaw which 
characterized the ideological philosophies of history 
which he had sought to surpass.2 This second major break 
was announced in Voegelin's seventies, after Order and 
History had met with lavish praise. Voegelin was his own 
toughest critic in part because his readers could simply 
not keep up. Commentators are confronted with a body of 
writings which is not only intrinsically difficult but 
also internally divided, and since Voegelin was more 
inclined to explore new directions than to explain 
precisely what could or could not be salvaged from prior 
paths, great care must be exercized when pronouncing any 
thesis a constant in Voegelin's work. 
One such constant in Voegelin's work is the view 
that Christianity is of fundamental importance in the 
generation and expansion of ideological consciousness. 
This view informs all of his major writings from Political 
Religions (1938) to The Ecumenic Age, despite several 
2voegelin's coinage for this flaw is "historio-
genesis, " or the conception of history as a sequential, 
unilinear process of advancement from a point of cosmic-
divine origin to the present. Voegelin broke with the 
initial program for Order and History after realizing that 
the five basic types of order with which he was working 
could not be aligned in any time sequence which would 
permit the conception of history as a "course." See 
Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 1-11, 57-113, and 
Barry Cooper, "The Concept of Historiogenesis," in The 
Political Theory of Eric Voegelin (Queenston: The Edward 
Mellen Press, 1986), pp. 125-160. 
107 
intervening shifts in emphasis.3 Yet it is not 
immediately apparent how this fact can be squared with the 
interpretation of the preceding chapters, viz., that 
Voegelin's last works trace the deepest roots of spiritual 
disorder into the human condition itself. Why should such 
special importance be accorded to Christianity, which 
arose in a particular place at a particular time, if the 
sources of pneumapathological consciousness are held to be 
universal and perennial? 
We can begin to work toward an answer by recalling 
the distinction between ideological and pneumapathological 
consciousness from the first chapter. The constant theme 
in Voegelin's writings is that ideological consciousness 
is a post- or anti-Christian phenomenon, one which can 
only be understood by reference to the background of 
3voegelin, Die politischen Religionen (Vienna: 
Bermann-Fischer, 1938. Reprinted, 1939, with a new 
Forward, Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer). English 
translation, by T. J. DiNapoli and E. s. Easterly III, 
Political Religions (Queenston: The Edward Mellen Press, 
1986). The principal shift in emphasis was from the view 
that a series of unfortunate decisions by ecclesiastics in 
the catholic Church created a vacuum in spiritual 
leadership to a focus on the inherently unstable dynamics 
of Christian faith itself. On the former see John A. 
Gueguen, "Voegelin's From Enlightenment to Revolution: A 
Review Article," The Thomist (vol. XLII, 1978, pp. 123-
35), pp. 128-30. On the latter see The New Science of 
Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 122-26, 129; The 
Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 17-22, 239-41, 300-304. The 
former view did not disappear completely in the late 
writings of Voegelin. Cf., e.g., "Response to Professor 
Altizer' s 'A New History and a New but Ancient God?' 11 in 
Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical 
Appraisal, p. 191. 
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Christian consciousness against which it arose in 
rebellion. But ideological consciousness is only one 
variant of pneumapathological consciousness, just as 
Christiantiy is only one among a number of modes in which 
the tensions of existence in the metaxy have been 
symbolized (albeit the most fully differentiated of these 
modes}. Thus it is possible to maintain that the sources 
of pneumapathological consciousness are universal and 
perennial, in the sense of being derived from tensions 
which inhere in the human condition, while still 
maintaining that Christianity is the central formative 
force behind particular manifestations of spiritual 
disorder. 
The conditio humana (in Voegelin's very broad sense 
of existence in the metaxy) has always been what it is--
but has not always been recognized for what it is.4 
4This simple insight provides the key to 
understanding why Voegelin sought to develop a philosophy 
of consciousness within a philosophy of history. The 
principle also helps to explain how Voegelin could 
maintain that human nature does not change and yet make 
the statement quoted in the last chapter that the men of 
the seventh century B.C. had no souls, immortal or 
otherwise. The statement serves the twofold function of 
illustrating the idea that a soul is not really a soul 
until it is experienced as the "sensorium of 
transcendence," while also criticizing those who reify the 
symbol of psyche. On human nature as an historical 
discovery see Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980), p. 
81. 
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According to Voegel in, human nature does not change. 5 
Yet, human understanding of human nature does indeed 
change in the process that Voegelin called the 
differentiation of the truth of existence, and different 
forms of self-understanding entail differing levels of the 
tensions inherent in the human condition. The human 
condition per ~ is not a sufficient condition for the 
development of pneumapathological consciousness; a variety 
of circum-stances ranging from the personal to the 
civilizational spheres of existence must coalesce for such 
a development to occur. The necessary conditions for 
spiritual disorder arise as soon as human beings become 
aware of the mystery of divine presence in reality, and 
Voegelin's analysis of the petroglyphic symbols of the 
Palaeolithicum suggests that this awareness dates from at 
least as far back as ca. 20,000 B.c.6 Yet the dim 
apprehension that humanity does not sit atop the hierarchy 
of being is not sufficient to bring forth the 
consciousness which hates the gods or seeks to enlist them 
in worldly struggles, much less the consciousness which 
would divinize humanity through the manipulation of 
immanent reality. One need not find a Palaeolithic 
5voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction (1952), p. 165. 
An Intro-
6voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer' s 'A New 
History and a New but Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., 
Eric voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal, p. 190. 
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equivalent to Marx to confirm Voegelin's thesis on the 
perennial nature of the sources of spiritual disorder, 
because the thesis does not imply that each type of 
pneumapathological consciousness is somehow built into 
the human organism and may break out at any time. A Marx 
cannot be imagined in the absence of a Judea-Christian 
culture which de-divinizes nature by locating the ground 
of being in a transcendent realm, thus making possible the 
notion that not only nature but reality itself is without 
divine forces of order. And even this civilizational 
atmosphere is not a sufficient condition which will give 
rise to the advent of elaborate Second Realities such as 
that offered by Marx. For this to occur the Judeo-
Christian culture must be in a phase of decomposition so 
that the symbols developed to express experiences of the 
First reality can be misunderstood by a thinker as untrue 
propositions about "things. 11 7 Science and technology must 
also have developed to the point that a thinker could fall 
into the illusion that these are sufficient for the 
creation of supermen. In addition there must appear a 
deeply alienated individual with vast intellectual powers 
and an absence of certain existential virtues, and if his 
Second Reality is not to be a hermitage he must appear at 
a time when the critical instruments of philosophy are so 
7see Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age {1974), pp. 36-43. 
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little known that "opinions which would have been laughed 
out of court in the late Middle Ages or the Renaissance" 
can attain general respectability.a 
This list of necessary conditions involved in the 
phenomenon of Marxism could be expanded further, but the 
point should already be clear. Al though the sources of 
pneumapathological consciousness are rooted in the human 
condition, which does not change in its essentials, its 
various manifestations have a history because they are 
shaped by historical events. For Voegelin the single most 
important event in the history of spiritual order and 
disorder is the epiphany of Christ, which is not to say 
that Christianity is the "cause" of pneumapathological 
consciousness, but rather that it has been the most 
salient of a broad set of catalytic factors which help to 
explain the particular patterns we have termed parousiasm 
and ideological consciousness. 
Yet the resolution of this problem leads only to 
another, more difficult issue. Even if it is allowed that 
a particular "leap in being," such as Christianity, may 
stand as a catalytic factor independent of the tensions 
imposed by the human condition itself, it remains to be 
seen how certain "leaps" can have a greater catalytic 
8voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1973), p. 49, 
quoted in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A 
I!.iographical Introduction, p. 86. 
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effect than others. If all of the great conceptions of 
human existence in the metaxy are held to be, in some 
sense, equivalent, why would certain conceptions pose 
greater dangers than others? If the human condition is 
essentially unchanging, and if the various modes of the 
"opening of the soul" are openings onto the same divine 
reality, why would the balance of consciousness be more 
precarious for a Christian than for a Platonist or a Jew? 
These questions are especially troubling in light of 
voegelin's repeated assertions that Christianity at its 
best provides the most fully differentiated understanding 
of human existence in the metaxy. 9 Voegelin held that the 
ancient search for the true order of being culminates in 
the Christian recognition of Jesus as the divine/human 
mediator between the poles of the metaxy. How, then, can 
this advance in human understanding of the order of being 
be seen as the great catalyst behind medieval and modern 
disorders of the soul? 
A direct answer is not immediately apparent in any 
of Voegelin's writings, but it is possible to clarify his 
argument by extrapolating from his account of the 
9voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), pp. 77-79, 164; "On Christianity," (letter 
to Alfred Schutz of January 1, 1953) in Peter Opitz and 
Gregor Sebba, eds. , The. Philosophy of Order: Essays on 
History, Consciousness and Politics, pp. 450ff; "The 
Gospel and Culture" (1971), p. 77; The Ecumenic Age 
(1974), pp. 303-304. 
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experiential dynamics of the search for order. It will be 
recalled that for Voegelin it was the experience of 
contingency--and the anxiety which attends to this 
experience--that prompts the search for the ground of 
being. The questions of "where-from" and "what-for" arise 
from the human condition itself, and Voegelin, following 
Aristotle, held that the search for understanding is a 
constant in human history. Voegelin's description of the 
events in consciousness which initiate the search suggests 
a plurality of motivations: the seeker desires a true 
understanding of the ontological structure of reality, but 
also a release from the pressure of anxious uncertainty 
and the prospect of meaninglessness. These motivations 
will have been present, according to Voegelin, regardless 
of whether the results of the search are subsequently 
expressed mythologically, philosophically, theologically, 
or even ideologically. Both truth and certainty are 
sought, but if the truth turns out to be that the order of 
being is essentially mysterious, the anxiety of 
uncertainty may be deepened rather than alleviated in the 
course of the search. Thus we can make sense of 
Voegelin's observation that Christianity brought to light 
the fully differentiated truth of the soul while 
simultaneously offering less certainty than more compact 
understandings. 
of being can 
A particular representation of the order 
be both more accurate than prior 
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representations, when measured against maximally 
differentiated experiences of reality, and yet less 
assuaging of the anxiety which prompts every search for 
order. 
A truth which requires faith for its confirmation 
will leave many a seeker unsatisfied. Those who do not 
have or cannot maintain the capacity for gracefully 
accepting a truth which does not slake the natural human 
thirst for certainty will have ample motivation to strike 
out again in search of something more tangible and less 
trying. This is the sense in which parousiasm and 
ideological consciousness were regarded by Voegelin as 
post- or anti-Christian phenomena. The drive for 
certainty was inflamed rather than calmed by Christianity 
because "uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity." 
This well-known observation from The New Science of 
Politics opens a passage in which Voegelin set forth his 
understanding of the connection between Christian 
experience and spiritual disorientation with greater 
conciseness, clarity, and beauty of expression than he 
achieved in any later work: 
The feeling of security in a "world full of gods" is 
lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-
divinized, communication with the world-transcendent 
God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the 
sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped 
for and the proof of things unseen. Ontologically, 
the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be 
found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically, 
there is no proof for things unseen but again this 
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very faith. The bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may 
snap easily. The life of the soul in openness toward 
God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dullness, 
guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, 
forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent 
stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of 
a certainty which if gained is loss [sic]--the very 
lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a burden 
for men who lust for massively possessive experience. 
The danger of a breakdown of faith to a socially 
relevant degree, now, will increase in the measure in 
which Christianity is a worldly success, that is, it 
will grow when Christianity penetrates a 
civilizational area thoroughly, supported by 
institutional pressure, and when, at the same time, it 
undergoes an internal process of spiritualization, of 
a more complete realization of its essence. The more 
people are drawn into the Christian orbit, the greater 
will be the number among them who do not have the 
spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure of the soul 
that is Christianity .•.. 10 
For Voegelin the truth of Christianity was essentially 
mysterious,11 and thus, unlike forms of truth which 
lOvoegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction (1952), pp. 122-23. 
An Intro-
11This did not become fully clear prior to Voegelin's 
increasingly frequent references to "the Unknown God" in 
his late work. In a 1977 article Voegelin' s longtime 
friend Gregor Sebba explained what a surprise it had been 
for him to learn of the essentially mystical character of 
Voegelin's philosophical activity: "To me," Sebba wrote, 
"Eric Voegelin has always been an exemplary representative 
of rationality in the Greek sense, but when I argued that 
against a statement calling him a mystic philosopher he 
wrote back: 'This will shock you, but I am a mystic 
philosopher. ' 11 "Prelude and Variations on the Theme of 
Eric Voegelin," Southern Review (n.s., vol. XIII, 1977, 
pp. 646-76), p. 662. On Voegelin's references to "the 
Unknown God" see Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "Professor 
Voegelin and the Christian Tradition," in Christianity and 
Political Philosophy {Athens, Georgia: University of 
Georgia Press, 1978), pp. 193-208; John A. Gueguen, 
"Voegelin's From Enlightenment to Revolution: A Review 
Article," op. cit., pp. 125-26; James M. Rhodes, "Voegelin 
and Christian Faith," op. cit., pp. 84-89. On Voegelin's 
mysticism see Russell Nieli, "Eric Voegelin: Gnosticism, 
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impose a finality upon the process of questioning, 
Christian consciousness was understood as an ongoing 
struggle which required great spiritual stamina. 
Accordingly, Voegelin seemed to take it as natural or 
inevitable that a Christian culture would produce an 
almost continual stream of efforts to develop less arduous 
modes of orientation.12 Although these forms vary widely 
in terms of their specific content,13 two basic tendencies 
can be observed: one may dispense with the mysteries of 
transcendent truth by collapsing reality into its immanent 
dimension, or one may distort Christianity in such a way 
as to make its truth appear to be certain, immediate and 
tangible. Out of the former tendency flow the histories 
of materialism, scientism and ideology; out of the latter 
tendency flow the histories of chiliasm, millenarianism, 
Mysticism, and Modern Radical Poli tics, 11 Southern Review 
(n.s., vol. XXIII, 1987, pp. 332-48), pp. 340-46. 
12cf. Voegelin, science, Politics and Gnosticism 
(1968), pp. 108-110. 
13Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: 
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the 
Middle Ages (New York: Oxford University Press, revised 
edition, 1970), second page of the unpaginated 
"Introduction": "Millenarian sects and movements have 
varied in attitude from the most violent aggressiveness to 
the mildest pacifism and from the most ethereal 
spirituality to the most earthbound materialism. And they 
have also varied greatly in social composition and social 
function." One of the central tenets of Cohn's work, 
however, is that in its essentials the vision of the 
millenarian is remarkably consistent from movement to 
movement. See p. 117 below. 
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and apocalyptic hysteria, or the history of the phenomena 
we have termed parousiasm. 
The wealth of recent studies of "heretical" 
Christian groups would seem to corroborate Voegelin's 
argument, at least to the extent that the apparent 
pervasiveness of parousiastic phenomena suggests a more 
than accidental connection between the rigors of Chris-
tianity and a widely discernible pattern of 
disorientation. This pervasiveness is not only 
geographical and chrono-logical but also social, in so far 
as no segment of the population would seem to have been 
immune to outbreaks of parousiasm.14 This is not an 
unimportant point, despite the fact that Voegelin's 
argument gives us reason to doubt that social class has 
much to do with spiritual disorder, because much of the 
recent literature has been produced by Marxist writers who 
endeavor to show that heretical movements were actually 
forms of class struggle. 15 There is indeed a strong 
historical correlation between various types of hardship 
or catastrophe and outbreaks of parousiasm, and certain of 
these types, such as famine, are indeed stratified in 
14rbid. See also Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End: 
Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 29-30. 
15cf. Norman Cohn, "Foreward," to The Pursuit of the 
Millennium. This area of Marxist "scholarship" can be 
traced to Engels. See The Peasant War in Germany (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1972). 
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their effects along class lines. Yet this is not the case 
with most types of natural disaster, nor are class 
distinctions particularly important when plague strikes or 
an empire is destroyed. Had Voegelin deigned to join in 
the controversy on the question of whether the roots of 
heresy are psychic or material, he would probably have 
argued that both are important but that parousiasm (as 
distinct from simple doctrinal error) must ultimately be 
recognized as a phenomenon in consciousness. To be more 
precise, he might have argued that purely mundane 
hardships do lead to acute forms of distress, but only 
lead to spiritual disorientation when these hardships 
cannot be reconciled within a consciousness of the world 
as providentially ordered. The dissonance occasioned by 
hardship is surely greater for one who must square the 
indifference of nature and the senseless succession of 
empires with a providential understanding of the world 
than for one who need not; in the latter case we might 
expect reactions such as cynicism or ruthlessness, but not 
the fervent expectation that things must soon be set 
aright by powers divine. 
Christianity has from its very inception provided 
fertile ground for such expectations, but it is important 
to stress once again that this class of phenomena 
antedates Christianity and is not a simple "effect" of a 
Christian "cause." Al though the debate as to how far 
Christ's own teaching was influenced by Jewish 
apocalypticism has continued since the problem was 
formulated over eighty years ago by Johannes Weiss and 
Albert Schweitzer, 16 there is no longer much doubt that 
messianism and millenarianism are prominent features of 
Jewish history. Norman Cohn's account of millenarianism 
in Jewish history dovetails with Voegelin's view that 
parousiasm results from the pressure exerted by senseless 
events in history upon the consciousness imbued with a 
sensitivity to the divinely ordained nature of history: 
Precisely because they were so utterly certain of 
being the Chosen People, Jews tended to react to 
peril, oppression and hardship by phantasies of the 
total triumph and boundless prosperity which Yahweh, 
out of his omnipotence, would bestow upon his Elect in 
the fulness of time. Already in the Prophetical Books 
there are passages--some of them dating from the 
eighth century--that foretell how, out of an immense 
cosmic catastrophe, there will arise a Palestine which 
will be nothing less than a new Eden, Paradise 
regained .... It will be a just world, where the poor 
are protected, and a harmonious and peaceful world, 
where wild and dangerous beasts have become tame and 
harmless. The moon will shine as the sun and the 
sun's light will be increased sevenfold. There will 
be an abundance of water and provender for flocks and 
herds, for men there will be an abundance of corn and 
wine and fish and fruit; men and flocks will miltiply 
exceedingly. Freed from disease and sorrow of every 
kind, doing no more iniquity but living according to 
the law of Yahweh now written in their hearts, the 
Chosen People will live in joy and gladness.17 
It was expected that this paradise would be preceded by 
16cf. Johannes Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation of the 
Kingdom of God {Goettingen, 1892) and Albert Schweitzer, 
The Quest for the Historical Jesus {Tuebingen, 1906). 
17cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 19-20. 
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pestilence, war, captivity, and the proliferation of every 
sort of abomination. Thus the righteous are provided with 
an explanation of how such tribulations could befall the 
chosen People: The tribulations can be seen as portents 
of the day of Yahweh, a Day of Wrath when the wicked 
within and the enemy without will be cast down, when the 
sun and the moon will be darkened, when the heavens will 
be rolled together and the earth shaken. In this way the 
senselessness of worldly catastrophe becomes not only 
sensible but even desirable as a sign that the Day of 
Yahweh will soon come to pass. 
This prophetic vision was to arise again and again, 
at least in its essential aspects, throughout ancient 
Jewish history.18 The Apocalyptic "dream" which occupies 
Chapter VII of the Book of Daniel was composed at the 
height of the Maccabean revolt, which resulted from the 
banning of Jewish religious observances by the Seleucid 
monarch Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Reflecting on the sym-
bolism of this apocalyptic vision, Cohn noted that: 
Already one can recognize the paradigm of what was to 
become and remain the central phantasy of 
revolutionary eschatology. The world is dominated by 
an evil, tyrannous power of boundless destructiveness-
-a power moreover which is imagined not as simply 
human but as demonic. The tyranny of that power will 
18see D. s. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish 
Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964); R. H. 
Charles, Eschatology: The Doctrine of a Future Life in 
Israel, Judaism and Christianity (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1963). 
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become more and more outrageous, the suffering of its 
victims more and more intolerable--until suddenly the 
hour will strike when the Saints of God are able to 
rise up and overthrow it. Then the saints themselves, 
the chosen, holy people who hitherto have groaned 
under the oppressor's heel, shall in turn inherit 
dominion over the whole earth. This will be the 
culmination of history; the Kingdom of the Saints will 
not only surpass in glory all previous kingdoms, it 
will have no successors.1~ 
It bears pointing out that when Cohn refers here to a 
paradigm which became and remained the central phantasy of 
revolutionary eschatology he refers not only to the later 
apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, nor only to that of John 
or those of medieval times inspired by the Book of 
Revelation, but also to the revolutionary eschatology of 
modern ideological movements.20 
Difficult as it may be to disentangle the Jewish 
and Christian apocalypticism of the first century A.D., 
experts generally agree that Christianity gave rise to an 
independent body of apocalyptic literature.21 To be sure, 
a considerable number of Jewish apocalyptic texts were 
19cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 21. For 
text and commentary see Andre Lacoque, The Book of Daniel 
(David Pellauer, trans., English edition revised by the 
author) (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979). 
20on the apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, see R. H. 
Charles, Eschatology, op. cit., pp. 323-53. 
21christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven: A study of 
Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity (New York: 
Crossroad, 1982), pp. 358ff; D. s. Russell, The Method and 
Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, op. cit., p. 34; Bernard 
McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 11-16; R. H. 
Charles, Eschatology, op. cit., pp. 362-400; Norman Cohn, 
The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 23-29. 
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incorporated into the early Christian canon with the 
adoption of the LXX translation of the Old Testament, many 
of which were taken over just as they stood and continued 
to enjoy a widespread popularity well into the third 
century.22 Other texts were revised by Christian editors 
who made them more suitable for their purposes or 
interpolated them with new material expressing 
specifically Christian doctrines. Examples of this are 
the Sibylline Oracles and II Esdras, which were freely 
augmented.2 3 The popularity of these writings among 
Christians is not difficult to understand, since the hopes 
and claims of the early Christian Church were enhanced in 
their authority by the teachings of these texts concerning 
"the two ages," the imminent coming of the Messiah, the 
messianic kingdom, the woes of the last days, the judgment 
of the world, the resurrection of the dead, the future lot 
of the wicked and the righteous, etc. Yet it is well 
established that many apocalyptic texts were composed by 
Christians. Although some of these are known to us only 
by name or in fragmentary allusions, many others have 
220. s. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish 
Apocalyptic, op. cit., pp. 33-35; W. D. McHardy, 
"Introduction" to The New English Bible: The Apocrypha 
(Oxford and Cambridge: Oxford and Cambridge University 
Presses, 1970), pp. xi-xiii. 
23Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 
43-50; D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish 
Apocalyptic, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
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survived, among the most important of which are The 
fil?ocalypse of Peter, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle 
Qf the Apostles, the Apocalypse of Paul, and the Ascension 
gf Isaiah. It was only through a long and controversial 
process that canonical authority was denied to these 
apocryphal writings, which nevertheless retained influence 
in Christian communities. It seems that apocalyptic and 
millenarian writings and movements sprang up as quickly as 
the Patres could put them dowm. 
Of these movements Montanism is the most widely 
known. Around A.O. 156 a certain Montanus, who claimed to 
be the incarnation of the Holy Ghost, began to surround 
himself with a number of ecstatics whose visionary 
experiences were brought together to form a "Third 
Testament. 11 24 it was asserted that the New Jerusalem 
foretold in Revelation would soon descend onto Pepuza, an 
obscure Phrygian town, and thus all Christians were 
summoned there to await the Second Coming. The Montanists 
were ascetical to the point of inviting martyrdom, which 
probably resulted from the passage in the Book of 
Revelation where it is said that those who "were beheaded 
for the witness of Jesus and for the word of God" are the 
ones who would reign in the new realm with Christ for a 
24Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 25. 
See also Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 
21-27. 
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thousand years. Consequently, Cohn has written, 
Nothing was so propitious to the spread of Montanism 
as persecution; and when, from the year 177 onwards, 
Christians were being once again persecuted in many 
provinces of the Empire, Montanism suddenly ceased to 
be merely a local movement and spread far and wide, 
not only through Asia Minor but to Africa, Rome, and 
even Gaul. Al though Montanists no longer looked to 
Phrygia, their confidence in the imminent appearance 
of the New Jerusalem was unshaken; and this was true 
even of Tertulian, the most famous theologian in the 
West at that time, when he joined the movement.25 
Cohn argues that in expecting the Second Coming from day 
to day and week to week the Montanists were "following in 
the footsteps of many, perhaps most, of the earliest 
Christians. 11 26 
This judgment appears to be supported both by the 
writings of certain apocalyptically inclined Fathers of 
the early Church, such as Lactantius, as well as by the 
disparaging accounts of heretical sects written by others 
such as Eusebius and st. Augustine.27 In The Unmasking 
and Refutation of False Gnosis by Irenaeus there can be 
25rbid., pp. 25-26. 
26rbid. I P• 26. 
27Lactantius, on the Deaths of the Persecutors (De 
Mortibus Persecutorum), Mary Francis McDonald, trans., in 
Lactantius: The Minor Works (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1965), pp. 137-203; see also 
Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 23-25. 
Eusebeus, The History of the Church from Christ to 
Constantine (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 
1965), esp. pp. 149-53. Augustine, City of God 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1984), 20:7, 
pp. 906-910. Note Augustine's uncharacteristic approval 
of the prophecies of the Erythraean Sibyl, 18:23, pp. 788-
91. 
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found a lengthy attack on a variety of movements, along 
with a telling strain of apocalypticism in Irenaeus' own 
theology. 28 Although the issue of the orthodoxy of the 
vast majority of apocalyptic writings was ultimately 
decided in the negative, the Book of Revelation was 
included in the canon despite misgivings about its 
compatibility with the idea and mission of the Church. 
Additional fuel for continued millenarianism was available 
in the Gospels themselves, most notably in the parallel 
passages of Matthew 24-25, Mark 13, and Luke 21, as well 
as in the First Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians 
(4:13-5:11).29 According to Voegelin, 
the life of the early Christian communities was not 
fixed but oscillated between the eschatological 
expectation of the parousia that would bring the 
Kingdom of God[,] and the understandinq of the church 
as the apocalypse of Christ in history.30 
The conflict between apocalyptic and eschatological 
28see esp. 5:25-35. Chapters 25-29 are concerned 
with the Antichrist; ch. 30 is a bridge section, and chs. 
31-35 treat of the chiliastic kingdom. See also Jean 
Danielou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1964), pp. 386ff. 
29For a close reading of other brief passages see 
Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven, op. cit., pp. 358-
402. 
30voegelin, the New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), pp. 107-108. The comma in this sentence 
(which greatly adds to its clarity) does not appear in the 
original due, according to Gregor Sebba, to an error in 
typesetting. See "Prelude and Variations on the Theme of 
Eric Voegelin," in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's 
Thought: A Critical Appraisal (1982), p. 23, 40n. 
126 
Christianity was correctly drawn by Voegelin in this 
passage, but it is helpful to reverse his usage of these 
adjectives in deference to the conventions of more recent 
literature. Following Alois Dempf, Voegelin applied the 
term "apocalyptic" to the doctrine that the divine will is 
revealed in history and in the Church, creating a new 
historical consciousness, in opposition to the "eschato-
logical" millenarianism of the Book of Revelation.31 
While this was an improvement over earlier treatments, 
which often invoked the terms interchangeably, more recent 
works generally regard apocalypticism as a species of the 
genus eschatology.32 All Christian conceptions of history 
are eschatological in the sense that history is understood 
as a teleological process toward a Scripturally revealed 
End, but there is a vast difference between viewing the 
events of one's time in the light of the End of history 
and seeing them as the last events themselves. St. 
Augustine provides the classic example that it is possible 
to be deeply eschatological and yet distinctly anti-
apocalyptic. The conflict between these orientations, or 
what Voegelin called the "oscillation" between them, was 
31Alois Dempf, Sacrum Imerium (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962), pp. 77ff. 
Voegelin's usage of the term "apocalyptic" on page 33 of 
In Search of Order (1987) suggests that he ultimately 
recognized the need for this reversal. 
32Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 
3-5. 
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not resolved with doctrinal finality until St. Augustine 
was able to "de-apocalypticize" the Book of Revelation 
with his highly allegorical interpretation in City of God 
20:7-17. Augustine dismissed literal beliefs in the 
imminence of the millennium as "ridiculous fables" and 
declared that 
The Church even now is the kingdom of Christ and the 
kingdom of heaven. And so even now his saints reign 
with him ...• For those people reign with Christ 
who .•. are in his kingdom in such a way that they are 
his kingdom. 33 
Augustine held that the Book of Revelation was not to be 
understood as a prophecy of impending events, but rather 
as an allegory of the struggle between good and evil in 
the present life of the Church and in the life of 
individual souls. 
According to Voegelin, "the Augustinian conception 
of the church, without substantial change, remained 
historically effective to the end of the Middle Ages. 11 34 
Literalist interpretations of Revelation were thenceforth 
pushed beyond the pale, but not by any means out of 
existence. Despite what Voegelin called Augustine's "tour 
de force of interpretation," an unbroken stream of 
millennial, apocalyptic and parousiastic literature was 
33Augustine, City of God, op. cit., 20:9, p. 915. 
Emphasis in original. 
34voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction {1952), p. 109. 
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turned out between the years 400 and 1100; that is, in the 
years prior to the writings and sects which have become 
widely known through Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millennium. 
Much of this literature has now been compiled and 
translated into English. 35 Its very existence helps to 
corroborate Voegelin's assertion, quoted above, that "the 
continuum of metastatic movements has never been broken"--
an assertion which in turn is central to the corroboration 
of Voegelin' s phenomenology of spiritual disorientation. 
The entire range of symbols engendered by the chiliastic 
excitement of certain early Christians, and preserved 
within the canon in Revelation, continued to appear in the 
interim between Augustine's work and the first serious 
challenge to it, that of Joachim of Flora in the twelfth 
century. The apocalyptic literature of the period abounds 
with the setting of dates for the apocalypse, visions of a 
descending New Jerusalem, the strange lore of Gog and 
Magog, and continual identifications of this or that 
figure as the Antichrist. The persistent reappearance of 
these symbols suggests that they were important for 
conveying experiences that may grow out of Christianity 
itself, and not merely out of the persecutions or 
prophecies of early times. 
35see the texts and commentary in Bernard McGinn, 
Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 37-125, and the 
bibliography. 
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Al though the millennial movements of the Middle 
Ages are simply too numerous--and the literature about 
them too extensive36 __ for it to be possible to describe 
them in any detail, we can at least get a sense of 
voegelin's understanding of the experiential dynamics of 
these movements from his analysis of why St. Augustine's 
philosophy of history and doctrine of the Church could not 
effectively prevent continued outbreaks of parousiasm. 
st. Augustine was indeed successful in turning Church 
doctrine away from chiliasm and apocalypticism by 
forwarding a view of the present as the saeculum 
senescens, the time of waiting for the Parousia, which 
would last for an unknowable period of time.37 The 
present age was cast as the last of six historical epochs. 
These epochs are not marked by mundane events because such 
events are, by definition, devoid of true 
meaningfulness.38 The first epoch extends from Adam to 
36see the excellent bibliographies in Gordon Leff, 
Heresy in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1967) ; Walter L. Wakefield and Austin P. 
Evans, Heresies of the High Middle Ages (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969); Bernard McGinn, Visions 
of the End, op. cit.; Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the 
Millennium, 2nd edition, 1970, op. cit. 
37Augustine, city of God, op. cit., 22:30, p. 1091. 
See also Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism 
(1968), pp. 92-93; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 172, 268. 
38see Karl Lowith, Meaning in History: The 
Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 166. 
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the Flood: the second to Abraham and the third to David. 
The fourth age extends from David to the Babylonian Exile, 
and the fifth to the birth of Christ. With the birth of 
Christ the succession of truly meaningful events in 
history comes to an end. The meaning of history as 
salvation is revealed with a finality such that for st. 
Augustine the historical task of the Church is not to 
develop the Christian truth through successive stages (as 
with Joachim) but simply to spread it. 3 9 While this 
understanding of the Christian mission served as 
something of a barrier against heretical innovations it 
also served, according to Voegelin, as a barrier to 
creativity which could not long stand against the human 
penchant for novelty. 40 Also restricted was the still 
more powerful penchant of humans to endow their mundane or 
political activity with a sense of mission--a penchant 
which is so strong that it is probably better described as 
a psychological need. Although Voegelin held that this 
need can give rise to such delusions as the notion that 
history culminates in one's own efforts, he also held that 
the tendency to conceive of one's political activity as an 
expression of a particular understanding of transcendent 
39rbid., pp. 145, 166. 
40see Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution 
(1975), p. 14. 
r 
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order is not, in and of itself, pathological. 41 Voegelin 
found evidence of this tendency in the earliest historical 
records of major (i.e., post-tribal) political societies: 
All of the early Empires, Near Eastern as well as Far 
Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a 
transcendent order .... Whether one turns to the 
earliest Chinese sources in the Shu King or to the 
inscriptions of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, or Persia, 
one uniformly finds the order of the empire 
interpreted as a representation of cosmic order in the 
medium of human society. The empire is a cosmic 
analogue, a little world reflecting the order of the 
great, comprehensive world.42 
When the implications of the discovery of the human soul 
were finally clearly drawn in the work of Plato it was 
recognized that "a political society should be not only a 
microcosmos but also a macroanthropos. 11 43 With this shift 
in accent the pattern for political order is found not in 
the rhythms of the cosmos but rather in the pattern of the 
souls of the leading citizens. Yet the element of 
transcendent representation was not lost, since a 
political order was understood to be healthy to the extent 
that the patterns of these souls are attuned to the 
transcendent pattern of order. But with St. Augustine's 
rigid articulation of Christian society into distinct 
spiritual and temporal orders the political realm was de-
41voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction (1952), pp. 27-28, 168-69. 
42rbid., p. 54. 
43 rbid., p. 61. 
An Intro-
132 
divinized to the point of being devalued. St. Augustine 
provided a valuable corrective against the more grotesque 
manifestations of the human tendency to attach 
transcendent significance to mundane activity, but for 
voegelin this was accomplished at the cost of virtually 
obscuring the significance of political activity per se.44 
The following passage from Book V of the City of God would 
seem to support Voegelin's contention: 
As for this mortal life, which ends after a few days' 
course, what does it matter under whose rule a man 
lives, being so soon to die, provided that the rulers 
do not force him to impious and wicked acts?45 
If human beings have a need (or at least a continual 
tendency) to understand their worldly political activity 
as transcendentally meaningful, as Voegelin's analysis 
suggests, then we may expect that, when a civilization no 
longer leaves room for the expression of this need, the 
need will make room for itself. In a striking passage 
that Voegelin admitted was "somewhat drastic," he seems to 
have drawn precisely this conclusion: 
If we formulate the deepest sentiment that causes the 
spiritual tensions of the West since the Middle Ages 
somewhat drastically, we might say that the bearers of 
Western civilization do not want to be a senseless 
appendix to the history of antiquity: they want to 
understand their civilizational existence as 
meaningful. If the Church is not able to see the hand 
of God in the History of mankind, men will not remain 
44see Voegelin, "World Empire and the Unity of 
Mankind" (1962), pp. 184-88. 
45Augustine, city of God, op. cit., 5:17, p. 205. 
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satisfied but will go out in search of gods who take 
some interest in their civilizational efforts. The 
church has abandoned its spiritual leadership insofar 
as it has left post-medieval man without guidance in 
his endeavors to find meaning in a complex 
civilization which differs profoundly in its horizons 
of reason, nature and history from the ancient that 
was absorbed and penetrated by the early Church. In 
the face of this abandonment of the magisterium it is 
futile when Christian thinkers accuse the superbia of 
modern man who will not submit to the authority of the 
Church. There is always enough superbia in man to 
bolster the accusation plausibly, but the complaint 
dodges the real issue: that man in search of 
authority cannot find it in the Church, through no 
fault of his own.46 
st. Augustine's symbolization of the era after 
Christ as the saeculum senescens remained effective only 
on the doctrinal level. As we have seen, parousiastic 
ideas and movements were pushed beyond the pale of 
orthodoxy but not out of existence, and by the twelfth 
century the expansion of medieval civilization and the 
rise of monastic orders led to such reinterpretations of 
history as the Chronica of Otto of Freising and the 
writings of Joachim of Flora. 47 According to Voegelin, 
46voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
pp. 22-23. 
47voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268. Otto 
and Joachim were not alone in their unwillingness to 
conceive of their own age as a mere time of waiting, nor 
were they alone in regarding the rise of monastic orders 
as a portent of an impending advance in an historical 
process of spiritual fulfillment. In a chapter on Joachim 
from Voegelin' s unpublished History of Western Poli ti cal 
Thought three other writers are also mentioned in this 
connection: Rup_ert of Deutz (De sancta trinitate et 
operibus eius, c. 1110); Honorius of Autun (Summa Gloria, 
c. 1120); Anselm of Havelberg (Liber de una forma credendi 
et multiformitate vivendi, c. 1135). The tremendous 
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both Otto and Joachim interpreted the flowering of the 
monastic life as an event which indicated a meaningful 
advance in the process of transfiguration after the age of 
Christ and before the end of the world. 48 Joachim broke 
with the Augustinian conception of Christian society by 
applying the symbol of the Trinity to the course of 
history in such a way that the impending era could be 
understood not as a mere time of waiting but as the time 
of ultimate spiritual consummation. The history of 
mankind was divided into three ages which were said to 
correspond to the three Persons of the Trinity. The first 
period of the world, the age of the Father, was succeeded 
by the age of the Son upon the appearance of Christ. 
According to Joachim's calculations (based principally on 
Rev. 11:3 and 12:6, along with Matt. 1:17) the third age 
would appear within two generations. The age of the 
Spirit would entail the ultimate revelation of God's 
purpose on earth and in time, and since the papacy and 
clerical hierarchy are institutions of the second epoch, 
enthusiasm with which Joachim's writings were received by 
figures such as Hugh of Digne, Gerard of Borgo San Domingo 
and John of Parma suggests that the Augustinian conception 
of the saeculum senescens had worn thin as a deterrent to 
millenarianism. See Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Latter 
Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. 68-83. 
48voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268; The New 
Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 110-113, 
119. See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, op. cit., 
pp. 150-51. 
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Joachim held that the existing Church would have to yield 
to the coming Church of the Spirit.49 
Joachim did not claim himself to be the Dux e 
Babylone who would usher in the coming era, nor did he, as 
a man of the second era, criticize the contemporary Church 
or draw revolutionary conclusions from his visions. His 
followers were not nearly so circumspect, and as the year 
1260 drew near there broke out an unusually intense and 
widespread rash of parousiastic excitement. 50 That the 
events prophesied by Joachim and Otto failed to 
materialize does not negate the importance of their 
reinterpretations of history, for the pattern of three-age 
conceptions of a history which leads to a final, perfected 
epoch was to act as a powerful influence in post-medieval 
symbolizations of ideological consciousness.51 For 
Voegelin these re-interpretations of history are crucial 
for an understanding of the continuity which binds 
medieval parousiasm and modern ideological consciousness: 
49cf. Karl Lowith, Meanino in History, op. cit., pp. 
149-151, and Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Latter Middle 
Ages, op. cit., pp. 77-79. 
50Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 
110-118, 128-131. 
51voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
pp. 11-12; The New Science of Politics: An Introduction 
(1952), pp. 111-112. Joachim's was not the only three-age 
conception of history during medieval times. See Norman 
Cohn's account of the doctrines of the Amaurians in The 
Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 154-56. ~-
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Though Otto's and Joachim's metastatic expectations 
were no more fulfilled than Paul's, their symbolisms 
marked a decisive step in the self-interpretation of 
Western society, because they created a new pattern of 
expectations: The age of perfection, the teleion, 
would be an age of the Spirit beyond the age of 
Christ; it would bring the free association of 
spiritualists, of men of the new monastic type, 
unencumbered by institutions; and it would be an age, 
therefore, beyond the establishment of church and 
empire. The potentialities of the new type of 
expectations became apparent in the fourteenth 
century, when Petrarca (1304-1374) symbolized the age 
that began with Christ as the tenebrae, as the dark 
age, that now would be followed by a renewal of the 
lux of pagan antiquity. The monk as the figure 
promising a new age was succeeded by the humanist 
intellectual. Hegel, finally, brought the potential 
to fruition by identifying revelation with a 
dialectical process of consciousness in history, a 
process that reached its teleion in his own "system of 
science" ••.. The Parousia, at last, had occurred.52 
As we turn in the following chapter to modern 
ideological consciousness we will find that expectations 
of an age of perfection were as compatible with movements 
stressing reason and enlightenment as with those grounded 
in revelation and mysticism. Yet the differences between 
these movements must not be minimized. The apocalyptic, 
millennarian movements associated with parousiastic 
consciousness were emphatically religious in character 
(regardless of the question of orthodoxy), whereas modern 
ideologies are uniformly and explicitly anti-religious. 
The perfected realm anticipated by the parousiast is 
envisioned either as a heavenly state beyond the 
imperfections of the world or as a new world made heavenly 
52voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268. 
through a 
conversely, 
massive influx 
the perfected 
of transcendent 
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order. 
by the 
ideologist is envisioned as a worldly paradise achieved 
through a flowering of purely human potentialities which 
have hitherto been stunted by the worship of imagined 
gods. Parousiasts look to God as the agent who will 
transform reality, with perhaps a bit of preparatory 
assistance from the Elect; ideologists look to immanent 
historical laws or the inevitable ascendancy of a 
particular class, race or methodology. 
In light of these dramatic dissimilarities, we must 
anticipate the question of whether the elements of 
continuity between parousiasm and ideological 
consciousness are sufficiently strong to warrant a 
positive evaluation of Voegelin's attempt to link 
ideological movements to a trans-historical pattern of 
spiritual disorientation. There can be little doubt that 
this attempt would prove to be unpersuasive if the 
analysis were restricted to the level of surface 
manifestations, and thus we can at least say that Voegelin 
was wise to couch the attempt in terms of a theory of 
consciousness. A comparison of the lives and writings of 
particular ideologists and parousiasts--even of 
apparently kindred spirits such as Marx and Thomas 
Muntzer--would likely lead one to the conclusion that any 
apparent similarities are vastly outweighed by differences 
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in their thought and activity. If it could be 
demonstrated that both had fallen prey to forms of 
disorientation, but not that these forms are intelligibly 
equivalent in some sense, then Voegelin's objective of 
finding historical precedents for the disorders of our 
time would not have been met. Rather than comparing 
individuals directly, it is a more promising (if less 
ambitious) approach to identify broad patterns of 
consciousness and then search the writings of individuals 
for symbols and indications of experiences which fit the 
general pattern. If we could be convinced that Marx was 
indeed an ideologist and that Muntzer was a parousiast, 
and furthermore that ideological consciousness and 
parousiasm are intelligibly linked as variants of a more 
general, pneumapathological con-sciousness, we might then 
be prepared to conclude that the differences between the 
two figures are not as daunting as a direct comparison 
would suggest. 
Thus, as the focus of our investigation of 
Voegelin's analysis shifts from parousiasm to ideological 
consciousness, we would expect to find two types of 
underlying continuity: one which is suggestive of common 
patterns of experience and symbolization among various 
ideologists, and another which is suggestive of a 
connection between ideologists and pneumapaths in general. 
If it cannot be shown that the wide variety of ideological 
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movements enumerated in the first chapter are expressions 
of a common pattern of consciousness, we would be forced 
to question the value of Voegelin's diagnostic project as 
a whole. For, if we cannot find good reason to equate 
ideologies with each other, we cannot legitimately speak 
of an ideological consciousness at all, much less locate 
it within the general category of pneumapathological 
disorientation. To push this line of speculation one 
stage farther, if we find that there are important 
similarities between metastatic faith, prometheanism and 
parousiasm but that we must stop here, we will have found 
conclusions that may be interesting but which are quite 
irrelevant to Voegelin's intentions. His excursions into 
the history of spiritual disorder were not undertaken 
because this class of phenomena was thought to be of 
particular value in its own right. As an historian of 
order, Voegelin would have been content to leave analysis 
of the materials we have encountered to this point to 
those who are interested in the history of various types 
of disorder; but as a political scientist and a man of the 
twentieth century, he regarded the task of understanding 
the ideological disorders of his age as a matter of 
obligation.53 It was the pursuit of this objective that 
53voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
pp. 22-23, 49; From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), p. 
247. 
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led him to search for historical precedents. The question 
which must ultimately determine our evaluation of 
voegelin's diagnostic project is whether earlier patterns 
of disorder can be related not to each other but 
specifically to ideological consciousness. This question 
will be taken up in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
IDEOLOGY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND HISTORY 
Since the concept of "ideology" was first used by 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy at the time of the French 
Revolution it has taken on a broad array of connotations.I 
Initially conceived simply as the science of ideas, the 
term has generally come to be reserved for political ideas 
in particular. Contemporary political scientists utilize 
the term in a bewildering variety of contexts, but four 
basic patterns of usage can be discerned. Students of 
international politics often use the term to denote any 
set of principles which serve to justify or conceal the 
true aims of a nation-state in its struggle for power.2 
Public opinion researchers and empirically-oriented 
students of political behavior are more likely to refer to 
ideology as a characteristic of the political outlook of 
individuals. In this sense, ideology is an internally 
consistent set of opinions and beliefs. Individuals who 
exhibit greater degrees of consistency are said to possess 
lFor brief histories of the concept see George 
Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New 
York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 3-46; Karl Manheim, Ideology 
and Utopia (New York: Harvest, 1936, pp. 55-108; David 
McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1986), pp. 1-63. 
2E.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: 
The struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 4th ed., 1967), pp. 83-86, pp. 219-223. 
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greater "ideological constraint" than those who adopt 
conflicting views in an ad hoc fashion.3 
Among political theorists the concept of ideology 
is almost always used in one of two senses, both of which 
are pejorative. Marxists generally refer to ideology as a 
type of false consciousness which results either from a 
limited historical perspective, distortions imposed by 
class interest, or intellectual domination by a ruling 
elite. 4 In non-Marxist circles, ideology is viewed as a 
form or style of political thought which is distinct from-
-and inferior to--philosophy.5 That the emphasis here is 
more on form than on content is evinced by the fact that 
mutually hostile creeds or "-isms" are grouped under one 
overarching rubric. Since those whose doctrines are 
classified in this way can easily point to elements which 
differentiate their creed from others in the set, it would 
seem that the very use of the term in this sense 
3E.g., w. Lance Bennett, Public Opinion in American 
Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 
pp. 48-56; Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Linda J. Medcalf, 
American Ideologies Today (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 
4-7. 
4For the most 
concept see Marx and 
Progress Publishers, 
Parekh, Marx's Theory 
extensive presentation of Marx's 
Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: 
1976), pp. 33-83. See also Bhikhu 
of Ideology (IDndon: Croom Helm, 1982) . 
5cf. , e.g. , Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology: The 
Revival of Political Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 
1967), · pp. 45-67; Elizabeth M. James, Political Theorv: 
An Introduction to Interpretation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1976), pp. 6-7. 
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presupposes an identification of common elements which 
unite widely disparate bodies of thought. 
Although it will not be possible here to track down 
the aspects of ideology which have been proposed by 
analysts other than Voegelin as these common elements, it 
is important to note the general agreement among 
contemporary theorists that the last two hundred years 
have witnessed a proliferation of novel political 
orientations which conform to some shared pattern. In 
this respect Voegelin's analysis of ideological 
consciousness is situated in the mainstream of current 
conceptions. His departure from the mainstream consisted 
most directly in the assertion that ideologies are not the 
products of fallacious thinking on modern problems, but 
rather of a deeper disturbance in consciousness which 
bears only an inessential connection to the specifically 
modern aspects of the political world. For Voegelin it 
was not the atheistic, systematic, quasi-scientific, 
progressivist or activist tendencies of modern ideologies 
which represented their common, central elements. These 
tendencies were indeed recognized by Voegelin, but only as 
epiphenomena! manifestations of a revolt against the human 
condition within the order of being. From Voegelin's 
perspective, an ideology is less a body of propositions 
about things in the world than an effort to conjure up a 
new and improved world. Thus, since ideologies are 
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constructed for the purpose of enacting such a 
transformation, activism and progressivism are inherent to 
their character. Moreover, since the very idea of a 
transformed world would be senseless if not accompanied by 
a rejection of the notion that the "old world" is divinely 
created and sustained, it is to be expected that 
ideologies would tend toward atheism. Finally, since the 
preferred means for predicting and effecting the 
transformation will be those which appear most promising 
at a given time, it is equally unsurprising that 19th and 
20th century ideologists would at least have affected the 
systematic form of the modern natural sciences. 
Voegelin's late work suggests that the fundamental 
motivations for a project of world transformation arise 
from the human condition as such, rather than from the 
historical circumstances of a particular period. 6 This 
6voegelin's late work (at least with regard to his 
diagnostic analyses) would include those writings 
published after the release of vols. II and III of Order 
and History in 1957. It is clear that Voegelin had once 
seen a more intimate connection between ideology and 
modernity, since the first chapter of The New Science of 
Politics (1952) which treats of ideological movements was 
entitled, "Gnosticism--The Nature of Modernity" (p. 107). 
By 1959. Voegelin was already speaking of an "essential 
sameness of attitudes and motives in ancient and modern 
gnosticism." Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis (Voegelin's 
inaugural lecture at the University of Munich), English 
translation, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), p. 
40. In the 1970s it appears that Voegelin came to doubt 
whether modernity had any nature at all. The essence of 
gnosticism (or pneumapathological consciousness) seems to 
have been completely dissociated with modernity in The 
Ecumenic Age (1974). Nowhere is this more forcefully 
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does not imply, however, that the characteristics of a 
period will play no part in determining the phenomenal 
aspects or the popular appeal of such projects. Although 
voegelin's analysis does have the effect of "de-
modernizing" the essence of ideology, it would be 
incorrect to state that his understanding of ideology is 
ahistorical. We have already seen that the spiritual 
demands imposed by Christianity are of decisive importance 
in Voegelin's account of the consciousness which searches 
for comprehensive and final certainty, and this holds true 
for ideologists as well as parousiasts. The historical 
axis of the typology introduced in the first chapter is 
based upon an historical event, the epiphany of Christ, 
and the subsequent history of the Church's struggle to 
maintain itself through dogmatization and social 
compromise forms the immediate background for ideological 
rejections of Christianity.7 
suggested than in two rhetorical questions from that work: 
"What exactly is modern about modernity .•• ?" "And what is 
modern about the modern mind ..• ?" (pp. 7, 68). In 
neither instance is an answer proposed. Note also 
Voegelin' s references to "the so-called Modern Age" and 
"the so-called modern period" in "On Hegel: A Study in 
Sorcery" (1971), p. 337, and "Wisdom and the Magic of the 
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 268. 
7voegelin, Anamnesis ( 1978) , pp. 191, 194: "The 
Churches as social organizations ... historically did 
everything that could provoke the ideological rebellion, 
under which they suffer today .•.. The antiphilosophical 
resentment of the ideologist thus is not directed against 
the classical noes is, of which they know nothing, but 
against Thomas's design of a propositional "metaphysics" 
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The influences exerted by the historic advances in 
the natural sciences are also of more than coincidental 
significance. Ideologies are unscientific by definition 
for Voegelin,8 but in his view the relationship ammounts 
to more, as we shall see, than mimicry on the part of 
ideologists. There can be little doubt that the successes 
of science in turning natural powers toward human 
objectives had much to do with ideological conceptions of 
a worldly paradise. Voegelin recognized that the longing 
for such a paradise is not simply the result of 
uncontrolled imagination, but rather of genuine hardship 
and social trauma: 
... (T)he population shifts, the deportations and 
enslavements, and the interpenetration of cultures 
reduce men who exercise no control over the 
treating of uni versa ls, principles and substances. The 
ideological rebellion, as I already said, was indeed 
strongly provoked." See also "Siger de Brabant," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (vol. IV, 1944, 
pp. 507-26), esp. pp. 523-25; From Enlightenment to 
Revolution (1975), pp. 19-23; "Autobiographical Memoir," 
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A 
Biographical Introduction (1981), pp. 80-81; "Response to 
Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New but Ancient 
God?,'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought: A 
Critical Appraisal (1982), p. 191; John Kirby, "Symbolism 
and Dogmatism: Voegelin's Distinction," The Ecumenist 
(vol. XIII, 1975, pp. 26-31), passim. 
8However, this is not to say that ideologies are 
simply untrue, or that none em.body important truths. 
Voegelin repeatedly stressed the critical accomplishments 
of the great ideologists. See From Enlightenment to 
Revolution (1975), pp. 299-301; "History and Gnosis" 
(1969), pp. 65, 82-83; "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" 
(1971), pp. 343-44; "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 
189-190. 
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proceedings of history to an extreme state of 
forlornness in the turmoil of the world, of 
intellectual disorientation, of material and spiritual 
insecurity. The loss of meaning that results from the 
breakdown of institutions, civilizations, and ethnic 
cohesion evokes attempts to regain an understanding of 
the meaning of human existence in the given conditions 
of the world.9 
The broader context of this passage is a discussion of the 
events in the ancient world which gave rise to Stoicism, 
the mystery religions, the Heliopolitan slave cults, 
Hebrew apocalyptic, Christianity, Manichaeism, and 
gnosticism. Voegel in was no less prepared to connect 
ideological attempts at a recovery of meaning with 
tangible sources of discontent .10 Thus, with regard to 
the etiology of particular movements, Voegelin cannot be 
charged with ignoring events in history in favor of events 
9voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
p. 8. See also the more extensive enumeration of 
historical sources of pneumapathological disorientation 
(which also speaks to modern sources) in In Search of 
Order (1987), pp. 35-36. 
lOAn important case in point, which has perhaps been 
given insufficient attention by Voegelin's more 
conservative admirers, is that of Marxism: "Marx has laid 
his finger on the sore spot of modern industrial society, 
on the cause of serious trouble (even if the trouble 
should not take the form of a general communist 
revolution), that is the growth of economic institutions 
into a power of such overwhelming influence on the life of 
every single man, that in the face of such power all talk 
about human freedom becomes futile .... That no economic 
theorist after Marx was sufficiently interested in the 
philosophical foundations of his science to explore this 
problem further, that no modern school of economic theory 
~xists that would understand and develop the very 
important beginnings of Marx, casts a significant light on 
this whole branch of science." Voegelin, From 
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 299-300. 
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in consciousness.11 
Nevertheless, while there is rarely if ever a 
shortage of tangible sources of discontent in human life, 
there is also no natural necessity whereby discontent 
brings forth projects for transforming reality: 
There is enough "darkness" in reality to provide the 
grievances from which a revolt can start. The life of 
man is really burdened with the well-known miseries 
enumerated by Hesiod. We remember his list of hunger, 
hard work, disease, early death, and the fear of 
injustices to be suffered by the weaker man at the 
hands of the more powerful--not to mention the problem 
of Pandora. Still, as long as our existence is 
undeformed by fantasies, these miseries are not 
experienced as senseless. We understand them as the 
lot of man, mysterious it is true, but as the lot he 
has to cope with in the organization and conduct of 
his life, in the fight for survival, the protection of 
his dependents, the resistance to injustice, and in 
his spiritual and intellectual response to the mystery 
of existence. The burden of existence loses its 
sense, and becomes absurd, only when a dreamer 
believes himself to possess the power of transfiguring 
imperfect existence into a lasting state of 
perfection.12 
A cataloging of the upheavals of the past two hundred 
years would certainly provide us with important 
llThis is, in substance, the charge once levelled 
against Voegelin by Hannah Arendt: 11 ••• I think that what 
separates my approach from Professor Voegelin's is that I 
proceed from facts and events instead of intellectual 
affinities and influences." "A Reply, 11 (to Voegelin' s 
review of The Origins of Totalitarianism) Review of 
Politics (vol. XV, 1953, pp. 68-85), p. 80. For 
Voegelin's response see his "Concluding Remark," esp. p. 
85. In fairness to Arendt it should be noted that her 
charge was closer to the mark at the time of writing, 
since Voegelin's break from the methodology of his early 
studies in the history of ideas was not yet fully apparent. 
12voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation (1981), pp. 237-38. 
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information for understanding modern ideological 
movements. But if we are to penetrate to the essence of 
ideology we must, according to Voegelin, move from the 
level of pragmatic events to an analysis of consciousness. 
In one sense, we find ourselves on familiar ground 
in the analysis of ideological consciousness. The 
tensions experienced in the "in-between" reality of the 
metaxy are not susceptible to change; once the di vine 
Beyond of reality has been differentiated from the 
immanent realm of human existence, the person who searches 
for meaning and orientation will participate in the same 
field of tensions as his or her predecessors .13 The 
questioning con-sciousness in our time, as always, will 
find that its own existence must be contingent upon a 
reality which lies beyond its immediate experience. 
Modern man has no more reason to believe that he has 
caused himself than ancient man, and hence no less reason 
to ask the question of the ground. The range of 
conceivable "answers" to the question will not have 
changed since ancient times, and none of the 
possibilities will offer much hope that the transcendent 
ground can be known with certainty or compelled to do our 
bidding. 
Even a hard-bitten materialist like Marx recognized 
13voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Sym-
bolization in History" (1970), pp. 216-17. 
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that the question of the ground will arise naturally--
along with its attendant implications--out of our basic 
experiences: 
A being only counts itself as independent when it 
stands on its own feet and it stands on its own feet 
as long as it owes its existence to itself. A man who 
lives by the grace of another considers himself a 
dependent being. But I live completely by the grace 
of another when I owe him not only the maintenance of 
my life but when he has also created my life, when he 
is the source of my life. And my life necessarily has 
such a ground outside itself if it is not my own 
creation. The idea of creation is thus one that it is 
very difficult to drive out of the minds of people. 
They find it impossible to conceive of nature and man 
existing through themselves since it contradicts all 
the evidences of practical life.14 
In this passage Marx has let his guard down long enough 
for one to glimpse the inner logic of an ideological 
rebellion. It is apparent that his problem was not simply 
one of spiritual obtuseness, for he was reflective enough 
to perceive that his own existence must have a ground 
beyond itself. One might ask why this observation did not 
prompt him to inquire into the nature of the ground, or to 
explore the extent to which he could know or participate 
in its order, but the answer is already before us. Marx 
knows in advance that the very presence of such a ground 
will necessitate the recognition of his status as a 
dependent being, and thus the revel t must begin at this 
point. Humanity cannot be independent--cannot be the 
14Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844," in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 94. 
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measure--unless Marx can find a way to depict it (however 
implausibly) as having created itself. Perhaps Marx's 
philosophical conscience as a former student of philosophy 
induced a bit of anxiety at this point. If so, he must 
have found a way to quell the disturbance, possibly by 
driving the idea of creation from his own mind. 
consistent with his role as the modern Prometheus, he then 
sets out to save others from the anxiety by attempting, 
difficulties notwithstanding, to drive the idea of 
creation from their minds as well. If it is objected that 
we are now reading too much into the passage, and that we 
have no evidence of any anxiety on Marx's part, we must 
still ask why he should care whether the idea of creation 
occurs to people. Is it because he knows that his theory, 
in which humanity creates itself through productive 
activity, begs rather than answers the question of the 
ground? If he believed that his theory could pass 
scrutiny when measured against "all the evidences of 
practical life," would he have any reason to wish that the 
idea of creation might be driven from people's minds? The 
succeeding paragraph makes it abundantly clear that Marx 
does not have persuasion in mind when speaking of a 
"driving out," since his final response to an imaginary 
critic (who pursues the Aristotelian argument for a proto 
arche) is, "give up your abstraction and you will give up 
your question .••• do not think, do not ask me 
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t . "15 ques ions ..•• 
This model case of existential closure reveals the 
sequence of events which, according to Voegelin, typifies 
the development of ideological consciousness.16 By using 
terms such as "revolt," "rebellion" and "closure," 
voegelin sought to stress the reactive nature of the 
ideological impulse. In his view, it is not as though an 
ideologist first discovers some neglected class of 
phenomena, builds a system explaining its ubiquitous 
effects, and then, after finding that his system conflicts 
with classical and Christian writings, proceeds to rebel 
against the latter. It is rather the case that the 
confrontation with the reality depicted in Christianity 
and classical philosophy comes first; the system which 
announces a preferable Second Reality is the product of a 
prior rebellion. Voegelin's writings would lead us to 
believe that this holds true for all of the great 
ideologists, since none are exempted from this general 
characterization. This contention would certainly have 
been strengthened if Voegelin had provided a broad set of 
1sibid., p. 95. 
16voegelin identifies Marx as a model case in "Wisdom 
and the Magic of the Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 
238. This section of Marx's "Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844" was regarded by Voegelin as something 
of a model case within a model case. For his analysis see 
Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 23-28, and 
~rem Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 289-91. 
153 
particular examples of the phenomenon, but he may have 
thought that treatments of Marx and Hegel would be 
sufficient for an understanding of the dynamics of 
ideological closure.17 
It was observed in the second chapter that the 
concept of personal closure against the transcendent 
ground presupposes a prior exposure. In some instances 
this exposure will have been more authentic than in 
others. For example, Voegelin credited Hegel with having 
penetrated beneath the dogmas and propositional 
metaphysics of his day to the experiential roots of 
Christianity and philosophy, whereas thinkers such as 
Helvetius and Vauvenargues were said to have revolted only 
against the opaque symbols of traditions which they could 
not fathom. 18 Nevertheless, a certain hostility towards 
Christianity and classical Greek philosophy would seem to 
stand as a constant in modern ideologies. One would be 
hard pressed to think of a major ideologist who was simply 
indifferent to these traditions. We must ask, therefore, 
17voegelin also refers to Hegel as a "prototypical 
case." See The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 21: Science, 
Politics and Gnosticism (1968), p. 40; "Response to 
Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New but Ancient 
God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought: A 
Critical Appraisal, p. 196. 
18on Hegel see In Search of Order (1987), pp. 48, 53, 
61-62. On Helvetius and Vauvenargues see From 
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 36-42, 59. See 
also "On Classical Studies," Modern Age (vol. XVII, 1973, 
pp. 2-8), p. 4. 
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why these modes of existential orientation would have 
proven so unsettling. 
If it is accepted that aggression is usually 
preceeded by frustration of some sort, the hostility of 
the ideologist will become intelligible as a response to 
two characteristics of Christianity and classical 
philosophy: both run counter to the libido dominandi and 
the longing for ultimate certainty. Perhaps it would be 
better to say that these are experiential characteristics 
of the human condition or of reality itself, and not of 
particular traditions of symbolization, but we must 
account for those cases in which the experience of the 
ideologist is mediated by a body of hypostatized symbols. 
In any event, the fundamental alternatives are clear. One 
may respond to the tensions of the metaxy with humility 
and reverence, faith and the love of wisdom, or one can 
attempt to eliminate the tension outright by falsifying 
reality so that the love of wisdom can become its 
possession. 19 The act of falsification is itself an 
expression of the will to power, but one which will also 
19voegelin, science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968}, 
p. 42: "Philosophy springs from the love of beingi it is 
man's loving endeavor to perceive the order of being and 
attune himself to it. Gnosis desires dominion over being: 
in order to sieze control of being the gnostic constructs 
his system." On the importance of the distinction between 
love and possession of wisdom, see "On Hegel: A Study in 
Sorcery" (1971), pp. 342-43; "The Meditative Origin of the 
Philosophical Knowledge of Order" (1984), p. 43; In Search 
of Order (1987), pp. 54-55. 
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pave the way for still more ambitious projects. A 
transcendent ground cannot be manipulated in pursuance of 
immanent objectives, and Plato's sophon can only be loved, 
not redirected. But when faith and philosophy become 
gnosis, a new world filled with manipulative possibilities 
is opened. 
The new world which is opened in the speculation of 
the ideologist will necessarily be a truncated world. 
Philosophy cannot become gnosis unless the realm of 
transcendent experience is cast adrift from the immanent 
sphere of life, and thus the personal closure of the 
ideologist will give rise to a stubborn theoretical 
immanentism. Once the intramundane has eclipsed the 
divine, the order of the world can, at least conveivably, 
be known with certainty. If an immanent counterpart to 
the transcendent ground can be located (as for instance in 
productive relations or racial composition or scientific 
rationality), it will then become possible not only to 
fully understand reality but to manipulate it to one's 
liking. The drive for certainty and the will to power 
will both have gotten their way, simultaneously, through 
the single act which Voegelin called "the decapitation of 
being" or the "murder of God. 11 20 
The speculative murder of God can be accomplished 
20voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
p. 54. 
156 
in a more or less subtle manner, but it must be 
accomplished if man is to emerge as the measure of all 
things. Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche are fairly 
explicit about their intentions, whereas others perform 
the feat indirectly. Thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes 
do not mount a frontal assault, but push the transcendent 
ground out of the back door by isolating nature as a self-
contained object of inquiry. When nature is declared to 
be nothing but matter-in-motion, devoid of design and 
purpose, God can be reduced to the status of a hypothesis 
and relegated to theologians so that scientists and 
philoso-phers can get on with the real business of 
enhancing human power and longevity.21 Hobbes abolished 
the tension between love of self and love of God in an 
equally efficient way. 22 By stating that "there is no 
such Finis ultimus (utmost ayme) nor Summum Bonum, 
(greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old 
21see Francis Bacon, The Great Instauration 
(Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1980), pp. 
15-17; Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of 
Science," in Discourse on Method and Meditations 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 44-47. 
22voegelin wrote that st. Augustine's analysis of 
this tension (which is roughly equivalent to voegelin's 
characterization of the tension of existence in the 
metaxy) is "philosophically perfect. 11 See st. Augustine, 
Expositions on the Book of Psalms, Psalm No. LXIV, and 
Voegelin, "Configurations of History," in Paul G. Kuntz, 
ed., The Concept of Order (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1968, pp. 23-42), p. 33; The New Science 
of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 178-184. 
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Morall Philoso-phers, " 23 Hobbes makes the passions the 
center of the person. Voltaire simply exchanges the 
transcendental pneuma of Christ for an intramundane esprit 
numain as the object of general history, and the change of 
heart is replaced by a progress toward ever more 
enlightened opinions.24 Helvetius discards the 
traditional understanding of the growth of the soul as an 
internal process which is nourished by communication with 
transcendent reality in favor of the formation of conduct 
through external management by an enlightened 
legislator. 25 Turgot, Saint-simon and Comte relegate 
spiritual experience to a bygone phase of human 
immaturity, with the obvious implication that those who 
still order their existence by reference to such 
experiences are unfit for the new age of positivistic 
rationality.26 Finally (or at least most recently), in 
what Voegelin called the ideologies of biologism and 
psychologism, the direction in which the realissimum of 
23Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
England: Penguin, 1968), Book I, ch. xi, P. 160. 
24voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
p. 10. 
25 b'd L.:!_. I P• 700 
26on Turgot see Voegelin, "Philosophies of History: 
An Interview with Eric Voegelin, 11 New Orleans Review (vol. 
II, 1973), pp. 135-36; From Enlightenment to Revolution 
(1975), pp. 135-36. On Saint-Simon and Comte see Ibid., 
pp. 136-94. 
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existence is to be sought is inverted from the 
transcendent realm to genetic coding or psychological 
conditioning. 27 Voegelin characterized this sequence of 
deformations as a 
.•. movement of intramundane religious sentiments, 
pressing the interpretation of history and politics 
downward from the spirit to the animal basis of 
existence. Neither the "model" of the secular "sacred 
history," .nor the dogmatic symbols on the level of the 
"thesis of generality" remain constant; they change 
continuously in accordance with the stratum of human 
nature that commands the attention of the time and 
becomes the object of the process of deification. The 
rapid descent from reason, through technical and 
planning intellect, to the economic, psychological and 
biological levels of human nature, as the dominants in 
the image of man, is a strong contrast to the imposing 
stability of the Christian anthropology through 
eighteen centuries. Once the transcendental anchorage 
is surrendered, the descent from the rational to the 
animal nature, so it seems, is inevitable.28 
In each of the cases discussed above the thinker 
has, according to Voegelin, defined nature or humanity in 
such a way that the transcendent ground of spiritual 
experience is eclipsed. For Voegelin this equivalence on 
the level of results arose from a deeper equivalence at 
the level of motivating experiences. Each of these 
projects was engendered by an inordinate drive for 
certainty and power, and thus Voegelin could argue for an 
27rbid., p. 69. Voegelin did not deny that these are 
important factors in human nature; biology and psychology 
become biologism and psychologism only when these factors 
are said to be all there is to human nature. See "Reason: 
The Classic Experience," in Anamnesis (1978), pp. 113-15. 
28voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), 
p. 13. 
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intelligible unity among these efforts, despite their 
phenotypical differences. Yet there is also another, 
rather more obvious commonality which runs through the 
writings in question. All of these thinkers understood 
themselves as scientists, regardless of what we might have 
to say about the value of their work as science. We must 
be wary of mistaking overenthusiasm or simple errors in 
judgment for a murderous will to replace God. At what 
point does science shade over into a scientism which 
bespeaks a pneumapathological disorder? 
In an important article published in 1948, 
entitled, "The Origins of Scientism," Voegelin set forth a 
characterization of the ideological nature of scientism 
which is strikingly consistent with the views he was 
expressing some forty years hence. Voegelin associated 
three principal dogmas with the scientistic creed: (1) 
the assumption that the mathematized science of natural 
phenomena is a model to which all other sciences ought to 
conform; (2) that all realms of being are accessible to 
the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all 
reality which is not accessible to the sciences of 
phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical 
form of the dogma, illusionary.29 Voegelin held that the 
creed implies two great denials: "it denies the dignity 
29voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism," Social 
Research (vol. XV, 1948, pp. 462-94), p. 462. 
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of science to the quest for substance in nature, in man 
and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and, in 
the more radical form, it denies the reality of 
substance. 1130 Scientism was defined as "the attempt to 
treat substance (including man and society and history) as 
if it were phenomenon .••• n31 Its origins, according to 
voegelin, 
began in a fascination with the new science to the 
point of underrating and neglecting concern for 
experiences of the spirit; they developed into the 
assumption that the new science could create a world 
view that would substitute for the religious order of 
the soul; and they culminated, in the nineteenth 
century, in the dictatorial prohibition, on the part 
of scientistic thinkers, against asking questions of a 
metaphysical nature.32 
In contrast to his definition of scientism, 
Voegelin once defined science in the following manner: 
Science is a search for truth concerning the nature of 
30Ibid., pp. 462-63. 
31Ibid., pp. 463-64. 
32Ibid., p. 462. Voegelin treated these as three 
distinct phases in the development of scientism as an 
intellectual movement. The first he traced to the second 
half of the sixteenth century, the second to the middle of 
the seventeenth century, and the third to the First 
Lecture of Comte's Cours de philosophie positive in 1830. 
With regard to Comte's prohibition of metaphysical 
questioning, Voegelin presumably had in mind a passage 
where Comte describes the positive philosophy, "whose 
leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to 
human reason those sublime mysteries which theology 
explains •••. Theologians and metaphysicians may imagine and 
refine about such questions; but positive philosophy 
rejects them." Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy 
(tr. Abrahams. Blumberg) (New York: AMS Press, 1974), pp. 
27 I 29 • 
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the various realms of being. Relevant in science is 
whatever contributes to the success of this search. 
Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge 
contributes to the study of essence, while methods are 
adequate in so far as they can be effectively used as 
means for this end. Different objects require 
different methods •..• If the adequacy of a method is 
not measured by its usefulness to the purpose of 
science, if on the contrary the use of a method is 
made the criterion of science, then the meaning of 
science as the orientation of man in his world, and as 
the great instrument for man's understanding of his 
own position in the universe is lost.33 
scientism is the ideological perversion of science through 
reduction to a single method, a method which does indeed 
have much to offer in the way of enhanced certainty and 
power--but which also, if declared to be the only 
legitimate mode of inquiry, entraps the practitioner 
within the closed and flattened world of an ideology. For 
the architechts of scientism this closure was not an 
unfortunate side effect of rigor. Rather, it is precisely 
because the ideologists of science sought refuge from the 
tensions and mysteries of an open consciousness that an 
immanentist method was enshrined. 
Scientism is thus an ideology or type of 
pneumapathological consciousness in its own right, as well 
as an undercurrent which runs through most modern 
ideologies. On the basis of Voegelin' s analysis, one 
could say either that scientism is a form of ideology or 
that ideologies are forms of scientism. This does not 
33voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction (1952), pp. 4-5. 
An Intro-
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h Wever that those in our day who confine their mean, o ' 
inquiries to the methods of the natural sciences are 
pneumapaths. We can observe that work within these 
methods, which for one such as Comte was a shield against 
the tensions of open existence, may at the other extreme 
be nothing more momentous than a job which pays the bills. 
The clear implication of Voegelin's "The Origins of 
scientism" is that the rank and file of modern science are 
not the active agents of a pneumapathological scientism 
but, rather, its victims.34 
voegelin argued that scientism, from its very 
origins, was the offshoot of an obsession with power. 
This is apparent enough in Bacon's declaration that 11 ••• I 
am laboring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or 
34voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), p. 
491: "The spreading belief [that human existence can be 
oriented in an absolute sense through the truth of 
science] has had the result that the magnificent advance 
of science in western civilization is paralleled by an 
unspeakable advance of mass ignorance with regard to the 
problems which are existentially the important 
ones ...• Once the scientistic pathos has penetrated the 
educational institutions of a society, it has become a 
social force which cannot easily be broken, if it can be 
broken at all. The problem is no longer one of mere 
ignorance; if the belief in the self-sufficient ordering 
of existence through science is socially entrenched, it 
has become a force which actively prevents the cultivation 
of human substance and corrodes the surviving elements of 
7ultural tradition still further. The spiritual desire, 
in the Platonic sense, must be very strong in a young man 
of our time to overcome the obstacles which social 
pressure puts in the way of its cultivation." The 
bracketed passage is interpolated from the preceeding 
Page. For Voegelin's views on contemporary universities, 
see "On Classical Studies" (1973), passim. 
163 
doctrine, but of human utility and power,n35 and in 
Descartes' praise of the method by which we will "make 
ourselves masters and possessors of nature.n36 Yet 
voegelin held that the idea of power through science is 
neither intrinsically pathological nor exclusively modern: 
The idea of power through science has a rational core: 
if we have knowledge of causal relations we can form 
means-ends relations; if we have the means we can 
achieve the end; hence knowledge in this sense is 
eminently useful. The rational, utilitarian core in 
itself is of necessity present in all human existence, 
both personal and social; utilitarian rationality 
determines a segment of life in primitive as well as 
advanced civilizations; in itself it is not the 
specific determinant of any particular society. Under 
the impact of the modern advance of science, however, 
this core has acquired the characteristics of a 
cancerous growth. The rational-utilitarian segment is 
expanding so strongly in our civilization that the 
social realization of other values is noticeably 
weakened. This expansion is carried by the mass creed 
that the utilitarian domination over nature through 
science should and will become the exclusive 
preoccupation of man, as well as the exclusive 
determinant for the structure of society. In the 
nineteenth century this idea of utilitarian 
exclusiveness crystalized in the belief that the 
dominion of man over man would be replaced by the 
dominion of man over nature, and that the government 
of men would be replaced by the administration of 
things •••. Here we can see in the raw the fascination 
with power that exudes from the new science: it is so 
overwhelming that it blunts one's awareness of the 
elementary problems of human existence; science 
becomes an idol that will magically cure the evils of 
existence and transform the nature of man.37 
35Bacon, The Great Instauration, op. cit., p. 16. 
36oescartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of 
Science," op. cit., p. 45. 
37voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), pp. 
486-87. 
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It is the obsession with power, the yearning for a magical 
cure for the evils of existence, and the desire to 
transform human nature which stand as equivalences on the 
level of consciousness among ideologies (and, for that 
matter, among ideology and metastatic faith, prometheanism 
and parousiasm). 
These projects of magical transformation cannot, of 
course, be effected until the realm of human nature and 
society can be brought within the grasp of the methods of 
the natural sciences. Although Bacon and Descartes 
ostensibly disclaimed any intention to take this step, 
Comte, among others, was clear about its necessity and 
desirability: 
This general revolution of the human mind is nearly 
accomplished. We have only to complete the Positive 
Philosophy by bringing Social phenomena within its 
comprehension, and afterward consolidating the whole 
into one body of homogenous doctrine ..•• When it has 
become complete, its supremacy will take place 
spontaneously, and will re-establish order through 
society ...• All our fundamental conceptions having 
become homogeneous, the Positive state will be fully 
established. It can never again change its character, 
though it will be for ever in course of development by 
additions of new knowledge.38 
Although Comte's distinctly millennialist hopes for a 
positivistic science of society were to take root most 
dramatically in totalitarian movements, Voegelin argued 
that they continue to find expression in Western social 
38comte, The Positive Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 30, 
36. 
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science and in "the so-called liberal and progressive 
movements. 1139 Here the obsession with power and the 
longing for a transformed existence takes the form of the 
belief that the calamities which accompany the age of 
science must be cured by still more science. The argument 
runs that, since we have gained dominion over nature 
through science, we must avoid the misuse of this power by 
gaining control over our social environment through a 
corresponding advancement of social science.40 While 
voegelin regarded such a project as impossible on 
principle, he found more than a simple misconception of 
science operating within this movement: 
Scientists of more social prestige than human wisdom 
stand up before large audiences and tell them in all 
seriousness that social scientists will have to 
emulate the natural scientists and do their share in 
order to realize the perfect society. There seems to 
be no suspicion that the effects of natural science, 
both beneficial and destructive, are not due to the 
genius of scientists but to the objective structure of 
the realm of phenomena which permits the introduction 
of human action into the chain of cause and effect 
once the law of the chain has been discovered; [there 
is] no suspicion that this objective structure does 
not prevail in the realm of substance •.•• The knowledge 
of phenomena is certainly the key to their utilitarian 
mastery, but the understanding of human substance is 
not the key to the mastery of society and history. 
The expansion of the will to power from the realm of 
phenomena to that of substance, or the attempt to 
operate in the realm of substance as if it were the 
realm of phenomena--that is the definition of magic.41 
39voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" ( 1948), p. 487. 
40rbid. 
4lrbid., pp. 487-88. 
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It would certainly be incorrect to state that all 
(or even many) of those who foresee fruitful avenues for 
the application of quantitative methods in the social 
sciences have fallen prey to the consciousness of the 
sorcerer. Indeed, behavioralists in the social sciences 
are more vulnerable to the charge that their researches 
are irrelevant to questions of substance than that they 
have mishandled such questions.42 The grandiose claims of 
the 1940s and 50s seem to have fallen by the wayside, 
largely due to the self-correcting character of the 
movement as one which sought not only progressivist 
objectives but also analytic rigor.43 
Nevertheless, if the heyday of scientism in the 
human sciences has passed, the great prestige of the 
methods of the natural sciences has not, and thus it would 
be premature to discount Voegelin' s observations. His 
principal fear in the late 1940s was not that scientistic 
42voegelin shifted his criticism in this direction 
only four years after the publication of "The Origins of 
Scientism. 11 See The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), pp. 1-13. 
43The more grotesque forms of scientism have been 
pushed into relatively insignificant private institutes 
for "futuristic studies." On occasion one hears talk of 
immortality through cryonics or cloning from certain 
quarters in the academic community, but by and large 
science as magic has fallen to writers of science fiction. 
This genre of "literature" is surely significant, as it 
preserves scientistic consciousness within the popular 
imagination, but it has failed to eclipse older sources of 
disorientation such as communal romanticism, astrology, 
apocalypticism, or popularized forms of Oriental mysticism. 
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projects would work, but rather that the general 
infatuation with the natural sciences would lead to 
atrophy in the historical and philosophical sciences to 
the extent that traditional sources of sobriety and 
reorientation would be lost to Western civilization. 44 
Although this danger has yet to pass, Voegelin found cause 
for optimism even before the end of the 1950s. As he 
moved beyond his early studies in the history of political 
ideas and into other disciplines, he was led to state that 
"we are living today in a period of progress in the 
historical and philosophical sciences that hardly has a 
parallel in the history of mankind: 11 45 
The enormous enlargement of our historical horizon 
through archaeological discoveries, critical editions 
of texts, and a flood of monographic interpretation is 
so well known a fact that elaboration is superfluous. 
The sources are already at hand; and the convergent 
interpretations by orientalists and semitologists, by 
classical philologists and historians of antiquity, by 
theologians and medievalists, facilitate and invite 
the attempt to use the primary sources as the basis 
for a philosophical study of order .••• We have gained a 
44see "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), pp. 489-94. 
45voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1973), quoted 
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Bio-
graphical Introduction, p. 82. For evidence that Voegelin 
found cause for such optimism even in the early 1950s see 
The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 
2-4. In these pages Voegelin identified three parallel 
periods of progress, each of which arose as a response to 
crisis: "On the largest scale of Western history three 
such epochs occurred. The foundation of political science 
through Plato and Aristotle marked the Hellenic crisis; 
St. Augustine's civitas Dei marked the crisis of Rome and 
Christianity; and Hegel's philosophy of law and history 
marked the first major earthquake of the Western crisis." 
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new freedom in science, and it is a joy to use it.46 
While we might question whether this renaissance has 
become an important force among the general public, or 
even within the academic community, the optimism of this 
passage stands in stark contrast to the pessimism 
expressed by Voegelin in 1948: 
.•• (A] s a consequence of the interlocking of science 
and social power, the political tentacles of 
scientistic civilization reach into every nook and 
corner of an industrialized society, and with 
increasing effectiveness they stretch over the whole 
globe. There exist only differences, though very 
important ones, in the various regions of the global 
asylum with regard to the possibility of personal 
escape into the freedom of the spirit. What is left 
is hope--but hope should not obscure the realistic 
insight that we who are living today shall never 
experience freedom of the spirit in society.47 
Yet we should not make too much of the finding of a shift 
around 1950 from pessimism to optimism regarding the 
future course of scientism, for these passages do not 
adequately convey the extent to which Voegelin expressed 
both sentiments before and after this time. We shall have 
occasion in the following chapter to examine Voegelin's 
prognoses from the 1970s and 80s, but here it will be 
helpful to note that in the same article from which the 
preceding quotation was drawn he implied that the 
civilization would survive scientism and that historians 
46voegelin, Israel and Revelation ( 1956), pp. xii-
xiii. 
47voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), p. 494. 
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would survive to view it in retrospect: 
.•. [I]n retrospect the age of science will appear as 
the greatest power orgy in the history of 
mankind; ... at the bottom of this orgy the historian 
will find a gigantic outburst of magic imagination 
after the breakdown of the intellectual and spiritual 
form of medieval high-civilization. The climax of 
this outburst is the magic dream of creating the 
superman, the man-made being that will succeed the 
sorry creature of God's making .••• 48 
This passage provides us with a point of transition 
to the last issue to be treated in this chapter. Having 
seen the grounds on which Voegelin could argue for an 
essential equivalence among modern ideologies at the level 
of consciousness, we must now (and also in the final 
chapter} ask whether this equivalence can be extended to 
earlier manifestations of pneumapathological dis-
orientation. Was it legitimate for Voegelin to speak of 
scientism in the modern world in terms of magic and 
sorcery? Can modern ideologies be intelligibly connected 
to Gnosticism, hermeticism and alchemy? Is it really the 
case that "the prophetic conception of a change in the 
constitution of being" (metastatic faith) "lies at the 
root of our contemporary beliefs in the perfection of 
society .•• 11 ? 49 
The first thing that must be said in response to 
these questions is that voegelin has simply not provided 
48Ibid., pp. 488-89. 
49voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii. 
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us with a sufficient amount of material upon which to 
conclusively decide the issue in his favor. In fairness 
it should be noted that Voegelin never presumed to have 
settled the issue in such a way that any rational person 
would be convinced, although it had certainly been settled 
to his own satisfaction. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that one can do much more in the way of corroborating 
voegelin' s basic thesis if the analysis is conducted at 
the level of patterns in consciousness than at the level 
of specific traditions and movements in history. 
Despite the importance of the concept of gnosticism 
in his work, Voegelin's discussions of the historical 
Gnostics and their writings do not amount to more than a 
few pages. Late in life Voegelin attributed great 
importance to magic, hermeticism and alchemy, and yet he 
provided virtually no explicit treatment of these 
traditions or of their specific points of connection to 
modern ideology. His account of metastatic faith was 
developed from a description of one event involving one 
prophet, and we were not told why Voegelin did not choose 
to interpret Isaiah's actions as prompted by God in this 
one instance when he was willing to do so in others. With 
regard to the phenomena we have termed prometheanism, 
Voegelin argued from a more fully articulated foundation 
by dint of his analyses of Homer, Aeschylus, Thucydides, 
Plato and Aristotle. Yet his references to a similar 
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diagnosis of the nosos of the psyche by the Stoics and 
cicero are, at least as far as I have been able to follow 
them, disappointing. What little Voegelin wrote on 
parousiasm was completed in the 1940s and has yet to be 
published. Aside from a brief section in The New Science 
of Politics on the radical Puritans in the English 
Revolutions of the 17th Century, Voegelin' s writings in 
this area are largely confined to a chapter entitled "The 
People of God" from the abandoned history of political 
ideas. Although this chapter, which has been consulted in 
the course of the present study, provides a number of 
interesting insights, one must still turn to a work like 
Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millennium for explicit 
connections to modern political movements. 50 In brief, 
those who may wish to establish connections between modern 
ideological consciousness and specific traditions from the 
past will not only discover that they will have to move 
beyond Voegelin's accounts to the original sources, but 
also beyond the materials mentioned by him.51 
50see esp. the concluding chapter to the first 
edition, published by Secker and Warburg (London) in 1957. 
51It is entirely possible that several of these gaps 
are filled in Voegelin's unpublished papers and cor-
respondence, which have recently been made available 
through the archives of the Hoover Institution. As cases 
in point, Voegelin's correspondence with Hans Jonas and 
Gilles Quispel may help to fill out his view of the 
relationship between ideologists and the historical 
Gnostics, and the manuscript of the final three volumes 
written under the original projection of Order and History 
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But with all of this said, I am still of the 
opinion that Voegelin has made a contribution of the 
greatest importance for our understanding of modern 
ideological movements--a contribution which can be, 
moreover, quite persuasive if properly understood. It is 
at least conceivable that, if enough monographic studies 
were performed in support of Voegelin's project, we might 
one day be able to connect ideological consciousness with 
earlier forms of disorientation in the manner of the 
comparative study of literature. Several such studies 
have already been published and others are forthcoming.52 
Yet, as I interpret Voegelin, the key to the discovery and 
confirmation of continuities in the history of disordered 
consciousness is to find such continuities at the level of 
experiences rather than literary expressions. 53 Stated 
(see Israel and Revelation, p. x} will almost surely 
include analyses of parousiastic writings. Much of this 
material will be published in the coming years by 
Louisiana State University Press. 
52E.g., David Walsh, The Mysticism of Innerworldly 
Fulfillment: A Study of Jacob Boehme (Gainesville: 
University Presses of Florida, 1983}; Stephen A. McKnight, 
11 The Renaissance Magus and the Modern Messiah," Religious 
Studies Review (vol. V, 1979, pp. 81-88) ; "Understanding 
Modernity: A Reappraisal of the Gnostic Element," 
Intercollegiate Review (vol. XIV, 1979, pp. 107-17), and 
McKnight's book on hermeticism, alchemy and magic in the 
Renaissance, forthcoming from Louisiana State University 
Press. 
53The issue is not quite this simple, and an example 
is in order. One such continuity at the level of literary 
expression would be the symbol of history as a sequence of 
three ages, of which the third age is the final and 
differently, one who wished to establish the essential 
equivalence of, say, ideological consciousness and 
medieval millenarianism would do better to articulate and 
compare the general ideological and parousiastic 
experiences than to attempt a direct comparison of texts. 
To pursue this example, one can only connect the 
parousiast' s symbol of the °Kingdom of God" with the 
ultimate fulfillment of an underlying design or 
progressive process. As examples of this symbol Voegelin 
mentioned Joachim of Flora's conception of history as the 
ages of the Father, Son, and Spirit; Turgot's and Comte's 
theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical, and 
scientific phases; Hegel's dialectic of the three stages 
of freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfillment; the 
Marxian dialectic of the three stages of primitive 
communism, class society, and final communism; the 
National Socialist symbol of the Third Realm; and the 
identification of Moscow as the Third Rome. It would be 
extraordinarily difficult, if not simply impossible, to 
ever demonstrate that the symbols which appeared later in 
time were the result of influences exerted by earlier 
symbolizations, or that the identification of three stages 
in each case was not a matter only of coincidence. For 
instance, Marx speaks of five historical stages in The 
German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 
38-44) and of only two in A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, 
pp. 20-22). While it may therefore be fruitless to 
attempt to demonstrate an equivalence among these 
particular symbols, it is possible to provide a plausible 
explanation for the continued appearance of the basic 
symbol by reference to engendering experiences (such as 
the desire to understand one's efforts as transcendentally 
significant or one's era as that of final -victory or 
enlightenment, which are in turn engendered by the 
experiences of uncertainty and the senselessness of 
mundane events in history). This point is by no means 
intended to depreciate the efforts of those who are 
applying the principles of Voegelin 's diagnostic project 
to particular texts, however, since the important 
experiences can only be articulated by reference to the 
symbols in which they are expressed. 
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Marxist "realm of freedom" by showing that both were 
engendered by an alienated dissatisfaction with worldly 
conditions and an inordinate longing for a perfected realm 
which would be, strictly speaking, "otherworldly." Those 
who anticipate a revolution of the saints are anticipating 
something very different than those who anticipate a 
revolution of proletarians, but it is entirely possible 
that both types of speculation arise from a similar 
condition in the soul. The student of comparative 
literature is likely to object if we attempt to draw a 
literary connection between these two types of 
revolutionary texts; the historian, on the other hand, may 
find Voegelin's experiential analysis extremely helpful as 
he struggles to understand the relationship between 
movements which are so similar and yet so different. 
What is certain is that the historian will also 
object if we do not disaggregate Voegelin's concept of 
gnosticism so that we can account for the very real 
differences in patterns of spiritual disorder in history. 
The problem here is not that the extent of the literary 
influences exerted by the historical Gnostics will be 
doubted, for as I have argued, that was not what Voegelin 
was driving at when speaking of gnostic tendencies in 
modern thinkers.5 4 The real problem is that, if we can do 
54see p. 33 above. 
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no better than to refer to those such as Marx and Muntzer 
with only one concept, we invite an unwarranted degree of 
skepticism because we obscure the line between common and 
distinct elements. It was one of Voegelin's great 
achievements to have highlighted the former; it is a minor 
and correctable flaw that his terminology does not do 
justice to the latter.SS 
Since it was Voegelin's intention to draw lines of 
continuity between patterns of consciousness rather than 
genres of literature, the lack of extended treatments by 
voegelin of writings that would correspond to certain of 
the patterns is less problematic than it might seem. For 
example, while we would be in a much better position to 
evaluate his comments on the enduring significance of 
metastatic faith if he had cited evidence of its presence 
in other prophets and provided a more elaborate treatment 
of the case of Isaiah, we have little reason to believe 
that no priest or prophet or soothsayer in the ancient 
world ever thought it possible to invoke divine powers in 
SSThe typology set forth in the first chapter is 
intended as a first step toward a solution for this 
problem. Any such solution must necessarily accomplish 
three distinct objectives: (1) differentiate between 
those types of spiritual disorientation which are marked 
either by a desire to perfect or flee the world, (2) 
account for the decisive catalytic effects of 
Christianity, and (3) embrace all of the resulting 
varieties of disorientation under a generic concept which, 
like Voegelin's concept of gnosticism, can reflect their 
underlying commonalities and perennial appearances. 
r 
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order to win worldly struggles or transform the conditions 
of life. We can have reason to doubt that metastatic 
faith existed in Isaiah without having reason to doubt 
that it existed at all. If we have cause to believe that 
millenialism has existed in the ancient, the medieval and 
the modern world, we also have cause to welcome a project 
such as Voegelin' s which attempts to account for this 
continuity through an analysis of consciousness. If it 
turns out that this continuity can be persuasively traced 
to certain experiences of the human condition which also 
help to account for the character of ideological thought 
and activity, then the political scientist in particular 
has cause to welcome such a project. 
In conclusion, Voegelin's analysis of consciousness 
is not only instructive for an understanding of the 
underlying commonalities among ideologies, but also for an 
understanding of the patterns of continuity within the 
general history of pneumapathological disorientation. In 
fact, the very experiences which Voegelin found essential 
in making the first type of connection are also those 
which permitted him to make the second type. These are 
the experiences of contingency, uncertainty and 
alienation, along with the corresponding longings for 
absoluteness, final certainty and control. It is the 
hubristic revolt against the human condition and the will 
to power in a transfigured reality which unites modern 
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ideologies--and which unites ideological consciousness 
with metastatic faith, prometheanism and parousiasm. 
CHAPrER v 
BEYOND THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 
It was noted at the outset of the first chapter 
that Eric Voegelin's career as a political scientist can 
be described as a search for the wellsprings of the crisis 
of his time, for the analytical tools required to render 
it intelligible, and for appropriate sources of therapy. 
Given the extraordinary complexity and breadth of 
Voegelin's writings, one could, of course, describe his 
career in a variety of equally legitimate ways. One 
objection which could be levelled against my description 
(and this study as a whole) would be that I have over-
emphasized the importance of Voegelin's diagnostic and 
therapeutic projects, or that Voegelin's quest was first a 
search for psychic order and only secondarily an attempt 
to understand and resist the forces of disorder. 
Inasmuch as constraints of space have required that 
this analysis be restricted to Voegelin' s diagnostic and 
therapeutic efforts, it must indeed be acknowledged that 
this study cannot provide a representative overview of the 
full extent of his life's work. Nevertheless, it would 
certainly be incorrect to state that Voegelin's search for 
order can be rightly understood if treated as distinct 
from his analysis of psychic disorder. Such a statement 
would not only run contrary to Voegelin' s reflections on 
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his own philosophical activity1 but also to his 
understanding of philosophy per se: 
I have spoken of remedies against the disorder of the 
time. One of these remedies is philosophical inquiry 
itself .•.. Philosophy is the love of being through love 
of divine Being as the source of its order. The Logos 
of being is the object proper of philosophical 
inquiry; and the search for truth concerning the order 
of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing the 
modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has 
to be gained and regained in the perpetual struggle 
against the fall from it; and the movement toward the 
truth starts from a man's awareness of his existence 
in untruth. The diagnostic and therapeutic functions 
are inseparable in philosophy as a form of existence. 
And ever since Plato, in the disorder of his time, 
discovered the connection, philosophical inquiry has 
been one of the means of establishing islands of order 
in the disorder of the age. Order and History is a 
philosophical inquiry concerning the order of human 
existence in society and history. Perhaps it will 
have its remedial effect--in the modest measure that, 
in the passionate course of events, is allowed to 
Philosophy. 2 
These lines, which conclude Voegelin's "Preface" to the 
first volume of Order and History, indicate the centrality 
of his diagnostic/therapeutic project within his work as a 
whole. 
What is not made clear in these lines, or for that 
l 11 It is not simply an academic problem, or a problem 
in the history of opinion and so on, that evokes my 
interest in this or that issue in the theory of 
consciousness, but the very practical problem of mass 
murder in the twentieth century." Voegelin, 
"Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two," in 
Frederick Lawrence, ed. , The Beginning and the Beyond: 
Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences, 
Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop (vol. IV, Chico, 
California: Scholar's Press, 1984, pp. 97-131), p. 117. 
See also Anamnesis (1978), p. 3. 
2voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiv. 
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matter in any of the pertinent passages in Voegelin' s 
writings, 3 is what he had in mind when speaking of a 
11 remedy 11 or "therapy." This is quite surprising in light 
of Voegelin's stated intentions for Order and History and 
in light of the remark in Science, Politics and Gnosticism 
that "our presentation of the phenomenon [of the spiritual 
crisis of a society], therefore, will at the same time 
furnish the remedy for it through therapeutic analysis. 11 4 
The bracketed section here, which is interpolated from the 
preceding sentence in the text, would seem to suggest that 
Voegelin was considering the possibility of a remedy which 
might prove effective against both individual 
disorientation and social crisis. Yet, when read in its 
entirety, the passage could also suggest that a society in 
disorder cannot be "cured" but only escaped through an 
3The most important of these pertinent passages would 
include, "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War," Journal of 
Politics (vol. VI, 1944, pp. 177-212), p. 195; "The 
Origins of Scientism" (1948), p. 488; Science, Politics 
and Gnosticism (1958), pp. 22-23; "On Readiness to 
Rational Discussion" ( 1961), pp. 283-84; "On Debate and 
Existence, 11 Intercollegiate Review (vol. III, 1967, pp. 
143-52), p. 152; "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), p. 101; 
"On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" (1971), p. 349; Anamnesis 
(1978), p. 188; The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 184; 
"Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two" (1984), p. 
118; In Search of Order (1987), p. 39. 
4voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), 
p. 23. 
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individual reordering.5 
This reading seems to receive decisive support from 
statements such as the following: 
Nobody can heal the spiritual disorder of an "age". A 
philosopher can do no more than work himself free from 
the rubble of the idols which, under the name of an 
"age", threatens to cripple and bury him; and he can 
hope that the example of his efforts will be of help 
to others who find th ems elves in the same situation 
and experience the same desire to gain their humanity 
under God.6 
The issue cannot, however, be settled so easily. Voegelin 
repeatedly suggested that certain types of philosophical 
activity could provide a remedy for disoriented 
individuals, and since he never broke from the Platonic 
"anthropological principle" that the order of a society is 
a function of the order in the souls of its leading 
citizens, it is entirely possible that even if Voegelin 
5The passage runs as follows: 11 ••• the spiritual 
disorder of our time, the civilizational crisis of which 
everyone so readily speaks, does not by any means have to 
be borne as an inevitable fate; ••• on the contrary, 
everyone possesses the means of overcoming it in his own 
life. And our effort would not only indicate the means, 
but also show how to employ them. No one is obliged to 
take part in the spiritual crisis of a society; on the 
contrary, everyone is obliged to avoid this folly and live 
his life in order. Our presentation of the phenomenon, 
therefore, will at the same time furnish the remedy for it 
through therapeutic analysis." Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
6voegelin, "On Hegel: A study in Sorcery" (1971), p. 
349. Lest it be thought that Voegelin was being so blunt 
in the first sentence of this quotation'because he thought 
that an "age11 could not be spiritually disordered, it 
might be noted that Voegelin once referred to his own time 
as "a diseased age. 11 See 11History and Gnosis" (1969), p. 
81. 
discounted the idea 
nonetheless for an 
socially effective. 
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of a "social remedy" he searched 
individual remedy that could prove 
This possibility raises another: If 
disoriented individuals can be reoriented, including 
individuals that are situated in such a way that order 
might be restored to an entire society, is it possible 
that the history of pneumapathological consciousness might 
one day come to an end? 
Voegelin's references to "remedies" and "therapies" 
are often puzzling, but with regard to this last 
possibility it can be said with confidence that he 
rejected the notion that spiritual disorder could ever be 
done away with. This rejection was tacit rather than 
explicit, since Voegelin never wrote on the issue, but the 
implication of his analysis is no less clear for that 
reason. To be more pointed, if we accept Voegelin's 
argument that pneuma-pathological consciousness is rooted 
in reactions to the most basic experiences of the human 
condition (which are unaffected by the accoutrements of 
social change or technological progress), we would have to 
conclude that the very expectation of an era free from 
spiritual disorientation would itself be an expression of 
spiritual disorientation. 
To use a pair of current phrases, we could say that 
whenever an "End of Ideology" might come to pass, and 
whatever a "post-modern era" might be like, an absence of 
r 
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pneumapathological consciousness will not be among its 
characteristics. Paradoxical as it may seem, there is 
reason to doubt that Voegelin would have thought such an 
absence to be desirable even if he had thought it 
possible. This is explained by the further paradox that 
well-ordered and disordered consciousness spring from the 
same sources in human experience. Both patterns of 
consciousness, according to Voegelin, arise in response to 
a condition of contingency, uncertainty, mortality and 
imperfection. Although these experiences supply the 
background for either a revolt against such a condition or 
an attempt to escape it into a transfigured paradise, they 
also stand as essential preconditions which permit the 
differentiation of the transcendent from the mundane realm 
of existence. A humanity which lost the capacity for a 
revel t against the ground of being would simultaneously 
lose the philosophical or religious capacity for "turning-
toward" the ground. To complicate matters further, it is 
not as though balanced and imbalanced consciousness share 
only their moment of origin and then go their separate 
ways.7 For Voegelin, it was rather the case that every 
7voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), pp. 100-
101: "· .. [T]he structural possibility of the derailment 
is present whenever the existential Movement of 
differentiating the Unknown God from the intra-cosmic gods 
has begun .... Though the possibility of the Gnostic 
derailment is inherent to the Movement from its beginning, 
only the full differentiation of the truth of existence 
under the Unknown God through his Son has created the 
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advance in the historical process of differentiation of 
the transcendent from the immanent realm will tend to make 
the point of balance in the metaxy that much more 
precarious: 
The differentiating experience, either noetic or 
pneumatic, can be so intensive that the man to whom it 
occurs feels transformed into a new being. The new 
image of the world resulting from the experience can 
be misunderstood as a new world; and the process of 
change itself can be extrapolated into the future. As 
that changeability mutates into images of a changeable 
reality comprising the poles of participation, we have 
the roots of the phenomenona of metastatic beliefs: 
The gradualistic idea of infinite progress in the time 
of the world, the apocalyptic visions of the 
catastrophe of an old world and its metastasis into a 
new one resulting from divine intervention; the 
revolutionary ideas of a metastasis manipulated by 
human action; and so on.8 
As the cosmological "world full of gods" gives way to a 
transcendent realm beyond objective knowledge (but not 
beyond experience), the uncertainties of our condition are 
multiplied even as the truth of existence is discovered; 
the apprehension of our contingency deepens as the 
absolute status of the source of order is sensed, and our 
mortality and imperfection become ever more difficult to 
bear as the immortality and perfection of the divine is 
revealed. 
The process which Voegelin called the "de-
divinization" of the world is the source of disorder as 
cultural field in which the extra-cosmic contraction of 
existence is an equally radical possibility." 
Bvoegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 166. 
185 
well as order in the soul.9 A ground which is 
progressively revealed as transcendent will require a 
progressively greater opening of the soul, which in turn 
will exacerbate the stimuli leading to existential 
closure. The closing of the soul is no more an 
intellectual error that can be corrected by means of 
instruction than the opening of the soul is a condition 
which results from following a formula.lo Since the 
history of spiritual experience (at least as read by 
voegelin) has not witnessed a diminution but rather an 
inflamation of disorders of the soul, and since the 
essential sources of spiritual disorder are rooted in the 
very structure of human life, there is precisely no reason 
to expect that pneumapathological consciousness can be 
relegated to the past. 
This bracing insight need not issue in quietism or 
pessimism, as was evinced by Voegelin's continued search 
for effective avenues of reorientation after he first 
sensed a symbiotic relationship between differentiation 
and disorder. Spiritual disorientation cannot be 
uprooted, but it does not follow that it cannot be cut 
back. Indications of a hopefulness concerning the 
remedial capacity of philosophy as a response to social 
9see Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An 
Introduction (1952), pp. 100-110. 
lOsee Voegelin, In Search of Order (1987), p .. 39. 
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disorder can be found in Voegelin's writings at least up 
until the late 1960s. However, it would be grossly 
misleading to suggest that Voegelin was simply hopeful; 
his response to the political crisis of modernity was 
tempered, almost from the start, by a clear perception of 
the enormity of the obstacles which confront a 
philosophical attempt to reorder a society. Voegelin knew 
well that philosophers have not established a 
particularly impressive record on this score. In 1948 
voegelin wrote that, "no wisdom of a Plato could prevent 
the suicide of Athens and no climactic synthesis of a st. 
Thomas the end of imperial Christianity. 11 11 We might add 
that the efforts of the Hebrew prophets, of Irenaeus and 
Augustine, of Hooker and Hobbes, and of Baur, Neander and 
Matter met with no greater success.12 
A review of Voegelin's comments on social and 
individual therapy shows no discernable trend toward 
llvoegelin, "The origins of Scientism" ( 1948) , p. 488. 
12For Voegelin's fascinating account of Richard 
Hooker's analysis of the Puritans see The New Science of 
Politics: An Introduction (1953), pp. 134-44. On 
resistance to parousiasm as a fundamental motivation in 
Hobbes see Ibid., pp. 152-62, 179-84. Voegelin credits 
Ferdinand Christian Baur (Die christliche Gnosis, 1835), 
Johann August Neander (Genetische Entwicklung der 
vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme, 1818), and Jacques Matter 
(Historie critigue du Gnosticisme et de son influence sur 
les sectes religieuses et philosophigues des six premiers 
siecles de l'eere chretienne, 1928) with having been among 
the first to call attention to gnostic tendencies in the 
Enlightenment and German idealism. See Science, Politics 
gnd Gnosticism (1968), pp. 3-5. 
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greater or lesser optimism in the thirty years which 
passed between the publication of Political Religions and 
Anamnesis. Such a review could indeed lead one to 
conclude that he was downright inconsistent, since 
voegelin seems to rise to the challenge of reform in one 
piece and deny in the next that reform by means of 
philosophy is even possible. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to believe that Voegelin was simply inept in his 
treatment of the problem or that his temperament was so 
uneven as to fluctuate according to the events of the day. 
I believe that the apparent inconsistency in his views is 
best explained by a striking, seemingly autobiographical 
passage from 1944: 
Platonism in politics is the attempt, perhaps hopeless 
and futile, to regenerate a disintegrating society 
spiritually by creating the model of a true order of 
values ••.• The position of Santayana implies the 
resignation, probably quite justified, that such an 
attempt at the present juncture would be vain. But 
resignation cannot be achieved by everybody; the man 
with the Platonic temper will try the impossible.13 
It was Nietzsche that Voegelin went on to identify as a 
man with the Platonic temper, but it seems indisputable 
that Voegelin also fit the pattern.14 Undaunted by his 
13voegelin, "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War" 
(1944) I P• 195. 
14This is not to say that Voegelin can easily be 
labelled a Platonist (or anything else, for that matter), 
since he frequently stressed Plato's limitations and 
included the label among those with which he had 
incorrectly been saddled: "On my religious 'position', I 
have been classified as a Protestant, a Catholic, as anti-
early awareness of the difficulties surrounding an effort 
to provide a socially effective remedy by means of 
spiritual analysis and evocation, Voegelin did indeed try 
the impossible. 
Of course, it was not entirely clear in 1944 that 
the task could not be successfully carried out, since much 
remained to be done on the diagnostic front. Voegelin 
knew that, by following Thucydides and Plato in adopting 
the medicinal model of diagnosis and prescription, he was 
obligated to let the latter be dictated by the former. 
since his diagnostic work continued to develop and deepen 
over the course of the next twenty-five years, the 
therapeutic project was often mentioned but always left in 
abeyance. No extended analysis of therapeutic 
possibilities was ever published because, by the time that 
his mature diagnosis had taken shape, the diagnosis itself 
indicated that any social remedy would almost surely be 
unworkable. Disappointing as this outcome may be, it is 
semitic and as a typical Jew; politically, as a Liberal, a 
Fascist, a National Socialist and a Conservative; and on 
my theoretical position, as a Platonist, a Neo-
Augustinian, a Thomist, a disciple of Hegel, an 
existentialist, a historical relativist and an empirical 
sceptic; in recent years the suspicion has frequently been 
voiced that I am a Christian. All these classifications 
have been made by university professors and people with 
academic degrees. They give ample food for thought 
regarding the state of our universities." Voegelin, "On 
Readiness to Rational Discussion" (1961), p. 280. Pages 
89-93 of Plato and Aristotle (1957) are highly suggestive 
of the parallels which run through the attitudes of 
Voegelin and Plato on questions of political reform. 
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still the case that Voegelin, like Plato before him, has 
bequeathed to us a profound set of insights into the 
intractability of spiritual crisis when it has penetrated 
the order of a society. 
It would appear that Voegelin' s early reading in 
Plato provided instruction on which paths to reform would 
most likely prove to be fruitless. It is perhaps 
surprising that Voegelin, who always referred to politics 
as his field of study, would never have entertained the 
possibility of institutional remedies against the crisis 
which provided the motivation for his choice of scholarly 
discipline. Mention of issues of form or procedure or 
policy are conspicuous by their absence from his works. 
Voegelin was persuaded that Plato was correct in regarding 
institutional problems as epiphenomenal manifestations of 
an underlying loss of spiritual orientation, and his view 
seems to correspond to that which we saw him ascribe to 
Socrates in the second chapter: 
... [H)e roundly refuses to go into details, not only 
of customs and mores, but even of civil, commercial, 
and criminal law, because such matters will take care 
of themselves if only the souls of the legislative 
rulers are in good order. Moreover, he restrains 
himself deliberately at this point in order not to 
give the false impression that good order in a polis 
can be created through institutional devices. He 
considers it, on the contrary, a symptom of disease in 
a polis when the citizens are feverishly active with 
patching up this or that gap in the law, but do not 
dare to touch the well-known source of the multitude 
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of minor evils.15 
In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin expressed this 
same fear that a preoccupation with form instead of 
spiritual substance would deflect attention from the root 
causes of social disorder: "The more fervently all human 
energies are thrown into the great enterprise of salvation 
through world-immanent action, the farther the human 
beings who engage in this enterprise move away from the 
life of the spirit. 11 16 
Voegelin could not indulge in the notion that an 
institutional reordering could effect a spiritual 
reordering for the simple reason that he did not share the 
Enlightenment view that human behavior is a product of 
institutional environment. He accepted the perspective of 
Plato and Aristotle that a human nature exists, that it is 
comprised of a complex set of competing forces which can 
be arranged in a variety of hierarchical orders, and that 
a social order can exert a limited influence upon the 
outcome of this competition but cannot abolish it or 
impose at will a preconceived hierarchy. He also accepted 
the classical insight that certain institutional 
arrangements are better than others (insofar as they may 
15voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 87. It 
bears pointing out that Voegelin' s formal training, and 
most of his early articles, were in the area of public law. 
16voegelin, The New Science of Politics: 
duction (1952), p. 131. 
An Intro-
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tend to encourage the flourishing of those elements such 
as wisdom and moderation which permit a healthy ordering 
of other elements and forces), but that no institutional 
patterns exists which cannot be perverted so as to hinder 
the proper formation of character and encourage the social 
ascendancy of infirm character types. Indeed it was the 
case for Voegelin that institutions and cultural 
environments have greater potential, owing to the 
peculiarities of the process of character development, for 
generalizing a pattern of personal disorder than for 
nourishing a healthy order in individual souls. Since a 
healthy personal order is in large part the outgrowth of 
an orientation by reference to the transcendent aspects of 
human experience, and since these experiences are either 
granted by grace to individuals or are evoked through a 
non-volitional responsiveness to symbols which articulate 
the experiences of others, it is not possible for society 
to mechanically call forth a citizenry characterized by 
the balance of consciousness. By contrast, societies can 
exert pressures that are quite effective in muting human 
responsiveness to transcendent experiences or restricting 
the avenues through which the resulting orientation can 
find expression in public activity. Thus it was a sad 
fact for Voegelin that the development of personal 
disorder can be a social or political phenomenon whereas 
the engineering of balanced consciousness cannot. 
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Given this perspective, it is understandable that 
voegelin's therapeutic speculation would have gravitated 
toward the possibilities of personal resistance toward a 
corrupting environment and individualized methods for 
reorienting others. He described his own work as just 
such an act of personal resistance,17 and devoted 
considerable attention to the question of whether rational 
discussion and debate can prove effective against 
pneumapathological consciousness. Here again, his 
scrupulousness in permitting his diagnostic work to 
dictate his conclusions on the possibility of therapy led 
to findings that are less than comforting. 
Voegelin's diagnostic analysis is premised upon the 
observation that ideological and pneumapathological 
closure is not a matter of ignorance or intellectual error 
but, rather, of experience and reaction. On one hand, 
this implies that the extent of a disorder such as 
ideological consciousness may be rather less widespread 
than we might expect from the number and influence of 
ideologies as identified by Voegelin. It is entirely 
possible to be hoodwinked by a Marx or a Comte for reason 
of insufficient experience or study without engaging in a 
self-conscious revolt against the conditions of existence. 
17 See Voegelin I "On Hegel: A study in Sorcery" 
(1971), pp. 336-37; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 3-4, 9-10; "The 
Meditative Origin of the Philosophical Knowledge of Order" 
(1984), pp. 43-44. 
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Yet, on the other hand, since genuine ideological 
consciousness within a Second Reality like Marxism or 
positivism is less a result of the intellectual 
attractiveness of the doctrine than of its capacity for 
dulling the tensions of open existence, a rational 
critique of the particulars of the doctrine is likely to 
be of no avail in such cases.18 
Voegelin argued that ideologies have long since 
been "torn to pieces" through scholarly criticism, yet we 
can observe that they continue to find adherents.19 This 
fact might be difficult to explain for one who understood 
ideologies simply as defective structures of opinion, but 
against the backdrop of Voegelin's diagnosis the epigonal 
afterlife of an ideology such as Marxism is easily 
understood. Since the passage of two millennia has not 
extinguished the phenomenon of parousiasm, and since the 
18Thus, from the 1940s onward, Voegelin ceased to 
engage in the detailed criticism of ideologies which 
characterized much of his early work. Examples of the 
earlier form of response would be Die Rassenidee in der 
Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus (Berlin: Junker & 
Duennhaupt, 1933); Rasse und Staat (Tuebingen: J. c. B. 
Mohr, 1933), and "The Growth of the Race Idea," Review of 
Politics (vol. II, 1940, pp. 283-317). The chapters on 
Marx from the abandoned History were the last occasions on 
which Voegelin deigned even to discuss the doctrinal 
principles of an ideology, and here the shift from the 
analysis of doctrine to engendering consciousness is 
already quite apparent. See From Enlightenment to 
Revolution (1975), pp. 240-302 and p. 25 supra. 
19voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980), 
pp. 15-19. See also "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 
188-89. 
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Marxist faith conforms to a similar pattern in conscious-
ness, it is not surprising that the continual failure of 
communist revolutions to deliver on their promises has not 
proven fatal to the appeal of the doctrine. Voegelin's 
analysis suggests that the provision of a plausible 
account of the world is only a secondary project within 
the con-struction of an ideological Second Reality, and by 
the same token it would appear that adherence to an 
ideology is first a matter of faith--followed by a more or 
less elaborate project of circumventing the dissonance 
between the First and Second Realities.20 
If ideological consciousness involves a misplaced 
faith in a misplaced, immanentized ground of being, is it 
possible that a reintroduction to genuine faith in a 
transcendent ground would provide the remedy for which 
Voegelin was looking? Voegelin's own resistance to 
ideological disorder--as well as his search for adequate 
representations of order--led him to the study of 
classical Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian revelation, 
but his analysis of the dynamics of existential closure 
20voegelin, "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), p. 190: 
"When conflicts with reality compel revisions with some 
frequency over a period, the activity of projecting can 
pass from a phase of comparatively naive indulgence to one 
of a more critical occupation with the standards of 
projects. For a Second Reality must, on the one hand, 
satisfy the requirements of the contracted self and, on 
the other hand, contain enough uneclipsed reality not to 
be ignored as a crackpot scheme by the contemporaries." 
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would seem to undercut the possibility of simply directing 
others toward the same path. The basic problem can be 
stated simply: exposure to the "heal thy" tension of 
balanced consciousness in the metaxy is not likely to 
reorient the closed soul, for it was exposure to precisely 
this tension which first prompted pneumapathological 
closure. Whether a person has eclipsed one of the poles 
of participation in reality because of an inability to 
endure either the corruption of the world or the shadow 
cast by divinity, a reintroduction to the tension of the 
metaxy will bring but another, perhaps stronger, dose of 
the same. 
The uncertainty from which escape was initially 
sought will not be alleviated by a spiritual tradition if 
it is used as an antidote in the authentic form of a 
symbolization of participation in an essentially 
mysterious reality. This problem might be circumvented by 
scaling down the spiritual demands of the tradition 
through the fundamentalist tactic of reducing it to a set 
of dogmatic propositions, but Voegelin recognized that 
this expedient is only temporary and can produce the most 
undesirable of unintended results: 
The symbolism providing an answer to (the basic 
questions of existence] is of secondary importance to 
the philosopher. That, however, is not to say that it 
does not have an important function in protecting the 
order of existence in both man and society. For the 
development of an answering construct, even if it 
should have to be revised in the light of a later, 
196 
more penetrating analysis of existence, will at least 
guard for a time against error concerning the truth of 
existence. But only for a time. For the structure of 
existence is complicated; it is not known once for 
all. If it be forgotten that the answer depends for 
its truth on the understanding of existence that has 
motivated it; if it be erected into an idol valid for 
all time; its effect will be the very opposite of 
protection. For the sensed, if not clearly known, 
invalidity of the symbol at a later point in history 
will be extended by the critics of the symbol to the 
truth nevertheless contained in it. An obsolete 
symbol may have the effect of destro~ing the order of 
existence it was created to protect.2 
The symbols of an authentic spiritual tradition are 
overwhelmingly likely to be misunderstood or rejected out 
of hand by the subject of a remedial course in religion or 
philosophy, primarily because pneumapathological 
consciousness is initiated by a renunciation of the 
experiences which the symbols are intended to convey. It 
is true that an ideologist or pneumapath will at least 
have had certain of these experiences but, in the wake of 
the subsequent revolt against the attendant implications 
of the experiences, there may be nothing left upon which 
to rebuild. For example, we saw in the preceding chapter 
that the experience of contingency had been impressed upon 
Marx with great forcefulness. He understood that humanity 
cannot be an autonomous species unless it has created 
itself, and that all the evidences of practical life 
contradict this notion. If Marx had remained open to the 
possibility that the basic conditions of our existence are 
21voegelin, "On Debate and Existence'' (1967), p. 147. 
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beyond our control, and had simply set out to investigate 
the extent to which we can contribute to an improvement of 
the terms of everyday life, it is conceivable that his 
subsequent work would not have eclipsed the original 
experience. Yet his work was motivated not by a desire to 
understand the world but rather to change it, and since 
fundamental change is impossible unless human contingency 
be obliterated, Marx was driven not only to depart from 
his own experience but also to attempt to drive the idea 
of creation from the minds of the people as well. 
One can well imagine the outcome of an effort to 
reform the Marx of the 1860s by means of a primer on 
metaphysics or theology. Voegelin had no illusions about 
the probable result of attempts to use theory as a form of 
therapy: 
••. [T]heory as an explication of certain experiences 
is intelligible only to those in whom the explication 
will stir up parallel experiences as the empirical 
basis for testing the truth of theory. Unless a 
theoretical exposition activates the corresponding 
experiences at least to a degree, it will create the 
impression of empty talk or will perhaps be rejected 
as an irrelevant expression of subjective opinions. A 
theoretical debate can be conducted only among 
spoudaioi in the Aristotelian sense; theory has no 
argument against a man who feels, or pretends to feel, 
unable of re-enacting the experience.22 
22voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Intro-
duction (1952), pp. 64-65. For Voegelin's most detailed 
account of the obstacles which confront the possibility of 
intellectual debate serving as a method of reorientation 
see "On Readiness to Rational Discussion" (1961), .12.assim. 
See also "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation" (1981), pp. 260-61. 
198 
If theoretical debate is only useful in debate among 
spoudaioi, who may benefit as a result but are certainly 
not the intended subjects of Voegelin's therapeutic 
project, we must ask whether Voegelin did not come around 
to the view that as a man with the Platonic temper he had 
indeed tried the impossible. 
As we shall see momentarily, there are indications 
that this was in fact Voegelin's final view on the 
therapeutic project. First it will be helpful to suggest 
why he may have thought that the impossible must be tried. 
The preceding quotation from 1952 shows that Voegelin knew 
that debate would be futile, but in 1967 he was to write 
that it is, nevertheless, a matter of obligation: 
Only if we know, for the purpose of comparison, what 
the conditions of rational discourse are, shall we 
find our bearings in the contemporary clash with 
second Realities. The best point of departure for the 
comparative analysis of the problem will be St. 
Thomas' Summa Contra Gentiles .•.. It was written in a 
period of intellectual turmoil through the contacts 
with Islam and Aristotelian philosophy, comparable in 
many respects to our own, with the important 
difference however that a rational debate with the 
opponent was still possible or--we should say more 
cautiously--seemed still possible to Aquinas ..•• It is 
a situation and an obligation that must be faced in 
our twentieth century as much as Thomas had to face it 
in his thirteenth. Hence, if the sapiens shuns the 
situation of debate, especially if he avoids the 
crucial intellectual issues threatening the beleagured 
city, he becomes derilect in his duties to God and 
man, his attitude is spiritually, morally and 
politically indefensible.23 
It might seem that Voegelin painted himself into a corner 
23voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967), p. 144. 
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by arguing that debate is a matter of obligation while 
also maintaining that it is futile, but he found an 
interesting (if not wholly satisfying) way out. 
Returning to the situation faced by St. Thomas for 
comparison, Voegelin stated that our present situation is 
much more difficult for reason of the absence of a common 
ground upon which a debate might be profitably conducted. 
st. Thomas could hope that the Summa Contra Gentiles would 
fulfill his objectives because the Old Testament was 
shared with Jews, the New Testament with heretics, and 
natural reason with pagans and Mohammedans. But in the 
twentieth century, Voegelin continued, 
we must say that we cannot argue by the Old Testament, 
nor by the New Testament, nor by Reason. Not even by 
Reason, because rational argument presupposes the 
community of true existence.24 
Since ideological consciousness is a self-conscious revolt 
against the community of true existence, the opponent is 
beyond rational persuasion and must, Voegelin was later to 
argue, be regarded not as a partner in debate but rather 
as an "object of scientific research. 11 25 And yet, 
surprisingly enough, Voegelin continued to insist that 
debate is a philosophical duty.26 What resulted from this 
24rbid., p. 152. 
25voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1977), quoted 
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Bio-
graphical Introduction (1981), p. 87. 
26see The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 184. 
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apparent paradox is an (admittedly) odd conception of 
debate: 
... [W]e are forced one step further down to cope with 
the opponent (even the word "debate" is difficult to 
apply) on the level of existential truth. The 
speculations of classic and scholastic metaphysics are 
edifices of reason erected on the experiential basis 
of existence in truth; they are useless in a meeting 
with edifices of reason erected on a different 
experiential basis. Nevertheless, we cannot withdraw 
into the edifices and let the world go by, for in that 
case we would be remiss in our duty of "debate." The 
"debate" has, therefore, to assume the forms of (1) a 
careful analysis of the noetic structure of existence 
and (2) an analysis of Second Realities, with regard 
both to their constructs and the motivating structure 
of existence in untruth. "Debate" in this form is 
hardly a matter of reasoning (though it remains one of 
the Intellect), but rather of the analysis of 
existence preceding rational constructions; it is 
medical in character in that it has to diagnose the 
syndromes of untrue existence and by their noetic 
structure to initiate, if possible, a healing 
process.27 
This passage would seem to suggest that, although Voegelin 
never renounced his therapeutic intentions, he ultimately 
came to drop the notion of a distinct therapeutic project 
in the hope that his diagnosis could itself have a 
remedial effect. 
The only indication provided by Voegelin of how a 
diagnosis could also serve as a therapy is to be found in 
Anamnesis: 
The nihilistic rebellion cannot be overcome on its own 
level of experiences and symbols, for instance, by 
means of criticism of ideology, culture, or the times, 
as attempted by intellectuals who no longer feel easy 
in their situation. Such attempts can lead only to a 
27voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967); p. 152. 
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confused stirring around in the nothingness of lost 
reality. The non-noetic thought about order of the 
kind that rebellion produces offers no point of 
contact to the noesis. This formulation of the 
problem seems to show the way to a solution: Whoever 
has had enough of rebellion against the ground and 
wishes again to think rationally needs only to turn 
around and toward that reality against which the 
symbols of rebellion aggress. It seems that the 
rebellion itself can become the guideline for the 
seeker, inasmuch as that against which it rebels is 
precisely that which he is seeking. The turning away 
and turning around is indeed the sine .Q.Y..9. non for 
finding the way from rebellion to reality; the 
periagoge must in any case be performed.28 
Unfortunately, this formulation of the problem only shows 
the way to a solution for the seeker--not the pneumapath. 
The potential effectiveness of the solution presupposes 
that its subject is not ensnared within a Second Reality 
but, on the contrary, has already had enough of the 
rebellion against the ground. The statement that a remedy 
will necessarily entail the periagoge is true, but as a 
piece of advice to one who is actively engaged in the 
revolt it is a bit like advising those with obses-
sive/compulsive tendencies to stop washing their hands or 
biting their fingernails. It would seem that the result 
of Voegelin's search for a form of therapy ended in the 
observation that for an act of personal revolt to end, the 
person in question must stop revel ting. 2 9 Once again, 
28voegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 188. 
29The following exchange appears in "Philosophies of 
History: An Interview with Eric Voegelin:" New Orleans 
Review: "Let me ask you a question which you may not wish 
to answer. Your work has always been brilliantly and 
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this is quite true, but as the conclusion of a great 
thinker it cannot but disappoint. Nevertheless, part of 
the measure of the greatness of a thinker is the 
unwillingness to be cowed by the perception of crisis into 
finding a solution where none exists. 
The situation can still not be hopeless, since we 
know of cases in which individuals have found their way 
out of ideological Second Realities as well as the other 
types of disorientation. If a Berdyaev could make his way 
from Leninism to mysticism, or an Augustine from the 
extremes of worldliness and other-worldliness to the 
community between the Cities of God and Man, avenues of 
reorientation must exist. But the implication of 
Voegelin' s analysis seems to be that only rarely can an 
individual (much less an entire society) be led to these 
avenues; either they appear mysteriously, as if by grace, 
or are found in the course of a search for more 
satisfactory representations of one's experience than are 
provided by Second Realities. We can make the hopeful 
observation that it is often the most sensitive souls that 
objectively descriptive. Would you undertake in any way 
to make prescriptive suggestions to impede the traumatic 
deculturalization of our own times?" Voegelin: "Well, 
the prescription is already contained in the description. 
People have to recover contact with reality, which has 
been lost in imaginary contacts with imaginary realities." 
New Orleans Review (vol. II, 1973, pp. 135-39), p. 138. 
The discussion turns to other subjects immediately after 
this exchange. 
203 
take flight from the metaxy, rather than those who are 
simply dull to its tensions. Although Voegelin does not 
make this point, we could venture to say on the basis of 
his analysis that the soul in revolt may have more in 
common with prophets and philosophers, at least in terms 
of spiritual sensitivity and experiential background, than 
with the general run of humanity. The sensitive but 
disoriented soul may not, at some point, be able to 
suppress the experiences of falsity and moral bankrupcy 
within a Second Reality, which itself exists in a tension 
with the enduring First Reality.JO The one, true reality 
inevitably intrudes upon the closed world of an 
ideological system, and although the tensions imposed by 
this reality will be no less acute the second time around, 
there are limits beyond which ideologies fail to provide 
insulation against the types of experience which can pave 
the way for a reorientation.31 
30For personal accounts of the failure of communist 
ideology in this sense see Aurthur Koestler, Igazio 
Silone, Righard Wright, Andre Gide, Louis Fischer and 
Stephen Spender, The God that Failed (Richard Crossman, 
ed.) {New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.) 
31These would be the type of events or moments of 
reflection that Karl Jaspers referred to as "border 
experiences" or "ultimate situations." The classic 
example is the apprehension of death, and there is reason 
to question whether an ideology can provide any guidance 
whatsoever when this apprehension is presented to 
consciousness. For instance, the only reference to death 
of which I am aware in the writings of Marx runs as 
follows: "Death appears as the harsh victory of the 
species over the particular individual and seems to 
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In 1 ight of the observation that the disoriented 
soul bears a certain resemblance to the well-ordered soul, 
we must ask whether Voegelin was justified in identifying 
ideological and proto-ideological figures as "spiritually 
diseased." This actually involves a series of questions 
which will be taken up in order in the concluding section 
which follows: First, has Voegelin provided a foundation 
that is sufficient to elevate the designation of spiritual 
disease from mere invective to the status of a theoretical 
classification? Second, should the very use of such a 
term prompt us to question Voegelin's tolerance or 
capacity for empathy? Third, can spiritual disease be 
identified as an important component within each of the 
movements that Voegelin identified as ideological? And, 
finally, do we have good reason to follow Voegelin in 
finding an essential sameness between modern and pre-
modern varieties of spiritual disease? 
With regard to the first question, it seems that 
Voegelin would certainly have been vulnerable to the 
charge that he had no foundation from which to diagnose 
spiritual disease in others if he had not provided an 
contradict their unity; but the particular individual is 
only a determinate species being and thus mortal." Marx, 
"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," in David 
McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 91. see Jaspers, 
Philosophy of Existence (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 76-88, and Voegelin, 
Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 109-114. 
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elaborately articulated conception of spiritual health. 
It is one thing to search historical materials for bizarre 
doctrines or movements and then say that sick people were 
involved, but quite another to develop and propose 
critical standards for the designation of manifestations 
of spiritual heal th and unheal th. As the foregoing 
accounts have hopefully shown, Voegelin pursued the latter 
tack in great detail through an extraordinary range of 
historical settings and, in virtually every case, with 
explicit analysis of the written evidence that backed a 
diagnosis of pneuma-pathological consciousness. 
Of course, one who is left unpersuaded by 
voegelin's description of healthy consciousness will have 
little regard for his diagnostic analyses. If there is no 
transcendent ground of being there can be no spiritual 
revolt against such a ground, and Voegel in' s concept of 
psychic imbalance is premised upon the validity of his 
notion of balanced consciousness within the tensions of 
the metaxy. To some extent, the evaluation of the 
foundation from which Voegelin diagnosed spiritual disease 
must therefore be made by the reader, as it would 
obviously be foolish to pronounce on such topics in 
passing. Su ff ice it to say that Voegelin was at least 
thorough enough, by dint of having clearly indicated his 
own premises on spiritual order, to permit those who are 
willing to examine his diagnoses to develop an informed 
r 
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evaluation. 
A more approachable part of this issue is whether 
voegelin's identifications of spiritual disease were 
theoretical diagnoses or mere attacks against those who 
ran afoul of his legendary capacity for unflattering 
characterization. Here we have a common-sense standard at 
our disposal. Since Voegelin was a writer who minced no 
words, one has little difficulty in discerning whether a 
historical figure was or was not held in favor by him. 
Thus we can ask, were the standards of spiritual health 
and unhealth just mentioned applied by Voegelin in an 
evenhanded and dispassionate manner? An affirmative 
answer is suggested by the fact that Voegelin followed his 
self-set standards to very harsh observations on a number 
of figures for whom he had the greatest respect, including 
Isaiah, Aristotle and st. Pau1.32 This resolute 
faithfulness to theoretical standards can also be seen in 
Voegelin's willingness to emphasize the deformative as 
well as the formative effects of every differentiation of 
32on Isaiah see Israel and Revelation (1956), pp. 
476-501: The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 25-27: 
"Autobiographical Memoir" (1981), quoted in Ellis Sandoz, 
The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction, 
pp. 134-35. On Aristotle and the "derailment" of 
philosophy see Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 276-79, 
332-36: Anamnesis (1978), pp. 159-66. On "gnostic" 
tendencies in St. Paul see The New Science of Poli tics: 
An Introduction (1952), p. 126; The Ecumenic Age (1974), 
pp. 239-71, and David Walsh, "Voegelin's Response to the 
Disorder of the Age," Review of Politics (vol. XLVI, 1984, 
pp. 266-87), pp. 273-75. 
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truth, including the Christian. Conversely, Voegelin did 
not become so embroiled in his resistance to ideologists 
and pneumapaths as to be incapable of recognizing merit 
within their thought or activity. 33 Although Voegelin's 
critical remarks can be shockingly (and perhaps 
needlessly) acrimonious, they rarely bear the markings of 
a mere attack. 
Nevertheless, the very use of the concept of 
spiritual disease carries a certain volatility in an era 
when tolerance is a candidate for the status of the prime 
academic virtue. Since Voegelin's main diagnostic works 
appeared at a time when the majority of the members of his 
discipline were loath even to speak of things as good, his 
willingness to speak of evil and sickness in politics was 
sure to draw fire. 34 Not all of the criticism has come 
from authors who were unsympathetic toward Voegelin's 
work. Dante Germino, one of the more distinguished of 
33see Voegelin, "History and Gnosis" (1969), pp. 65, 
82-83; "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 189-190; "On 
Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" (1971), pp. 343-44; From 
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 299-301. 
34cf., e.g., Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of 
Politics: New and Old," World Politics (vol. VII, 1955, 
pp. 479-89); Aurthur W. H. Adkins, "Review: Plato and 
Aristotle and the World of the Polis," Journal of Hellenic 
Studies (vol. LXXXI, 1961, pp. 192-93). It might be noted 
that one of the great costs imposed by a "value-free" 
methodology is an inability to come to grips with 
manifestations of evil, however elusive that term may be. 
There would surely be something pathetically hollow about 
an account of concentration camps and gas chambers that 
was limited to the judgment that they are "dysfunctional." 
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voegelin's commentators, has written that: 
one problem is to distinguish between "error and the 
person who errs," as John XXIII expressed it. 
Voegelin frequently seems to suggest that not only the 
ideas of Hegel, Marx, and the rest of the "Gnostics" 
are erroneous, but that the thinkers are spiritually 
diseased as persons. I must confess that I still find 
it difficult to accept this latter judgment and wonder 
if it is necessary to condemn these thinkers as whole 
persons in the way, again, that Voegelin appears to 
argue. [Emphasis in original.]35 
charitable as these remarks are, it may be that Germino's 
tolerance is misplaced. I would suggest that, to the 
degree that ideological systematizers have knowingly 
falsified reality for purposes of enlisting others in a 
ruinous project of world transformation, it ~ necessary 
for Voegelin to invoke the concept of spiritual disease; 
the real problem is that many of those who are 
subsequently enlisted in one or another way will not have 
partaken of the experiences which motivated the 
ideological patriarch, and thus would presumably not have 
fallen prey to the same disorder. 36 To expand upon a 
point made earlier, it is entirely possible to be swindled 
by an ideologist or a paraclete for reason of insufficient 
35oante Germino, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for 
Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work," 
American Political Science Review (vol. LXXII, 1978, pp. 
110-121), p. 118, 29n. The tentative tone of the passage 
is puzzling, since Voegelin explicitly used the term 
"spiritual disease" with great frequency. 
36voegelin made a similar point (though clearly not 
with the intention of excusing the rank and file) in From 
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 242-49. 
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experience or study, or to be enlisted in a mass movement 
due to pressures from a corrupt regime or peers or simple 
boredom, without engaging in a self-conscious revolt 
against the conditions of existence. 
It is the question of whether an individual has 
knowingly falsified reality and engaged in a self-
conscious revolt that should determine where we draw the 
line between spiritual disease and lesser disorders. It 
seems that Voegelin did not always respect this 
distinction, especially in his later years,37 and if 
Voegelin's tolerance is to be questioned, I believe that 
this is the appropriate ground. Returning to Germino 1 s 
argument, it would seem that Voegelin has left little room 
for a distinction between ideologists and their ideas. 
The premise of his late work (which is characterized by 
the shift after 1950 from intellectual history to the 
37For example, in the following comment with regard 
to the inability of his work on the race idea and that of 
Kant on the idea of evolution to affect ideological 
conflicts on these topics, Voegelin seems to confuse 
stupidity with self-conscious closure or the "refusal to 
apperceive": "One should not think, however, that once 
this analysis is made, it has any influnce on anybody. It 
does not. Neither did Kant have any influence on anybody 
in this respect, nor did my analysis of the race idea have 
any influence in this respect ••.. [T)here is still the same 
level of stupidity as you find in the 1920s and the same 
level of stupidity as you find in the the time of Kant in 
the eighteenth century. So nothing happens in practice, 
even when the problem gets analyzed. One must not expect 
a rational analysis to make people intelligent all of a 
sudden. They remain as stupid as they were before. 11 
Voegelin, "Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two" 
(1984) I P• 118. 
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theory of consciousness) is that ideas are epiphenomenal 
manifestations of the experiences which set the pattern of 
an individual soul and its activity. With regard to Hegel 
and Marx, the thinkers mentioned by Germino, the salient 
experiences are alienation from the conditions of 
existence, will to power (to the extent of attempted 
murders of God) , and a hubristic desire to make history 
culminate in their own efforts. Their ideas are not 
simply erroneous; on the contrary, they are ingeniously 
orchestrated according to the inner logic of a spiritual 
rebellion which seeks popular acceptance. If Voegelin was 
correct in arguing that both were well aware of what they 
were doing, it is difficult to understand why criticism 
should be restricted to the level of ideas.38 
Nevertheless, Germino's reservations on the 
question of whether "the rest of the 'Gnostics'" should be 
regarded as spiritually diseased (for reason of being 
partisans of one of the many movements identified as 
"gnostic" or ideological by Voegelin) seem quite well 
founded. This point must be made cautiously, given the 
brevity of Voegelin's treatments of most of these 
38on the intentionality of the Hegelian and Marxism 
deformations of reality see Science, Politics and 
Gnosticism (1968), pp. 23-28, 34-46; "On Hegel: A Study 
in Sorcery" (1971), passim; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 
262-66; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 3-4. On the general issue 
of intentionality in pneumapathological consciousness see 
esp. "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970). 
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movements, but it must be made nonetheless for this very 
reason. Of the fourteen ideologies listed on p. 14 of the 
first chapter, Voegelin has left us with extended analyses 
only of Hegelianism, Marxism, scientism, positivism and 
anarchism, with the last two being restricted to the 
positivism of Comte and the anarchism of Bakunin. The 
remainder of these ideologies were either treated 
peripherally or simply mentioned in passing. Thus we must 
be cautious and not reject the possibility that Voegelin 
could have provided grounds for concluding that spiritual 
disease was indeed an important factor within each of 
these movements, but we must be still more cautious before 
arriving at the conclusion that an individual is 
spiritually diseased on account of being, say, a liberal 
or an existentialist (and before concluding that liberals 
and Marxists can be placed on the same plane). such 
conclusions would represent, I believe, a misuse of 
Voegelin's work, although it must be admitted that one who 
wished to use his work as support for blanket 
condemnations could plausibly point to passages where 
Voegelin seems to have done exactly that himself .39 
In light of the severity of the charge involved in 
39see Voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xii: 
.Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 4-5: From 
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), p. 69; Anamnesis 
(1978), pp. 3-7, 145-46; "Wisdom and the Magic of the 
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 240. 
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the concept of spiritual disease, it is important to 
emphasize why it must be utilized with the greatest 
circumspection. The concepts of spiritual disease and 
pneumapathological consciousness refer to an existential 
state that is distinct from neuro-physiological disorders, 
criminal impulses, or intellectual deficiencies. However, 
in concrete cases, it may be very difficult to distinguish 
between these variegated phenomena. Pneumapathological 
consciousness can be expressed in criminal behavior or 
intellectual weaknesses, but mere stupidity or "simple" 
homicidal mania in an individual could be confused with 
pneumapathological consciousness if they are observed 
under the aegis of an ideological movement. Moreover, it 
will frequently happen that, when an ideological system 
becomes the foundation for a widespread intellectual or 
political movement, many individuals will encounter the 
system only in part or in a diluted form and will accept 
it for reasons quite different than those which led to its 
construction. Thus it is essential that diagnoses of 
spiritual disease be restricted to individual cases, and 
indeed to those cases where a sufficient body of evidence 
is available for the spurious factors (which Voegelin 
himself recognized) to be dismissed and for the self-
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consciousness of a revolt to be established. 40 On one 
hand, it is perhaps absurd to demand more of a scholar who 
was as productive as Voegelin but, on the other hand, it 
could be argued that it is incumbent upon one who would 
speak of spiritual disease to provide clear distinctions 
on what does and does not constitute such disease, and 
moreover to refrain from using the term in reference to 
groups of unnamed individuals.41 It is probably 
illegitimate to use the term in reference to any such 
group, and it is certainly meaningless and 
counterproductive to speak of a "diseased age. 11 42 
There may also be reason to fault Voegelin for not 
having drawn distinctions between the groups and 
40voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Mediatation" (1981), p. 236: "I am speaking cautiously of 
a suspension of consciousness because it is frequently 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine in the case of 
an individual activist whether the suspension is an act of 
intellectual fraud or persuasive self-deception, whether 
it is a case of plain illiteracy or of the more 
sophisticated illiteracy imposed by an educational system, 
whether it is caused by a degree of spiritual and 
intellectual insensitivity that comes under the head of 
stupidity, or whether it is due to various combinations of 
these and other factors such as the desire to attract 
public attention and make a career." Parenthetically, it 
might be noted that this passage, which was also quoted in 
the first chapter, shows that Voegelin was not in the 
habit of equating pneumapathological consciousness with 
stupidity, as might be wrongly assumed from the passage 
quoted in note 37 above. 
41For examples see the passages cited in note 39 to 
this chapter. 
42voegelin's words from "History and Gnosis" (1969), 
p. 81. See also The Ecumenic Age (1974}, p. 266. 
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intellectual schools to which he referred as ideological 
or gnostic movements. One can find Voegelin's arguments 
for the presence of ideological elements within each of 
these movements persuasive and yet resist the notion that, 
say, liberalism and existentialism belong on the same 
plane with Marxism and fascism. 43 Since these elements 
differ both in kind and in relative prominence from 
movement to movement, it would seem that Voegelin should 
have provided caveats which would lead readers away from 
the conclusion that these movements are all of one 
piece.44 In light of one hundred and fifty years of what 
43rn the case of a varied tradition such as 
existentialism this problem can be aggrivated by a lack of 
analysis at the individual level. For example, Voegelin 
presumably had no desire to condemn existentialists per 
se, for while he stridently criticized Sartre and 
Heidigger he found much to praise in Jaspers and Camus. 
on Sartre see "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 185, 
190; The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 228. on Heidigger see 
Science, Politics and Gnosticism {1968), pp. 46-49; 
"History and Gnosis" (1969), pp. 65, 69, 81-83. on 
Jaspers see "Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two" 
(1984), pp. 113, 121. On Camus see Anamnesis {1978), pp. 
170-72, 189-90; Conversations with Eric Voegelin {1980), 
pp. 18, 26. 
44The one passage that I am aware of where Voegelin 
alludes to the possibility of his writings being misused 
or misunderstood does not shed much light on the question 
of whether he was either resigned to this fate or actively 
sought to guard against it, but is interesting 
nonetheless: "Every analysis ••• can lead to 
misunderstanding if it falls into hands of people who 
aren't very bright. Absolutely, the non-brightness of the 
people who might read you is a fact you have to face. We 
just have to put up with the fact that there are people 
who are not sufficiently literate to handle the problems 
with which we have to deal. I have always had to explain 
to the students at the beginning of my seminars a-11 my 
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Voegelin called the "dogmatomachy" of inter-ideological 
conflict, it is true that Voegelin's analysis of the 
commonalities which characterize the various movements 
represented a more important task than that of stressing 
their differences, but this latter task would have 
complimented the former and helped to protect it against 
misunderstandings. For example, although Voegelin wrote 
that there is a "gnostic" component to be found in 
liberalism,45 he also gave indications (in the same 
article) that it should probably not be considered a 
gnostic movement in the sense that he usually used the 
term. In his view liberalism posed less a danger in 
itself than the danger of creating a spiritual vacuum, 
through secularism, that could permit the victory of 
ideologies like Marxism or fascism which can exploit the 
human penchant for attaching ultimate significance to 
one's actions.46 If there is something faintly metastatic 
life: there is no such thing as a right to be stupid; 
there is no such thing as a right to be illiterate; there 
is no such thing as a right to be incompetent. It is 
usually taken for granted that you have a right to be all 
of these things, and will still be regarded as a wonderful 
person." Voegelin, "Responses at the Panel Discussion of 
'The Beginning of the Beginning" in Fred Lawrence, ed., 
The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and 
Voegelin Conferences (Supplementary issue of Lonergan 
Workshop, vol. IV, Chico, California: Scholar's Press, 
1984, pp. 97-110), p. 100. 
45voegelin, "Liberalism and its History" (translation 
of "Der Liberalismus und seine Geschichte," 1960), Review 
of Politics (vol. XXXVII, 1974, pp. 504-20), p. 512. 
46Ibid., pp. 512, 517-18. 
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about the assumption that "actions undertaken in rational, 
anticipatory self-interest will lead to harmonious order 
in society, "4 7 it must be remembered that this 1 iberal 
hope was premised upon the sober assumption that most 
human beings are incapable of giving themselves over to 
the community without thought for their own narrow 
interests (and would not acquire this capability even if a 
harmonious order were to result from liberal social and 
economic institutions).48 One would be hard pressed to 
find talk of "new men" in the classics of liberalism, and 
indeed certain liberals were apprehensive about the 
effects that liberal institutions would have upon the men 
of their day.49 Although we should not make too much of 
this one example, it seems impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that the prominence of pneumapathological and 
47rb'd 515 
__ 1_.' p. . 
48cf., e.g., John Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), pp. 12-13, 65-
66; Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The 
Federalist (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), papers 6, 10 
and 51, pp. 27-33, 53-62, 335-41. 
49Tocqueville's fears regarding the effects of 
equality of conditions are well known. See Democracy in 
America (New York: Anchor, 1969), pp. 9-20, 53-57, 189-
95, 231-45, 254-61. Less well known are the fears of Adam 
Smith: "[The workman in industry] generally becomes as 
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature 
to become .... [T]he nobler parts of the human character may 
be, in great measure, obliterated and extinguished in the 
great body of the people." Quoted in Robert L. 
Heilbronner, Marxism: For and Against (New York: Norton, 
1980), pp. 130-31. 
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ideological con-sciousness varies widely among the set of 
movements in question, and Voegelin's work is poorer for 
the lack of distinctions which could do justice to the 
extent of this variation. 
With regard to the last of our concluding issues, 
which involves the question of whether Voegelin was 
successful in demonstrating continuities at the level of 
consciousness between modern and pre-modern forms of 
spiritual disorientation, we must first note that his 
thesis could never be "established" to the satisfaction of 
one who was unwilling to accept his basic theory of 
experience and symbolization--and not without difficulty 
even for those who find the theory valuable. 50 In the 
last analysis, the confirmation of Voegelin's basic thesis 
on the historical continuity of pneumapathological 
consciousness depends upon the possibility of establishing 
the existence of a common layer of experience beneath the 
various symbolisms developed throughout history for the 
expression of "existence-in-revolt." This type of 
interpretation is rather more susceptible to controversy 
50For the most helpful presentations of the theory 
see Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol" (1967) 
and "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in 
History" (1970). Two outstanding secondary analyses can 
be found in Russell Nieli, "From Myth to Philosophy: Eric 
Voegelin's Theory of Experience and Symbolization," Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Princeton University,· 1979, and Eugene Webb, 
Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1981), pp. 52-151. 
218 
than the less daunting tasks of placing a text in 
historical context or arguing for a certain relationship 
among its parts, but inasmuch as all interpretation 
ultimately involves the attempt to understand the 
intentions of the author, Voegel in' s interpretive method 
is not all that unusual. Nevertheless, it is the nature 
of the case that exception can be taken with any 
interpretation, and when one undertakes to establish an 
essential unity among as varied a set of texts across as 
vast a span of time as did Voegelin, strenuous objections 
are sure to be invited. 
Although it would take us too far afield to make 
the point by way of exhaustive comparisons, I would 
venture to say that Voegelin' s was the most daring and 
broadly-based of the many attempts in this century to 
analyze the nature of the so-called Age of Ideology. If 
one compares Voegelin's analysis to the already ambitious 
attempts of scholars like J. L. Talmon and Norman Cohn to 
trace the lineage of ideological movements beyond this Age 
(into romanticism and medieval millenarianism, 
respectively), Voegelin's effort to extend the connections 
to the ancient world and the human condition itself must 
be seen as an extraordinary undertaking. It would be 
unfair to expect such an effort to issue in rigorous 
"demonstrations," which cannot really be expected even 
from much less grandiose forms of historical and 
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philosophical analysis. This does not mean, however, that 
we can do no better than to admire Voegelin's boldness and 
leave others to assess the results of his work. 
We can first ask whether Voegelin was able to 
substantiate the assertion from the first volume of order 
and History that "the continuum of metastatic movements 
has never been broken. 1151 In retrospect we can say that 
voegelin was unable to establish any such continuum at the 
level of "movements," but that he was able to provide very 
good reason for believing that ideological consciousness 
is intimately related to a broader pattern of 
disorientation which can be observed on the individual 
level well before the modern period. The problems at the 
first level have less to do with dissimilarities among the 
movements that Voegelin investigated than with two other 
factors: first, the paucity of historical materials (and 
the thinness or absence of analyses by Voegelin) for many 
eras and particular movements, and second, the 
difficulties associated with using the concept of personal 
spiritual revolt as an explanation of popular movements. 
There is one important problem of dissimilarity 
among the movements, namely, that which distinguishes 
5lvoegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 454. It 
will be recalled that Voegelin seems to have been using 
the term, "metastatic faith" at this time in much the same 
generic sense in which he often spoke of gnosticism. See 
p. 58 supra. 
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those movements which sought a transformation of existence 
through transcendent forces from ones which conceived of 
the transformation as a purely human accomplishment. 
Although this distinction was blurred in Voegelin's 
generic usage of the term "gnosticism," that usage was 
still valid insofar as he was able to show that both types 
of movements originate from an inability to endure the 
tensions of existence in the metaxy. Since the problem of 
a blurring can largely be overcome through simple changes 
in terminology, and since the concept of 
pneumapathological consciousness can alleviate much of the 
confusion between historical Gnosticism and psychic 
"gnosticism," it would seem that more imposing 
difficulties for the "continuum of movements" thesis are 
presented by the other two factors. 
As was maintained in the conclusion to the 
preceding chapter, Voegelin' s argument for an essential 
continuity between modern and pre-modern forms of 
spiritual revolt cannot be "confirmed" in any very solid 
way because of a lack of more extended treatments of the 
Hebrew prophets, the historical Gnostics, the Hermeticists 
and Alchemists, and the many millennial ist sects of the 
Middle Ages. Although it was also mentioned that Voegelin 
has inspired a number of studies which can help to fill 
these gaps, his late work suggests that it should be 
possible to find evidence of pneumapathological 
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disorientation wherever the process of differentiating a 
divine Beyond from the immanent realm of existence was 
begun.52 This means, in effect, that a full confirmation 
of his thesis would require an analysis of historical 
materials not only from Western civilization but also from 
the Orient and from primitive civilizations throughout the 
world. In his last years Voegelin began this work through 
the investigation of ancient Chinese texts and the 
symbolisms of neo- and paleolithic civilizations in Malta, 
the Yucatan, France and England,53 but it is obvious that 
a body of evidence sufficient to "demonstrate" Voegelin's 
thesis will not be available within the foreseeable 
future--if ever. Thus it is more sensible to approach 
Voegel in' s diagnostic work as a set of hypotheses to be 
considered where they prove helpful in understanding a 
particular case rather than as a completed theory to be 
proven or disproven. 
52voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A 
Meditation" (1981), pp. 267-68: "Existential 
consciousness does not have to be noetically 
differentiated in order to suffer the trials of 
deformation. In the crisis of the Egyptian Old Empire, in 
the third millennium B.C., a rich literature of 
deformative rebellion and of resistance to deformation 
conducts the existential debate in the language of the 
cosmological myth." 
53For analysis of Chinese texts see The Ecumenic Age 
(1974), pp. 272-99, 306-13. For accounts of Voegelin's 
work on neo- and paleolithic symbolisms see Conversations 
with Eric Voegelin (1980), pp. 85-94; "Autobiographical 
Statement at Age Eighty-Two" (1984), pp. 122-31. 
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In general, these hypotheses will probably tend to 
prove more helpful in investigations of individual cases 
as opposed to movements. Since the pneumapathological 
consciousness of a spiritual rebel is no more a group 
phenomenon than is the transcendent experience of a 
mystic, there must always be a presumption against 
explaining events such as wars, revolutions, or even 
intellectual trends in the terms of Voegelin's diagnosis 
(even though the pneumapath can, like the mystic, affect 
the consciousness of others}. It is difficult to see how 
the conditions which must be met for a valid diagnosis of 
spiritual disease could ever be satisfied in an 
investigation of such events, and thus it would also be 
difficult to support Voegelin's early finding of an 
unbroken chain of "metastatic" movements.54 
This having been said, we can nevertheless propose 
the conclusion that Voegelin's diagnostic studies stand as 
a contribution of singular importance for understanding 
the nature of ideological thought. To have penetrated 
beneath the intellectual history of ideologies to the 
inner workings of the ideological mind was one of his 
greatest achievements, and, by developing an analysis of 
54Indeed, the first link in the proposed chain is 
suspect, since Voegelin's concept of metastatic faith was 
developed from an analysis of only one event involving one 
prophet, and as such does not stem from an analysis of a 
movement at all. 
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ideological consciousness which can encounter it on the 
deepest levels of human experience, Voegelin may have 
provided the first truly philosophical approach to the 
phenomenon of ideology. He has made it possible to 
account for the specifically modern aspects of ideologies 
(by identifying their undercurrent of scientistic reaction 
against the opaque symbols of a doctrinalized 
Christianity) while also accounting for their perennial 
elements of alienation, closure, chiliasm, and hubristic 
will to power. Voegelin has taken us beyond the 
conception of our era as a novel "Age of Ideology" through 
his restorative application of the classical concepts of 
morbus animi, aspernatio rationis, libido dominandi, 
hybris, pleonexia, polypragmosyne, and antidivine and 
antihuman self-assertiveness. In addition, by showing 
that ideological consciousness originates from the same 
experiences of tension which can give rise to an 
orientation toward transcendence, Voegelin was also able 
to provide a precise and sophisticated explanation of 
those similarities between ideology and religion which 
have led a generation of analysts to conceive of ideology 
as a "quasi-religious" mode of thought. 55 One of the 
55E.g., Karl Lowith, Meaning in History: The 
Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Raymond 
Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York: Norton, 
1962); Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the 
Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Time Inc., 1963); 
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principal merits of this explanation is that it permits an 
understanding of the resemblance between ideological and 
religious patterns of disorientation without implying that 
religion is itself a form of disorientation. Voegelin 
showed that a differentiated religious tradition does not 
provide a "solution" for the tensions imposed by the human 
condition but, rather, a heightened sensitivity to tension 
which may lead either to balanced consciousness or to 
millenarian escapism, closure within doctrine, and violent 
intolerance of competing doctrines; thus, he was able to 
provide a wealth of original insights into the similarity 
of ideological and religious fanaticism while 
simultaneously maintaining a clear distinction between an 
authentically religious consciousness and a fanaticism of 
either variety. 
If Voegelin did not leave us with a remedy for the 
fanaticism which can arise from pneumapathological 
consciousness, he did at least enable us to understand the 
nature and history of psychic disorder by reference to a 
parallel history of spiritual order. We have seen that 
Voegelin's work began as a response to the political 
crisis of modernity, and that he characterized philosophy 
Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism (Cleveland: 
World Publishing, 1963); Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents 
of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 3 vols., 1981), vol. III, pp. 
525-26. 
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as "an act of resistance illuminated by conceptual under-
standing. 1156 The success of such a struggle can never be 
complete or permanent, since the wellsprings of disorder 
flow from the human condition itself, but one can still 
speak of successes in a philosopher's act of resistance: 
Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but the 
light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; and help 
is not a piece of information about truth, but the 
arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and 
identify their nature. For half the battle is won 
when the soul can recognize the shape of the enemy 
and, consequently, knows that the way it must follow 
leads in the opposite direction.57 
56voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 68. 
57rbid., pp. 62-63. 
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